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Summary 
Firms operate in a complex world characterized by interdependencies among 
various factors which are difficult to anticipate and can pose a risk to a firm’s 
operations. On the one hand, prior research has identified major categories of 
supply chain risk. On the other, it has established that supply chain disruptions 
do indeed negatively affect a firm’s performance once they materialize. 
However, prior research has not explained which external uncertainties actually 
turn into what type of risk exposure. Moreover, such research has not yet 
explained under what conditions external events are extraordinarily harmful, 
and whether firms should have managed these potential risks. In order to fill in 
this lack of knowledge, this dissertation has developed a new measurement of a 
firm’s exposure to risk. To this end, it scrutinizes a firm’s 10-K reports and 
transforms the unstructured textual data into quantitative information. The 
resulting novel data set is augmented by financial and other publicly available 
secondary data. The results suggest that the industry is an important moderator 
of how external threats affect a firm’s performance. Furthermore, external 
threats always increase a firm’s exposure to risk, while internal strategies partly 
increase and partly decrease such an exposure. Finally, a firm must carefully 
analyze the type of risk to which it is exposed, because the efficiency of the 
mitigation strategy employed depends on the type of risk exposure. In sum, this 
dissertation suggests exploiting a firm’s self-disclosed textual information by 
means of linguistic computer analysis. As a result, it provides new answers to 
new research questions and hence extends the existing knowledge in the field 
of supply chain risk management. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
In an ideal business world, a firm possesses assured finances, receives a steady 
flow of supply for its operations, runs its operations without interruptions, and 
satisfies customer demand successfully which materializes as forecasted. In 
other words, a firm operates smoothly in an accommodating world. In reality, 
the external environment, however, poses challenges which are difficult to 
anticipate and can interfere with a firm’s planned operations. For example, both 
the supply and the demand side of a firm are susceptible to risk which can 
materially influence a firm’s performance. The suppliers that provide key raw 
materials and components in accordance with a firm’s specifications might go 
bankrupt or fail in other ways with the result that they can no longer deliver the 
required products. Likewise, customers who buy the final product might have 
new or changing needs with the result that they stop buying the firm’s product. 
In the same way, the further external environment beyond the supply or 
demand side can also exert a strong negative influence on a firm’s success: 
Natural disasters may damage or even destroy production facilities if a firm 
operates in areas where such risks occur; market dynamics can render a 
successful product obsolete if a new entrant develops a convincing substitute; 
direct competitors can alter their competitive activities in such a way that a 
firm’s profit margins are substantially eroded.  
While these challenges may well harm a firm’s performance, the true risk 
exposure depends on the strategies selected by the firm, the alternatives 
available, and the industrial environment in which a firm operates. Although 
firms are exposed to a theoretically unlimited number of challenges, in reality 
only a minority of these potential challenges or risks presents a serious 
problem. Most importantly, some risks may be totally irrelevant for a given 
firm. For example, a firm which operates far from the coastline can never be 
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exposed to the risk of a tsunami destroying its production facilities. Similarly, a 
monopolist can ignore the risk of a price war in the short term because there are 
effectively no competitors in the market. Yet, if a firm is confronted with a risk, 
it can actively decrease its vulnerability to such a risk. Typical risk 
management strategies that address a firm’s potential vulnerability include 
preventative and avoidance strategies. A firm can establish a relationship with a 
second-source supplier, for instance, to reduce the risk of supply interruptions 
(prevention). Alternatively, it can modify the specifications of a purchased 
product in such a way that the product represents a commodity for which 
several suppliers come into question (avoidance). Nevertheless, some 
circumstances may make it impossible for a firm to reduce its vulnerability 
completely, either because this is infeasible or economically prohibitive. This 
residual risk is subsequently denoted as risk exposure and limits the overall risk 
to one which a firm has recognized but neither prevented nor avoided. This risk 
exposure can potentially have a negative effect on a firm’s performance, should 
some event materialize. Typical risk management strategies that address the 
consequences of materialized risk include risk mitigation and risk transfer 
strategies. Considering the above example of a supply interruption, a firm can 
maintain additional safety stock in order to be able to resume production in the 
event of supplier failure (mitigation). Alternatively, it can cover financial losses 
due to a supply shortage by a production interruption insurance (transfer). 
Although these strategies lower the negative effect should some event 
materialize, they also lead to immediate cost without return should no 
damaging event occur. Finally, a firm can simply decide to do nothing about its 
exposure at all (acceptance) which is for free should no event occur but can 
result in high cost otherwise. As a result, firms face some kind of lottery: 
Should they incur some sure cost now to reduce future possible negative effects 
or should they avoid the sure cost now and accept possible higher payouts in 
the future? In order to make a sensible decision, firms must understand the 
sources of their risk exposure, the conditions under which events lead to 
extraordinarily negative consequences, and the strategies that efficiently tackle 
their risk exposure. 
Despite its importance, risk exposure has up to now been largely neglected: On 
the one hand, researchers have categorized the different types of risk that firms 
might face. To this end, different categories such as supply risk, demand risk, 
technology risk, infrastructure risk, or catastrophic risk have been specified. 
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However, these studies only explain what type of risk a firm might face in 
general terms, but do not explain specifically which uncertainties turn into what 
type of risk exposure. On the other hand, researchers have investigated the 
effect of actual materialized events in depth. If a firm announces that it has 
experienced a shortfall in supply or its operations are otherwise disturbed, its 
performance – measured in terms of several dimensions (e.g., share price, net 
income, or operating profit) – declines on average. This observation may lead 
to the conclusion that these actual materialized events do evidently pose a 
threat to a firm and should have been managed accordingly. Although the 
subsequent analysis of actual materialized events provides important evidence 
that disruptions do really matter, it cannot explain, however, whether a firm is 
potentially exposed to a given type of risk, whether this risk exposure possesses 
negative implications as far as a firm’s performance is concerned, and whether 
the mitigation of the respective risk would have been beneficial in expectancy. 
Very few studies have actually attempted to measure a firm’s potential 
exposure to risk. One notable exception is the study by Wagner and Bode 
(2008) which investigates the relationship between risk exposure and operating 
performance based on a survey among executives.  
Figure 1-1: Relationships between sources of risk, risk exposure, and 
performance outcomes as analyzed in this dissertation 
 
Note: Shaded areas indicate separate paper projects, overlap indicates common 
variables. 
 
This dissertation now focuses on a firm’s potential risk exposure and sheds 
light on the relationships between exposure to supply chain risk on the one 
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highlights the core of each essay. The first essay focuses on the risk of natural 
disasters and how this affects a firm’s performance under different conditions. 
It addresses the following research question: To what extent do industry 
attributes mitigate or exacerbate the negative effect of a natural disaster? The 
second essay focuses on supply risk in particular and evaluates the sources of 
supply risk with the result that the following research question is answered: 
What environmental uncertainties and which internal strategic choices turn into 
an exposure to risks in the supply chain? The third essay explores supply and 
demand risk, how the exposure to these risks affects a firm’s performance, and 
what a firm can do about these risks. Specifically, it provides an answer to the 
last research question: How do firms deal efficiently with an exposure to such 
supply chain risk?  
In an attempt to provide answers to these research questions, this dissertation 
has constructed – based on publicly available secondary data – new 
measurements of a firm’s exposure to supply chain risk. To this end, firms’ 
annual reports (Form 10-K) were scrutinized. Annual reports are arguably 
among the most important means of communication for firms and a crucial 
source of information for share- and other stakeholders. The main objective of a 
firm’s financial reporting is to inform investors on the amount, timing, and 
degree of uncertainty about future cash flows. By publishing information in 
their annual reports, firms legitimize their position vis-à-vis stakeholders, gain 
access to financial capital or other resources from outside the firm, and put 
themselves in an advantageous position over competitors. 10-K reports are 
composed of several elements, such as the income statement, the cash flow 
statement, the balance sheet, and qualitative descriptions of the firm’s situation. 
The great advantage of 10-K reports is their standardized structure and the set 
order of topics mandated by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Each relevant topic is dealt with in a separate chapter 
which is headed as an “Item”. Information in the 10-K report comprises both 
descriptions of the current and past financial years as well as forward-looking 
statements concerning future prospects. The information content, style, and 
language of 10-K reports have been investigated in the course of numerous 
studies in the fields of accounting and finance. In general, 10-K reports have 
been found to be adequately informative about a firm’s competitive position 
(Gao et al., 2016). In particular, firms also provide operations-related 
information in their 10-K reports. In Item 1.A of a firm’s 10-K report, the SEC 
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mandates firms to disclose those factors that “make the offering speculative or 
risky” (SEC, 2005). Among all the risk factors that firms disclose in Item 1.A 
they also report on supply chain risk factors. In Item 2 a firm must describe the 
significant properties (e.g., plants, mines, other physical properties) that it 
controls. This description comprises both self-owned and leased property and 
hence provides a detailed picture of a firm’s production network. As one of the 
first in the field of operations management, this dissertation relies on 10-K 
reports as a valuable source of information. For the analysis on a large scale, it 
employs automated text mining algorithms to elicit the desired information. 
The information from the 10-K reports is augmented by financial data (e.g., 
balance sheet, income statement) from secondary data sources describing the 
industry in which a firm operates, the strategies it pursues, and the overall 
performance it delivers.  
Contingency theory has been applied as theoretical lens to investigate the 
relationships which exist between a firm’s risk exposure, its environment, and 
its strategies. In a nutshell, contingency theory posits that firms must be 
designed to cope with the uncertainties in their environment and must change 
appropriately in order to remain effective. The more drastic and unforeseen 
such changes in the environment are, the more difficult becomes the 
identification of appropriate decisions by managers in response to these 
changes. Throughout this dissertation, a firm’s environment is characterized by 
contextual factors like competitive intensity, sales growth, demand volatility, or 
pace of technological change within the industry in which a firm operates. A 
firm’s effectiveness in coping with changes in the environment is described by 
its profitability, whereas managerial decisions are depicted by inventory levels 
and spare capacity as well as business and geographic diversification. The 
findings suggest that the analysis of risk exposure contributes to the 
understanding of a firm’s competitive position, its decisions, and ultimately its 
performance.  
Chapter 2 presents an empirical study on the moderating effect of the industrial 
environment on the negative association between the effect of a natural disaster 
on a firm’s production network and its subsequent performance. The study has 
been motivated by the observation that economies can rebound quickly from 
the destruction caused by natural disasters provided that aid is directed to the 
right recipients. Just as people differ with respect to their need for help, the 
same holds good for firms. If financial aid is directed to the right firms after a 
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disaster has damaged or destroyed their assets, firms can recover more quickly 
and the economic repercussions of the natural disaster are reduced to such an 
extent that the overall welfare losses are kept to a minimum. However, the 
question still remains which firms exactly require disaster relief aid. Applying 
the conceptual model of contingency theory, the study argues that the effect of 
a natural disaster on a firm’s performance is primarily contingent on the 
industrial environment in which a firm operates. Firms that operate in certain 
industrial environments may require aid, while others in a different 
environment do not. For this study, Item 2 was extracted from a firm’s 10-K 
report. It presents the significant physical properties controlled by a firm. Thus, 
Item 2 describes where a firm may be vulnerable to the destruction of its assets 
by natural disasters. For the identification of locations in Item 2, a named entity 
recognition (NER) tagger from computational linguistics was deployed. 
Subsequently, data on natural disasters collected by the Center for Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security at the Arizona State University were 
matched to the location information in order to identify those firms that had 
actually been hit by a natural disaster. Finally, these data were augmented by 
financials which described a firm’s industrial environment in terms of its three 
generally accepted attributes: complexity, munificence, and dynamism. A 
difference-in-difference regression model was then employed to test the 
hypothesized relationships. The empirical results suggest that the occurrence of 
a natural disaster does indeed have a negative effect on a firm’s performance. 
More importantly, this negative effect is intensified in high-complexity and 
high-munificence industries. These results support the conclusion that disaster 
relief aid should be first of all directed to firms operating in such industries in 
order to mitigate negative performance repercussions. The provision of aid is 
less important in low-complexity and low-munificence industries. This article 
has been written jointly with Christoph Bode1.  
The study in Chapter 3 empirically investigates the sources of supply risk 
exposure. It has been motivated by the observation that the interplay between 
the industrial environment in which a firm operates and the strategic decisions 
which it actively makes strongly influence a firm’s performance. Primarily 
conceptual models postulate that risk is in reality a function of how a strategy is 
likely to perform in an unexpected scenario (Porter, 1985) or a function of the 
                                                          
1 Westerburg, M. and Bode, C., 2018. Relief or burden? The role of the economic environment after 
a natural disaster. Unpublished Working Paper, 1-32. 
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interaction of strategy and industry (Baird and Thomas, 1985). Although supply 
chain risk exposure in particular is a highly critical factor, it has not yet 
received sufficient attention. Moreover, time may exhibit other effects those 
those of differences between firms. On the basis of the literature dealing with 
strategic management and organizational theory, the main factors from the 
industrial environment affecting a firm and the strategic decisions made by the 
firm are delineated and their effect on the supply risk exposure is hypothesized. 
This study has used the disclosure of risk factors in Item 1.A of a firm’s 10-K 
report for the measurement of a firm’s risk exposure. A risk is defined as a 
possible loss caused by future events (FASB, 1975). The risk disclosed can 
cover a wide range of topics, such as the risk from a firm’s supply or 
operations, its employee risk, refinancing risk, or regulatory risk (FASB, 1975). 
A previously developed sentence latent Dirichlet allocation (sLDA) algorithm 
was employed to identify only supply-related risk items within Item 1.A and 
quantify a firm’s exposure to such risks. The factors characterizing a firm’s 
industrial environment were technological change and complexity. A firm’s 
strategic decisions comprehended business and geographic diversification 
strategies. The empirical analysis utilizing a multi-level regression model 
explicitly distinguishes different levels present in the data set. The results 
suggest that the industrial environment increases a firm’s exposure to supply 
risk in both the short and the long term. In contrast, business diversification 
appears to be an appropriate strategy for actively managing a firm’s exposure to 
supply risk in the long term, although it does increase a firm’s exposure to 
supply risk in the short term. Also, the results provide an indication of what 
type of risk a firm can expect from operations in an industry characterized by a 
certain set of factors or the pursuit of a certain set of business strategies. This 
article has been written jointly with Christoph Bode2. 
Chapter 4 deals in more detail with risk mitigation strategies to tackle risk 
exposure. This study has been motivated by the observation that firms are under 
severe pressure to simultaneously lower their operating costs and their risk 
exposure. If a firm accepts too much risk, then disruptions and consequential 
                                                          
2 Westerburg, M. and Bode, C., 2018. Sources of supply risk: Environment or strategic choice?. 
Unpublished Working Paper, 1-42.; an earlier version was nominated for the Chan Hahn Best 
Paper Award of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Division of the Academy of 
Management at the Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL in 2018; abbreviated paper published as: 
Westerburg, M. and Bode, C., 2018. Sources of supply chain risk: External environmental factors 
or strategic choice?. In Guclu Atinc (Ed.), Proceedings of the Seventy-eighth Annual Meeting of the 
Academy of Management. 
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operational losses are almost certain. By contrast, if a firm invests too much in 
risk management, its operations become inefficient and profit margins decline. 
Only a few guidelines exist which indicate what risk management strategies 
firms should employ against a given type of risk. Against the backdrop of 
information processing theory, the study posited that firms could introduce 
operational slack to meet outside uncertainties. However a contingency 
perspective suggests that the type of operational slack must be matched to the 
type of uncertainty in order to be efficient (i.e., minimum negative impact on 
performance). This study also derived its risk exposure from Item 1.A of the 
10-K reports. In this study, the sLDA algorithm was employed to identify and 
quantify two types of risk, demand and supply. The types of operational slack 
investigated were inventory and capacity. Utilizing a fixed effects regression 
model, this study first demonstrates a negative relationship between the two 
types of risk exposure and firm performance. Second, the effect of operational 
slack was investigated. In line with arguments from contingency theory, 
operational slack effectively mitigates the association between supply risk 
exposure and performance, but exacerbates the effect of demand risk on firm 
performance. Third, the joint effect of both types of operational slack on the 
link between risk exposure and performance is greater than the sum of their 
parts. By the “right” combination of the two types of operational slack, a firm 
can further decrease the negative performance implications of risk while not 
incurring additional costs. This article has been written jointly with Christoph 
Bode3. 
 
                                                          
3 Westerburg, M. and Bode, C., 2018. Supply chain risk and risk mitigation: Which strategies tackle 
identified risks most efficiently?. Working Paper, 1-40. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215155.; an earlier version received the ISM Best Paper Award in 
Supply Chain Management of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Division of the 
Academy of Management at the Annual Meeting in Atlanta, GA in 2017; abbreviated paper 
published as: Westerburg, M. and Bode, C., 2017. Supply chain risk and risk mitigation: Which 
strategies tackle identified risks most efficiently?. In Guclu Atinc (Ed.), Proceedings of the 
Seventy-seventh Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. 
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2 Relief or Burden? The Role of the 
Economic Environment after a 
Natural Disaster 
Co-author: 
Christoph Bode 
Endowed Chair of Procurement, Business School, University of Mannheim, 
Germany 
 
Abstract: 
Natural disasters can have severe negative effects on people, businesses, and 
the environment. However, empirical evidence suggests that some countries are 
less affected by a disaster compared to others, which has been attributed to 
various country-specific characteristics. The present paper investigates whether 
this phenomenon also exists at the firm level and how certain characteristics of 
the industrial environment, specifically the three attributes of complexity, 
munificence, and dynamism, influence the relationship between disaster 
occurrence and firm performance. The locations of firms’ production networks 
were identified in annual reports using a named entity recognition tagger from 
computational linguistics and linked with disaster occurrences. Based on these 
data, a negative association between natural disaster occurrence and firm 
performance could be established employing a difference-in-difference 
regression estimation. Furthermore, this observed negative relationship was 
found to be exacerbated by industry complexity and munificence.   
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2.1 Introduction 
Natural disasters pose a serious threat to people, businesses, and the 
environment alike. They are among the top risks worldwide in terms of impact 
and likelihood of occurrence (WEF, 2018). For 2017, total losses of US-$ 
340bn were recorded, exceeding the record losses of US-$ 163bn in 2005 with 
hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma (MunichRe, 2018). Additionally, the 
number of weather-related disasters causing billion-dollar damages has been on 
a constant rise since 1985 (NOAA, 2018). For firms, the negative effects of 
natural disasters are twofold. On the one hand, natural disasters can directly 
destroy a firm’s productive assets (Belasen and Polachek, 2009, Strobl, 2011). 
On the other hand, natural disasters are a major cause of business interruptions 
(Allianz, 2018) with negative indirect repercussions, such as a delay of product 
introductions (Reuters, 2011) or a decline in firm performance (Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2005a).  
Yet, under certain conditions, natural disasters have a less severe negative 
effect on economies. If the economic development level of a country is high, if 
its institutional quality is high, or if societal resilience measures are in place, 
the negative effect of a disaster on a country’s welfare is lower (e.g., Cuaresma 
et al., 2008, Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014, Kahn, 2005, Noy, 2009). 
Furthermore, the long-term negative economic loss from natural disasters can 
be decreased if assets and profitability are restored quickly after the disaster 
occurred (Leiter et al., 2009, Okuyama, 2003). Similar moderation mechanisms 
might also exist at the firm level. Under certain conditions, the effect of a 
natural disaster on a firm’s performance might be stronger or weaker. It is 
important to identify such conditions because they hint at firms that require 
urgent aid. The more quickly the most severely affected firms of a country’s 
economy are identified and receive aid, the less negative the country’s 
economic outlook becomes due to the natural disaster. As a result, firms stay in 
business and provide jobs; thus, people are less likely to move away after the 
disaster (Belasen and Polachek, 2009). An important level of analysis is the 
industry (Ketokivi, 2006). According to extant literature, industries can be 
characterized by three attributes: (a) munificence, (b) dynamism, and (c) 
complexity (Dess and Beard, 1984, Keats and Hitt, 1988). Our research 
questions address these three industry attributes. Specifically, we asked, (1) Do 
natural disasters have a negative influence on firm performance? and (2) To 
what extent do the industry attributes – (a) munificence, (b) dynamism, and (c) 
Relief or Burden? The Role of the Economic Environment after a Natural Disaster 
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complexity – exacerbate (mitigate) the negative association? The answers to 
these research questions respond to calls for further research on the relationship 
between natural disasters and their effect on firms (Cavallo and Noy, 2011, 
Zhou and Botzen, 2017). 
To address these research questions empirically, we collected and analyzed a 
unique set of data. First, a firm’s production network was identified in its 10-K 
report using a named entity recognition (NER) tagger from computational 
linguistics. Second, places where natural disasters occurred were linked to the 
firm’s production locations. Third, financial information of firms was merged 
with the production and disaster location data. This novel data set allowed us to 
clearly link disaster occurrences to production plants and firms. After 
establishing a negative direct effect of natural disasters on firm performance, 
we explored different industry attributes that moderated the negative 
relationship between natural disasters and firm performance. 
This study contributes to the extant research in several important ways. To 
begin with, we contribute to the literature by showing that the negative effect of 
natural disasters on performance is highly dependent on the industry context. If 
firms face severe competition or operate in munificent industries, they face 
more severe losses compared to firms operating in less competitive or 
munificent industries. Thus, the provision of disaster relief aid to these firms 
would directly alleviate their performance losses and would efficiently mitigate 
the negative performance effect of a disaster on a country’s economy. 
Furthermore, the focus on the United States (US) as geographical area and the 
empirical estimation strategy of a difference-in-difference approach preclude 
alternative explanations of the identified effect and establish a strong empirical 
foundation. Finally, this study applies computational linguistics to establish a 
convincing link between the location of plants and the location of disaster 
occurrences. Recent studies have used primarily the location of a firm’s 
headquarters (e.g., Dessaint and Matray, 2017) or the location of patent filings 
(Ryu et al., 2018). 
This essay is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we present the background 
on natural disasters and the effect of industry attributes in the empirical 
operations management literature. Subsequently (section 2.3), hypotheses are 
developed for the direct effect of natural disaster occurrence and performance 
as well as the moderating effect of the industry. Next, the construction of the 
data set is explained, followed by the presentation of the analysis and the 
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results (section 2.4). Finally, the results are discussed in section 2.5 before the 
conclusion (section 2.6).  
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Effect of natural disasters 
Risk can be conceptualized either as fluctuations around an expected value 
(Arrow, 1965) or as a purely negative deviation from an expected outcome 
(Mao, 1970). Although both are found in the literature, the latter more 
accurately reflects managerial perceptions (March and Shapira, 1987) and is 
hence predominantly found in management in general (e.g., Miller and 
Leiblein, 1996). Among the most prominent and most severe causes of an 
unexpected negative deviation are natural disasters. For the purpose of this 
study, a natural disaster is a “natural event that causes a perturbation to the 
functioning of the economic system, with a significant negative impact on 
assets, production factors, output, employment, or consumption” (Hallegatte 
and Przyluski, 2010, p. 2). Examples of natural events are earthquakes, storms, 
and hurricanes as well as intense rainfall, heat waves, and cold spells. A 
country’s economy can suffer from natural disasters directly and indirectly 
(Kousky, 2014). As direct effect, natural disasters destroy the factors of 
production, labor, and physical capital. As indirect effect, they provoke but do 
not directly cause losses. Such losses include the cost of business interruptions 
due to destroyed public infrastructure or private assets (Hallegatte and 
Przyluski, 2010). The consequences of natural disasters have been studied 
extensively at the level of a country’s economy. Although the empirical 
evidence of a negative association between the occurrence of natural disasters 
and economic growth is still inconclusive (Cavallo et al., 2013, Strobl, 2011), it 
dominates empirical research (e.g., Cavallo and Noy, 2011, Lazzaroni and van 
Bergeijk, 2014). The main reason for this observed negative association is that 
natural disasters destroy physical assets required for the production of goods 
and services, shifting an economy’s production possibility frontier inwards 
(Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014). If the destroyed assets are not replaced, the 
level of production is permanently lowered (Leiter et al., 2009), particularly if 
the natural disasters evoke major political changes or turmoil (Cavallo et al., 
2013). Furthermore, the effect of a natural disaster is strongly associated with 
its severity (Kousky, 2014). Comparing the growth rates of different countries 
and using geophysical and meteorological data, the worst 1 % of disasters 
decrease the growth-rate of the gross domestic product by 6.8 % while a 
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disaster in the lowest quartile still decreases the growth-rate of the gross 
domestic product by 0.01 % (Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014). Other US-centric 
studies revealed similar results. Counties hit by a natural disaster were found to 
experience a decline in the growth-rate of the gross domestic product by 0.45 
percentage points compared to an average growth-rate of the gross domestic 
product of 1.68 % in counties that were not hit by a disaster (Strobl, 2011). 
Such negative effects also propagate to other states through linkages of firms 
(Bernile et al., 2017b). Besides economic losses, natural disasters cause societal 
disruptions, as people tend to leave areas affected by a natural disaster (Belasen 
and Polachek, 2009). Various factors moderate the intensity of the negative 
effects of natural disasters on a country’s economic performance (Kousky, 
2014), including the country’s current development level (Cuaresma et al., 
2008, Kahn, 2005), overall government effectiveness (Lazzaroni and van 
Bergeijk, 2014), institutional quality, openness to trade, and financial openness 
(Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014), and societal resilience that comprises 
measures such as early warning systems, evacuation plans, building codes, or 
other preventive actions (Kahn, 2005, Noy, 2009, Zhou and Botzen, 2017). In 
addition, several studies have focused on major single events to illustrate their 
negative effect on the growth rate of the gross domestic product: the Kobe 
earthquake in 1995 (Chang, 2010, Horwich, 2000), hurricane Katrina in 2005 
(Cashell and Labonte, 2005, Vigdor, 2008), the Great East Japan Earthquake in 
2009 (Carvalho et al., 2016) or the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 (Cavallo et al., 
2010). Such single, although major, events were found to be negatively 
associated with a country’s overall economic performance. 
As natural disasters in general and single events in particular have negative 
economic repercussions, researchers have started to investigate their effect on 
smaller units within an economy, such as firms. Studies of major single natural 
disasters have indeed shown that in the short term, natural disasters harmed 
firms that operated in the affected areas. A major event, like Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, destroyed important assets, threatening the firm’s existence (Runyan, 
2006). After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, operational performance 
and stock returns of the affected firms declined (Hendricks et al., 2017, Todo et 
al., 2015). Moreover, the effect of this earthquake also propagated through the 
value chain (Carvalho et al., 2016). While these major single events have 
demonstrated the potential negative effects of natural disasters, they are luckily 
relatively rare. Thus, an understanding of the effect of a broader range of events 
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is necessary. In particular, four studies have investigated the effect of natural 
disasters on firm level data. First, firms that operated in European NUTS-II 
regions hit by a flooding in 2000 experienced a decline in productivity but 
growth in employment and total assets (Leiter et al., 2009). Second, the effect 
of a disaster on a firm’s performance depends on its position in the value chain 
(Altay and Ramirez, 2010). As measurement, Altay and Ramirez (2010) used 
the product of a binary variable (assigning the value of 1 if a firm’s 
headquarters were located in a country that had been hit by a natural disaster 
and 0 otherwise) and a composite variable measuring the effect of the disaster. 
They further classified each firm into one out of four different industry 
categories. They found that the strength of the effect of a natural disaster on 
cash flow, leverage, and asset turnover depended on the industry in which the 
firm operated without further characterizing the industry. Third, the effect of 
major natural disasters propagates through the value chain (Barrot and 
Sauvagnat, 2016). Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) constructed buyer-supplier 
dyads, showing that a buyer’s growth of sales and cost of goods sold declined if 
a firm had at least one supplier with headquarters located in a state hit by a 
natural disaster. This effect was stronger if the supplier provided specific inputs 
(Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016). Fourth, firms with headquarters located in 
proximity to regions hit by a hurricane increase their cash holdings and report 
more frequently about hurricane related risk in their annual report (Dessaint and 
Matray, 2017). In their study, Dessaint and Matray (2017) connected disaster 
data with the location of firms’ headquarters. Utilizing a difference-in-
difference regression estimation, they compared the cash holding of firms that 
were located in the immediate vicinity to a disaster occurrence with those of 
firms located further away from the disaster occurrence. They found that firms 
close to disasters had higher cash holdings and reported on natural disasters in 
their annual reports more frequently. In line with prospect theory, they 
concluded that the firms’ managers were more strongly influenced by risks that 
were more salient to them.  
Common to all these studies is that they usually rely on the location of a firm’s 
headquarters to identify a firm hit by a natural disaster. However, a firm can 
operate a dispersed production network of plants independent from its 
headquarters’ location, as the example in Figure 2-1 illustrates. An empirical 
investigation of the effect of natural disasters on firm performance based on 
plant locations would be more accurate and more relevant for operations 
Relief or Burden? The Role of the Economic Environment after a Natural Disaster 
15 
management. Furthermore, these studies do not investigate whether this effect 
is stronger for certain groups of firms compared to others. Country 
characteristics have been found to moderate the relationship between disaster 
occurrence and a country’s economic performance. Similarly, certain attributes 
of an industry might moderate the relationship between disaster occurrence and 
a firm’s performance.  
Figure 2-1: Production network of Apogee Enterprises, Inc. (CIK: 6845) as 
reported in its annual report for the fiscal year ended March 2, 2013 
 
Note: Shaded states indicate a production location, no production locations in Alaska or 
Hawaii. 
 
2.2.2 Industrial environment 
Firms operate in industries that they cannot easily influence (Bourgeois, 1980) 
but which play an important role as a moderator of the relationship between 
organizational strategies and performance outcomes (Keats and Hitt, 1988, 
Ketokivi, 2006). Three general attributes characterize the industrial 
environment (Dess and Beard, 1984). First, complexity is a function of the 
number, diversity, and distribution of external factors and parties with which a 
firm must interact (Dess and Beard, 1984, Heeley et al., 2006). Industry 
complexity is characterized by many firms with equal market shares (Palmer 
and Wiseman, 1999). Second, munificence is reflected in the degree to which 
resources support sustained growth for all the firms of a specific industry (Dess 
and Beard, 1984). A munificent industry provides sufficient growth 
opportunities for all firms and is characterized by a constant growth in terms of 
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overall industry sales (Heeley et al., 2006). Third, dynamism pertains to the 
degree of instability or the turbulent nature of the industry in which a firm 
competes. This instability is especially characterized by random occurrences of 
changes and new developments (Dess and Beard, 1984, Heeley et al., 2006). 
Although munificence and dynamism scores are drawn from the same data, 
they focus on unique aspects of the industry (Heeley et al., 2006). Munificence 
focuses on an industry’s sales trend, whereas dynamism explains the fluctuation 
in sales over time.  
In operations management, numerous empirical studies have documented the 
moderating effect of the industry on the relationship between operational 
decisions and performance. Using primary data, many researchers have 
highlighted that the fit between operational strategies and the environment is 
crucial for firm performance (e.g., Jambulingam et al., 2005, Ketokivi, 2006, 
Patel, 2011). Various empirical studies have demonstrated the moderating 
effect of industry attributes on the relationship between operational strategies 
and financial performance outcomes. Previous studies have investigated 
operational strategies, such as operating flexibility (Anand and Ward, 2004), 
top-level communication and strategy making (Demeester et al., 2014), service 
innovation (Prajogo and Oke, 2016), and the success of exploratory innovation 
(Jansen et al., 2006). Industry attributes also moderate the relationship between 
operational strategies and operational performance (like quality, delivery, 
speed). Examples for operational strategies that were investigated pertain to 
lean practices (Chavez et al., 2013) and e-collaboration (Rosenzweig, 2009). 
Finally, these industry variables have been found to influence not only the 
strength of the effect, but also its functional form, specifically, the link between 
team autonomy and new product development performance (speed, cost, 
success) becomes inversely U-shaped in turbulent industries while it is U-
shaped in constant industries (Chen et al., 2015). 
Other studies have relied on secondary data to measure the industry attributes 
of complexity, munificence, and dynamism. These moderate at least partly the 
relationship between financial performance as dependent variable and 
operational strategies, such as lean operations and lean purchasing (Azadegan 
et al., 2013b), product quality and product cost (Terjesen et al., 2011), or 
operational slack (Eroglu and Hofer, 2014) as the independent variable. 
Industry attributes also moderate the link between operational slack as 
independent variable and other performance indicators like product safety 
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(Wiengarten et al., 2017) or the likelihood of venture survival (Azadegan et al., 
2013a) as dependent variable. Furthermore, the industry attributes moderate the 
link between operational strategies, like realized absorptive capacity and stock 
market performance (Setia and Patel, 2013). 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The literature review has revealed that natural disasters negatively affect the 
production network operated by a firm and consequently firm performance. 
Industry attributes might moderate this negative association. Such a moderation 
would hint at boundary conditions to the negative effect of natural disasters. In 
the following subsections, the direct effect of natural disasters on firm 
performance is elucidated first (2.3.1). Subsequently, the extent to which the 
three industry attributes, (a) complexity, (b) munificence, and (c) dynamism, 
influence the association between natural disaster occurrence and firm 
performance is posited (2.3.2). 
2.3.1 Direct effect of natural disasters 
Natural disasters have a severe negative effect on the performance of firms that 
operate plants in regions hit by these disasters. First, a firm’s assets (e.g., 
property, buildings, machinery, raw material, unfinished and finished goods, 
and other supplies) might be damaged or destroyed. Depending on the damage, 
the firm must depreciate the assets’ book values. Similarly, a firm may have to 
replace fully depreciated assets with the result that these have to be written off 
again and a firm incurs depreciation cost. Higher depreciation costs directly 
affect a firm’s bottom line, its net income. Indeed, after hurricane Katrina, 
small businesses reported the largest losses in terms of inventory and 
equipment (Runyan, 2006). Second, prior studies have shown a negative 
relationship between the unpredictability and instability of demand and firm 
performance (e.g., Kovach et al., 2015, Patel et al., 2012). On the one hand, the 
precise occurrence of natural disasters in terms of time and place is 
unpredictable. On the other hand, natural disasters cause instability along the 
supply chain (e.g., Allianz, 2017, Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005, Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004). As natural disasters are both unpredictable and cause 
instability, they are likely to lead to a decline in performance. In sum, the 
replacement of assets in a firm’s production network as well as the 
unpredictability of the disaster itself and the instability it causes decrease a 
firm’s performance. 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms whose production network is affected by a natural 
disaster face a decline in return on assets compared to the 
previous quarter. 
2.3.2 Moderating effects: Complexity, munificence, and dynamism 
Complex industries are characterized by many firms with equally sized market 
shares (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). Complexity has two major implications 
that affect the disaster-performance relationship. First, high complexity of an 
industry creates causal ambiguity for managers, which impedes their precise 
understanding of the effectiveness of a chosen strategy (King, 2007, Kunc and 
Morecroft, 2010, Teece et al., 1997). Firms’ managers must identify various 
influencing factors and the interplay among them in a complex industry. They 
must also estimate the consequences for their firm’s operations and product 
offerings and draw conclusions from their analysis for their firm’s strategy. 
Given managers’ bounded rationality, they focus primarily on the response to 
immediate competitive pressures in their markets and may overlook more 
distant external threats (Kocabasoglu et al., 2007). Thus, they are likely to be 
surprised and caught off guard by natural disasters if their firms operate in 
complex industries. Second, high industry complexity implies the presence of 
many competing firms that offer similar products. However, these competing 
firms have different “operating footprints”. If a disaster hits a specific region, 
the production location of some firms within an industry will be destroyed; 
thus, their production will be disrupted. However, other firms will operate in 
distant states not affected by the disaster and will continue to produce. Due to 
the high number of competing firms with similar product offering, customers 
can switch from the disrupted to other available producers. Additionally, 
competitors will attempt to exploit the weakness of the disrupted firm and 
actively target its customers (Sirmon et al., 2010). Consequently, firms not 
affected by the disaster can enlarge their sales at the expense of firms with 
disrupted production (Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010). In sum, surprise and 
seizure of market share by competitors will exacerbate the negative relationship 
between the effect of a natural disaster on a firm’s production network and its 
performance if a firm operates in a complex industry. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms whose production network is affected by a natural 
disaster face a stronger decline in performance if they 
operate in a complex industry than if they operate in a less 
complex industry. 
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An industry’s munificence indicates that sales are growing for all firms, like a 
rising tide that lifts all boats (Pagell and Krause, 2004). In such an industry, 
speed and efficiency matter in strategy execution (Demeester et al., 2014). 
Additionally, managers focus more on the opportunities than on the threats of a 
decision (Wiengarten et al., 2017). Hence, they are willing to consider 
potentially risky investments to take advantage of the growth opportunities 
while neglecting low-probability events, like natural disasters. As a result, firms 
in munificent industries are more likely to operate a production network that is 
exposed to hits from a natural disaster. Second, such industries call for the rapid 
accumulation of operations resources and capabilities to seize the largest share 
of the market growth (Demeester et al., 2014). Thus, in anticipation of strong 
market growth, such firms have typically invested more resources into 
property, plant, and equipment or inventory compared to firms that did not 
anticipate such strong growth. If a disaster hits the production locations of a 
firm that anticipated strong growth, the resulting damage is larger compared to 
the damage to a firm that anticipated only slow growth. Third, to keep its 
market share constant in a munificent industry, a firm’s sales and the industry’s 
growth must expand at the same rate. Being hit by a disaster, however, 
obstructs important internal resources. Human resources attempt to keep the 
business operational and cannot focus on the firm’s strategic development; 
capital assets are destroyed and not available for production anymore; financial 
resources are required for the disaster response and not available for the 
expansion of the business. As a result, a firm hit by a disaster cannot execute its 
strategic business plans in line with the market development and consequently 
loses market share. In sum, firms’ managers are less aware of the probability of 
a natural disaster and crucial resources are obstructed, thus, the negative 
relationship between the effect of a natural disaster on a firm’s production 
network and its performance becomes exacerbated for firms operating in 
munificent industries.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms whose production network is affected by a natural 
disaster face a stronger decline in performance if they 
operate in a munificent industry than if they operate in a 
less munificent industry. 
In a dynamic industry, change occurs at a faster pace and with greater 
magnitude (Rosenzweig, 2009). First, firms that operate in dynamic industries 
typically implement adaptable production approaches to react flexibly to 
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unforeseen changes (Anand and Ward, 2004). In the aftermath of a disaster, 
such firms can capitalize on their flexible production systems and can easily 
switch parts of their production to non-disrupted plants in their production 
network. As a result, these firms are less vulnerable and they can resume 
production more quickly. Second, dynamic industries require firms to include 
contingency schemes in their supply contracts, ensuring that agreed upon 
procedures are in place to handle design or volume changes (Kaufmann and 
Carter, 2006). In addition, these industries require firms to build close and 
stable supply chain partnerships with suppliers and customers (Kocabasoglu et 
al., 2007). The aforementioned two aspects, flexible contracts and close 
relationships with suppliers and customers render a firm’s operations more 
flexible. Third, firms that operate in a dynamic, fast-changing industry have 
developed capabilities to quickly respond to change, adapt the organization, 
and learn from the new situation. Since a natural disaster affects the supply 
situation, production, and demand pattern, such capabilities are also beneficial: 
A firm that is accustomed to unforeseen change is more capable of dealing with 
it. In short, in dynamic industries, firms apply more flexible production and 
sourcing approaches and are more used to sudden changes. Thus, these firms 
can better accommodate the effect of changes following a natural disaster on 
their production network.  
Hypothesis 4: Firms whose production network is affected by a natural 
disaster face a weaker decline in performance if they 
operate in a dynamic industry than if they operate in a less 
dynamic industry. 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Construction of the data set 
The data necessary for analyzing the hypothesized negative association 
between natural disasters and firm performance and the moderation of industry 
were compiled from three databases. Production location data were extracted 
from a firm’s annual reports filed in the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Data on natural disasters were 
downloaded from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the 
United States (SHELDUS) database. Financials were derived from the archival 
database in Compustat (Capital IQ North America Fundamentals Quarterly). 
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Annual reports are arguably the most important communication channel for the 
presentation of business performance and firm development (Gao et al., 2016). 
Disclosures therein affect shareholder behavior (e.g., Staw et al., 1983). As 
annual reports are widely accepted to be accurate, relevant, and representative, 
their semantics have been used to extend industry classifications (Hoberg and 
Phillips, 2016) or to detect competitive forces (Hoberg et al., 2014). According 
to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the US (US-GAAP), a firm’s 
major property is described in Item 2 of its annual report (Form 10-K) (17 CFR 
229.102). The section states the location of the significant physical properties 
(fixed assets, property, plant, and equipment) of a firm. Intellectual property 
and intangible assets are not described in this section (SEC, 2018).  
The location information in Item 2 was extracted from the annual reports in a 
multi-step procedure. First, Item 2 itself was separated from the entire report. 
The start and end of Item 2 were identified by a combination of text and visual 
features. In the 10-K report, its start is marked by the header that contains the 
terms “Item 2” or “Properties” while its end is marked by the header of the 
subsequent section that contains the terms “Item 3”, “Legal Proceedings”, 
“Item 4” or “Mine safety regulations”. When such a term was found, its font-
style was checked (whether it was printed in bold letters) to determine whether 
the found term indeed was a header. If two headers were identified as start and 
end, the text in between them was extracted. Second, html-code had to be 
deleted and the text cleansed. As firms are only required to present the 
information in a structured format, they employ different structuring elements 
in html, such as lists, tables, or just paragraphs. Tables were identified by their 
html-tags and the entire text of a single table cell was extracted. After the 
extraction of the text from all cells of all the tables, the remaining text of the 
section was extracted. This text was then further cleansed (e.g., deletion of 
digits, replacement of multiple white spaces, substitution of defined 
abbreviations by full names, replacement of capitalized words). Third, the 
location information was separated using a NER tagger. A named entity is a 
“real-world object” to which a name is assigned (e.g., person for Martin Luther 
King, country for United Kingdom or product for Galaxy Note). The detection 
of a named entity in text is not trivial, because named entities can comprise 
several words (e.g., West Virginia). Additionally, the assignment of the type of 
named entity can be ambiguous because different objects can be assigned to the 
same word (e.g., the types of product, person, or company can be assigned to 
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the word Ford). Therefore, each tag is predicted based on a statistical model. 
Due to the complexity and the potential ambiguity, spaCy’s trained and well-
calibrated NER tagger was used to identify the major geographic entities 
(countries, states, counties, cities) in the text extracted from the annual reports 
(Choi et al., 2015, Honnibal and Johnson, 2015, Honnibal and Montani, 2017). 
The text other than the geographic entities was discarded. Fourth, additional 
geographic information was aggregated and standardized to a common notation 
for US-states. Most importantly, all US counties that could be uniquely 
matched to a US-state were manually replaced by the respective state. As the 
same town and city names were found in various states (e.g., Portland in 
Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Texas, and other states), they did not 
provide additional information and were not included in the further analysis. 
Based on this aggregation, a location vector was created that contained a binary 
variable for each of the 50 US-states and the District of Columbia. The binary 
variable associated with a state was set to 1 if a firm operated at least one major 
location in the respective state and 0 otherwise. For the sake of reliability, 
frequencies were neglected. The reason for this was twofold. On the one hand, 
some firms mentioned the same location several times because different 
business segments produced at the same plant. On the other hand, other firms 
used a hierarchical structure and only mentioned the state once, although they 
operated several plants in several cities of the respective state.  
SHELDUS collects disaster incidents that occur across the US. These include 
thunderstorms, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and tornados as well as flash 
floods or heavy rainfall. For each county and month, the database contains 
direct losses caused by the disaster (property and crop losses as well as injuries 
and fatalities). Data from SHELDUS have been used to detect the propagation 
of natural disasters through the supply chain or to investigate the extent to 
which early-life disasters affect a CEO’s risk attitude (e.g., Barrot and 
Sauvagnat, 2016, Bernile et al., 2017a). In the present study, relevant disasters 
were identified by their financial effect on counties because disasters were 
found to exert strong effects at county-level (Strobl, 2011). Specifically, 
counties were considered to be hit by a disaster if the disaster lasted for less 
than 30 days and all disasters in the respective quarter caused a total loss of at 
least US-$ 25mil (in 2016-US-$). Injuries or fatalities were not considered as 
indicators of a relevant disaster because the focus was on losses in 
infrastructure or property of firms. Different disaster types were not 
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distinguished because they are usually intertwined (Kousky, 2014). Hurricanes 
like Katrina or Sandy also caused severe floods in large areas. Finally, a 
disaster vector was created for each quarter that contains a binary variable for 
each of the 50 US-states and the District of Columbia. The binary variable 
associated with a state was set to 1 if at least one county of the state was hit by 
at least one natural disaster in the respective quarter that met the criteria defined 
above and 0 otherwise.  
The quarterly disaster occurrence was matched to the production locations 
based on the fiscal quarter end because most damage occurs immediately after 
the disaster (Raddatz, 2009). Thus, for each firm and quarter, a vector of 
production locations and a vector of disaster occurrences were created, both of 
the same dimensionality, with one dimension for each state. Financials for 
industries and firms were derived from Compustat and merged into this data 
set. 
2.4.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is firm 𝑖’s delta of the return on assets 𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 from 
the previous quarter 𝑞 − 1 to the current quarter 𝑞 in year 𝑡. The delta of 
returns allows to focus on the immediate effect of the disaster and avoids a 
distortion by any firm-specific differences in the returns. The return on assets 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 of firm 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 was operationalized by dividing a 
firm’s net income 𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 by its book value of assets 
𝑏𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡.  
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 =
𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
𝑏𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
−
𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡,𝑞−1
𝑏𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞−1
 
Negative values indicate a decline in performance compared to the previous 
quarter, positive values indicate performance growth. 
To derive the measure of disaster occurrence 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 by which firm 𝑖 is hit in 
quarter 𝑞 in year 𝑡, first the transposed vector of production locations 𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
𝑇  of 
firm 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 was multiplied with the vector of disaster 
occurrences 𝐷𝐿𝑡,𝑞 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡. If a firm only maintained production 
locations in states not hit by a natural disaster or if disasters happened in states 
in which a firm did not operate production locations, the resulting scalar was 
zero. Depending on the number of states with production locations that were hit 
by a disaster, the dot product between 𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
𝑇  and 𝐷𝐿𝑡,𝑞  was positive. Second, 
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this value was coded as 1 for any positive value of the dot product. This 
measure captures whether in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡, firm 𝑖 operates at least one 
production location in any US-state that was hit by a natural disaster in the 
same period.  
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 = {
 1  𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
𝑇 ⋅ 𝐷𝐿𝑡,𝑞 ≥ 1
 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The variables describing the industry are based on Dess and Beard (1984) and 
were operationalized similar to numerous studies across strategic and 
operations management (e.g., Azadegan et al., 2013a, George, 2005, Heeley et 
al., 2006, Keats and Hitt, 1988). In this study, an industry is described by its 
four-digit SIC code. Industry complexity 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑗,𝑡,𝑞 was approximated by the 
reverse of industry concentration, because a higher concentration corresponds 
to a lower complexity (e.g., Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). Industry 
concentration was measured by an industry’s Herfindahl index of sales that is 
defined as the sum of the squared quarterly market shares of each firm 
operating in the industry. This measure has been widely used in strategic and 
operations management to account for industry complexity (e.g., George, 
2005). 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑗,𝑡,𝑞 = 1 − ∑ (
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,𝑞
𝑠𝑗,𝑡,𝑞
)
2
𝑁𝑗,𝑡,𝑞
𝑖=1
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,𝑞  equals the quarterly sales of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 and 
𝑠𝑗,𝑡,𝑞 the sum of sales of all firms 𝑁𝑗,𝑡,𝑞 in industry 𝑗 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡. 
Industry complexity is computed as 1 minus sales concentration with higher 
values indicating higher complexity. 
For munificence and dynamism, first the sum of industry sales in industry 𝑗 in 
quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡, 𝑠𝑗,𝑡,𝑞, was computed. Second, industry sales were regressed 
on time using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on moving 20-quarter-
windows with the following equation: 𝑠𝑗,𝑡,𝑞 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑞,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑞, in 
which 𝑏0 was the common intercept, 𝑏1 the estimate of time and 𝜀𝑡,𝑞 the error 
term. The 20-period time horizon corresponds to the commonly used five-year 
time horizon used in empirical operations management studies. For the 
measurement of munificence 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑗,𝑡,𝑞 of industry 𝑗 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡, the 
estimate of time (𝑏1) was divided by the industry-average sales of the same  
20-quarter time horizon. For the measurement of dynamism 𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 in 
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industry 𝑗 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡, the standard error of the estimate of time (𝑏1) 
was divided by the industry-average sales of the same 20-quarter time horizon. 
This operationalization is common in empirical research (e.g., Azadegan et al., 
2013a).  
Several variables controlled for differing firm characteristics. To begin with, 
firm fixed effects accounted for heterogeneity among firms. Year-dummy-
variables absorbed any general trend of returns (e.g., due to economic 
downturns). Quarter-dummy variables captured any seasonality in returns. 
State-dummy-variables accounted for unobservable heterogeneity among 
locations in the states, because some states are more disaster-prone and at the 
same time more disaster-experienced. One firm can operate in several states. 
Furthermore, larger firms usually operate more production locations (i.e. are 
more likely to be hit by a disaster), but are less dependent on a single plant. The 
natural logarithm of firm sales was used to control for firm size. Finally, 
leverage has an influence on the net income for which a firm’s leverage ratio 
controlled. The leverage ratio was computed as quotient of the book value of 
debt and the sum of the book values of debt and equity. 
2.4.3 Sample 
The unit of analysis was the firm-quarter that a firm’s Global Company Key 
(GVKEY) and the quarter of its quarterly reporting date uniquely identified. 
The investigated period covered the twelve-year time horizon from 2005 until 
2016.  
Table 2-1: Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and pairwise correlations 
  M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) ΔROA 0.001 0.057 1.000       
(2) Disaster 0.236 0.425 –0.013 1.000      
(3) Complexity 0.751 0.176 0.009 –0.017 1.000     
(4) Munificence 0.045 0.077 –0.003 0.043 0.119 1.000    
(5) Dynamism 0.023 0.019 0.006 –0.002 –0.225 –0.030 1.000   
(6) Size 5.820 1.969 –0.013 0.131 0.034 –0.011 –0.005 1.000  
(7) Leverage 0.238 0.249 0.006 0.059 –0.001 –0.085 0.019 0.323 1.000 
Note: n = 48,314; Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown; all 
pairwise correlations |𝑟| > 0.01 are significant at 𝑝 < 0.05. Complexity, 
munificence, and dynamism standardized by mean and standard deviation,  
size was transformed using the natural logarithm.  
 
In order to derive meaningful and comparable results, only firms of the 
manufacturing sector (SIC codes 20 to 39) were retained. Furthermore, we 
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restricted the sample by minimum values of assets (US-$ 1mil), quarterly sales 
(US-$ 0.5mil) and quarterly returns on assets (larger than –1.5 and smaller than 
1.5). In addition, firms that operate production locations in more than 15 states 
were dropped. Moreover, we required at least two observations per firm and 
three observations per industry-quarter. The total sample comprised 48,314 
firm-year-quarters (2,254 firms). Thus, we observed on average 21.4 quarters 
per firm (min: 2; max: 48). Last but not least, all variables were winsorized at 
the 99-percentile to address outliers (Aguinis et al., 2013). Means, standard 
deviations, and pairwise correlations coefficients for all key variables are 
displayed in Table 2-1. Details of firms hit by a disaster (i.e., treatment group) 
and of those not hit by a disaster (i.e., control group) are presented in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: Summary statistics for control and treatment group 
 Disaster = 0  Disaster = 1 
 M SD  M SD 
ΔROA 0.001 0.059  –0.001 0.049 
ROA –0.014 0.086  –0.005 0.071 
Sales 455.516 1,555.641  569.498 1,634.951 
Total assets 2,295.883 8,517.472  2,755.947 8,651.098 
Complexity 0.753 0.176  0.745 0.177 
Munificence 0.043 0.076  0.051 0.08 
Dynamism 0.023 0.019  0.023 0.019 
Number of observations 36,903  11,411 
Note: The control group (Disaster = 0) comprehends observations of firms not hit by a 
natural disaster in the respective quarter, whereas the treatment group 
(Disaster = 1) comprehends firm-quarters in which a firm is hit by a disaster. 
 
2.5 Analysis 
2.5.1 Model specification 
The effect of having a production location in at least one state that was affected 
by a natural disaster on the change in return on assets was investigated using a 
difference-in-difference estimation which is common practice to answer such 
questions (e.g., Dessaint and Matray, 2017). The control model (CM) served as 
benchmark and includes control variables only. The base model (BM) also 
included the variables of the disaster occurrence and of the industry attributes 
(munificence, dynamism, complexity). The estimate 𝑏1 in the BM measured 
how much the performance of a firm hit by a disaster has changed relative to 
firms not hit by a disaster. The interaction model (IM) also included the 
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interaction terms between the disaster and the three industry attributes 
complexity, munificence, and dynamism respectively (estimates of interest: 𝑏5, 
𝑏6, and 𝑏7 in the IM). These estimates measured whether the identified change 
in performance varied with the respective attribute of the industry. To facilitate 
the interpretation of the interactions, the three industry variables were 
standardized by mean and standard deviation (Aiken et al., 1991). 
Control model (CM) 
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 = 𝑏0,𝑖 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏3,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝑏4,𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑞 + 𝑏5,𝑠 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 
(1) 
 
Base model (BM) 
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 = 𝑏0,𝑖 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
+ 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏7,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝑏8,𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑞 + 𝑏9,𝑠 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 
(2) 
 
Interaction model (IM) 
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 = 𝑏0,𝑖 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
+ 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
+ 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏7 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 ∗ 𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞
+ 𝑏8 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏9 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 + 𝑏10,𝑡 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝑏11,𝑞 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑞 + 𝑏12,𝑠 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 
(3) 
 
In these regression equations, 𝑖 indexes firms, 𝑡 years, 𝑞 quarters, and 𝑠 states. 
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 measures a disaster’s impact on firm performance for firm 𝑖 in 
quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 as difference of the return on assets to the previous period 
𝑞 − 1. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑞  is the main variable of interest capturing whether a disaster 
occurs in a state in which firm 𝑖 operates a production location in quarter 𝑞 of 
year 𝑡. 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 , 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑡,𝑞, and 𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 describe the industry attributes 
complexity, munificence, and dynamism in industry 𝑗 in quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 
respectively in which firm 𝑖 operates according to its primary SIC code. 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 and 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡,𝑞 control for a firm’s size and leverage, respectively. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 , 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑞 , and 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 are year, quarter, and state fixed effects. 𝑏0,𝑖 is the firm-
specific intercept. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term that is clustered at the firm level to 
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account for potential serial correlation. Multicollinearity is unlikely to be 
present, because variance inflation factors ranged between 1.0 and 1.1. 
2.5.2 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity poses a serious threat to the validity of empirical results. Its most 
frequent causes are reverse causality, measurement error, or omitted variable 
bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Although the absence of endogeneity cannot be 
proven, this study fulfills reasonable standards for the plausible exogeneity of 
the regressors (cf. Ketokivi and McIntosh, 2017). The arguments revolve 
around the exogeneity of the natural disaster occurrence, the measurement of 
variables, and the specification as a difference-in-difference regression model. 
First, natural disasters represent independent events which are not directly 
caused by a firm’s operations or strategic decisions. Thus reverse causality is 
unlikely to be present. Second, measurement error was addressed by 
minimizing the risk of common method bias which is one of the main sources 
of measurement error (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The dependent and independent 
variables were not only calculated from secondary data sources, but had even 
been obtained from three different data sources. The disaster occurrence 
variable was derived from disaster data independent from companies 
(SHELDUS) as well as the textual analysis of Item 2 of a firm’s 10-K report. 
Performance and industry variables were derived from a firm’s financial data 
that have been widely applied in strategic and operations management (e.g., 
Azadegan et al., 2013a, Heeley et al., 2006). Third, omitted variable bias was 
addressed by the specification as difference-in-difference model. Two groups 
of firms were constructed. In one group, firms experienced a natural disaster 
during quarter 𝑞 of year 𝑡 (treatment group), whereas in the other group, firms 
did not experience a disaster during the same quarter (control group). As only 
the difference in returns has been considered, any firm-specific effects that 
were constant over time were controlled for. Given the parallel trend 
assumption of treatment and control group, all the time effects on the level of 
the performance were also controlled for. Nonetheless, firms may have 
different capabilities to react to disasters. Furthermore, some years may be 
more sensitive to external events. These are controlled for by firm and year 
fixed effects. Any seasonality is controlled for by quarter fixed effects. As firm 
size and leverage could also affect the difference in trends as time varying 
covariates, these were also controlled for. As one firm can be hit multiple times 
by a disaster, robust standard errors, combined with the clustering option, 
Relief or Burden? The Role of the Economic Environment after a Natural Disaster 
29 
relaxed the assumption of independence of observations within the cluster of a 
firm. 
2.5.3 Results 
While the CM included only the control variables (𝐹 = 4.47, 𝑝 < 0.001), the 
BM has also included the main variable of interest (disaster occurrence in a 
state with production location) and the industry variables as controls  
(𝐹 = 4.50, 𝑝 < 0.001). The IM (𝐹 = 4.43, 𝑝 < 0.001) also comprised the 
interaction terms. Table 2-3 presents the results of the analysis for the three 
models. The hypothesized relationship between the negative effect of a natural 
disaster on a firm’s production network and the change in firm performance 
received support from the data. 
Table 2-3: Results of difference-in-difference regression analysis 
 Control model Base model Interaction model 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Disaster     –0.002 ** (0.001) –0.002 ** (0.001) 
Complexity     0.001  (0.001) 0.001  (0.001) 
Munificence     0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 
Dynamism     0.001 * (0.000) 0.001 * (0.000) 
Disaster × Complexity        –0.001 * (0.001) 
Disaster × Munificence        –0.001 * (0.001) 
Disaster × Dynamism        0.000  (0.000) 
Size 0.002 *** (0.001) 0.002 ** (0.001) 0.002 ** (0.001) 
Leverage 0.000  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 
Constant –0.011 ** (0.004) –0.011 ** (0.004) –0.011 ** (0.004) 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
R² (within) 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Observations 48,314 48,314 48,314 
Number of firms 2,254 2,254 2,254 
Note: Robust standard errors (SE) in parentheses (clustered at firm-level).  
 † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed). 
 
The base model estimate suggests that a natural disaster in a state in which 
major property is located lowers firm performance (Hypothesis 1). As expected, 
the coefficient (BM: 𝑏1 = −0.002, 𝑝 = 0.01) is significantly negative. A firm 
that experienced a natural disaster in a state in which it operated major property 
faced a decline of 0.2 basis points in the return on assets in a single quarter 
compared to a firm that was not affected by a disaster in the same quarter. 
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Given the mean and median close to 0 (M = 0.0004, SD = 0.055, median = 
0.00003) and the typical size of quarterly return on assets, this is an 
economically meaningful result. 
Figure 2-2: Interaction plots for complexity and munificence on the disaster-
performance link 
 
Note: The plots are based on standardized estimates reported in Table 2-3. The 
interactions are plotted at one standard deviation above (“high”) and below 
(“low”) the mean values of the moderator variables. 
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When looking at the interaction model, the estimates indicated some support 
for the moderating effect of industry attributes on the relationship between 
disaster occurrence in a state with major property and performance decline. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that higher industry complexity would exacerbate this 
relationship. Indeed, the results of the interaction model confirm this 
expectancy (IM: 𝑏5 = −0.001, 𝑝 < 0.05). Figure 2-2a illustrates this 
relationship. Firms that have operated a major plant in a state hit by a natural 
disaster face a decline in performance. While this relationship is only weakly 
existent in industries characterized by low complexity (–1 SD), this relationship 
becomes more negative, the more complex the industry becomes (+1 SD). 
Hypothesis 3 posited that higher industry munificence would also exacerbate 
the relationship between disaster occurrence in a state with a major property 
and performance decline. In line with Hypothesis 3, industry munificence 
negatively moderates the suggested relationship (IM: 𝑏6 = −0.001, 𝑝 < 0.05). 
Figure 2-2b illustrates that firms that operate a major property in a state hit by a 
disaster experience a decline in performance. Again, in industries characterized 
by low munificence (–1 SD), the occurrence of a disaster in a state in which a 
firm has operated major property hardly matters. However, with increasing 
munificence (+1 SD), the negative relationship becomes more pronounced and 
clearly negative. Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that industry dynamism 
mitigates the negative influence of a natural disaster in a state in which a firm 
has operated major property on performance. However, the data do not provide 
empirical support for this hypothesis (IM: 𝑏7 = −0.0003, 𝑝 = 0.47). 
2.6 Discussion 
This study investigated the effect of natural disasters on firms under several 
industry conditions. More specifically, firms that operated major plants in states 
that were hit by a natural disaster faced a decline in performance. This decline 
in performance was found to be even more pronounced in complex (i.e., highly 
competitive) or munificent (i.e., growing) industries. These results contribute to 
our understanding of the negative effects of external threats on firm 
performance. 
First, we developed a new empirical measurement to determine the effect if a 
firm is hit by a natural disaster. Recent studies have noted that the information 
on the location of production facilities was not available (Dessaint and Matray, 
2017, Ryu et al., 2018). To obtain this information from publicly available data, 
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we suggest employing a NER tagger as automated text analysis method to 
systematically scrutinize Item 2 of a firm’s annual report. This empirical 
contribution is crucial for understanding a firm’s distribution of assets because 
not only a firm’s headquarters but also its plants are significant assets. Several 
studies provide empirical evidence that even the slightest disruption of 
production facilities can have severe detrimental effects on stock market and 
operational performance. Thus, the empirical measurement of a firm’s 
production locations based on publicly available data opens several avenues for 
further research. 
Second, employing this new measurement, we were able to accumulate further 
empirical evidence that natural disasters have a detrimental effect on firm 
performance. We found that when a firm is hit by a disaster, this is bad news 
without potential positive outcome in the same quarter. Thus, we contribute to 
the ongoing debate about the extent to which natural disasters destroy a firm’s 
operating base and harm its profits. 
Third, just as country characteristics have been found to moderate the 
relationship between natural disaster occurrence and a country’s economy, 
industry attributes have been found to moderate the relationship between a 
disaster occurrence and firm performance. Natural disasters have only a minor 
effect on firm performance in low complexity industries. Low complexity 
industries are characterized by the existence of few players or one dominant 
player or both. In each case, competitors are not able to scale up their 
production and to replace the product offering of the affected firm. As a result, 
a firm operating in a low complexity industry can delay the fulfillment of the 
demand without diverting it to its competitors. In contrast, highly complex 
industries comprise many independent firms. If a firm is disrupted in such an 
industry by a natural disaster, its competitors can replace the disrupted firm’s 
products, fulfill market demand, and consequently take over its market share. 
Our findings for munificent industries revealed a similar picture. Firms that 
operate in highly munificent industries suffer more from natural disasters 
compared to firms that operate in less munificent industries. Our results are in 
line with prior studies, which have shown that firms operating in munificent 
industries focus on the expansion of production networks in order to fulfill the 
increasing demand. Furthermore, these firms appear to be less aware of 
potential small probability risks, such as the risk of natural disasters that they 
may face when making their location decisions. Once these firms are affected, 
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they cannot keep up with the market growth and consequently lose market 
share. 
These results have major implications for managers and policy makers. First, 
managers must be aware of natural disasters which have a direct negative effect 
on their company’s performance. To cope with them, managers can either 
reduce the susceptibility of being hit or lower the exposure to such events. On 
the one hand, managers should consider the probability of being hit by a natural 
disaster and reduce it where appropriate. To this end, they could find locations 
that are less prone to the occurrence of disasters or perform more crucial 
activities at locations that are less likely to be hit by a natural disaster. On the 
other hand, managers can try to reduce the effects of a disaster by preparing for 
emergencies (e.g., backup power, water drainage) or by developing 
contingency plans if they are hit by a disaster. Moreover, managers must 
consider the conditions in which their firm operates. If their firm faces fierce 
competition, they should take the risk of potential natural disasters more 
seriously than if the firm faced low competition. Additionally, if a firm faces a 
strongly growing (i.e., munificent) market, its managers should always account 
for potential risks in their location decisions. 
Although this study makes important contributions to theory and has important 
implications for managers, it should be considered in light of its limitations. 
First, we examined Item 2 of a firm’s annual report by means of a NER-tool to 
identify its major production locations. Although annual reports are generally 
regarded as valuable source of information, regulation only mandates firms to 
disclose information about a major property. However, firms have some 
discretion about what constitutes a major property. Thus, just as accounting 
studies investigate whether specific sections of annual reports provide valuable 
information, future studies should also assess this particular section to confirm 
the source of information. Furthermore, we focus on whether a firm operates a 
property in a given state. Thus, our data neither quantify the production 
network nor identify product flows. Further research should be conducted to 
identify product flows among plants to further refine the analysis.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This study investigated conditions under which a natural disaster causes more 
severe performance losses in affected firms. To this end, a firm’s production 
locations, as mentioned in Item 2 of its annual report, have been matched to 
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disaster occurrences. Subsequently, industry and firm financial information 
have been merged in the data set. The results of a difference-in-difference 
regression estimation suggested not only that natural disasters were associated 
with performance declines, but also that industry attributes had a moderating 
effect on this relationship. Complexity and munificence both exacerbated the 
negative relationship between disaster occurrence and performance 
development. These results provide evidence for the conclusion that firms 
operating in complex or munificent industries require disaster relief aid quicker 
to allow them a quicker rebound from the negative repercussions of the natural 
disaster. 
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Abstract: 
The interplay between the external environment in which a firm operates, the 
strategies it pursues, and the context in which it makes decisions together 
determine a firm’s success or failure. As all these interdependencies are 
impossible to evaluate ex-ante, some strategies may have unforeseen and 
unintended consequences. They can even jeopardize lower-level functional 
strategies such as the sourcing strategy. However, little is known about the 
extent to which the environment (outside-in) and high-level corporate strategic 
decision making (inside-out) increase supply risk. This is surprising, because 
the availability of supply has a strong influence on corporate performance. This 
paper investigates the extent to which the external environment and corporate 
strategies contribute to a firm’s exposure to supply risk. Their effects are 
investigated over time and between firms. To this end, a hybrid regression 
model is estimated, capturing time- and firm-effects in a single empirical 
model. The results suggest that an outside-in perspective explains supply risk 
exposure better than an inside-out perspective can. Furthermore, the distinction 
between time- and firm-effects explains different directions of several sources 
of a firm’s exposure to supply risk.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Firms must formulate their performance goals, identify the industries in which 
they compete, and define their competitive strategies against rival firms. These 
complex and difficult strategic decisions are critical determinants of a firm’s 
survival or failure (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). These decisions can also 
have potentially detrimental effects on different levels and in different 
functions of a firm. For instance, an internationalization strategy can generate 
additional revenue in a new geographic market, but also necessitate 
relationships with new suppliers in that market. However, if the phasing in of 
the new suppliers fails, the internationalization strategy and consequently 
overall firm performance might be at risk. Another difficulty stems from 
possible opposing interpretations of the same situation. For instance, a 
competitive industry may hint at an attractive market volume on the one hand, 
but on the other may also impede the supply of a firm operating in that industry 
with the result that its operational, financial, and stock market performance is 
weakened (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal, 2005a). However, we do not know how 
the unexpected and unintended consequences of corporate strategies and the 
environment affect or even put at risk different subordinated hierarchies of a 
firm. This study focuses on supply risk and integrates supply risk in the 
literature on strategic decision making; despite its importance, this topic has 
been largely neglected (van der Vegt et al., 2015).  
Quite a few studies describe the phenomenon of supply risk by taxonomies and 
typologies (Wagner and Bode, 2006). For example, the supply- and demand-
side risk as well as catastrophic risk which a firm faces can stem from different 
sourcing initiatives. However, these studies neither investigate the extent to 
which initially well-intended corporate strategies contribute to a firm’s 
exposure to supply risk nor do they evaluate how strongly the environment 
contributes to a firm’s exposure to supply risk. Therefore, this essay addresses 
this important gap and investigates how a firm’s own strategic decisions and 
the external environment translate into its exposure to downside supply risk.  
To tackle this research question, we propose a new measurement for a firm’s 
ex-ante exposure to supply risk based on secondary data sources. Supply risk 
exposure is a firm’s acknowledgement of a supply-related issue in the risk 
disclosure section of its annual report (Item 1.A in 10-K filings). For the 
detection of these issues, we use a topic modeling approach previously 
developed for the analysis of Item 1.A. The derived exposure to supply risk is 
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investigated from the angle of external factors and internal strategic choices on 
two levels: change within and between firms. Regarding external factors, new 
entrants disrupt existing product offerings and reshape industry boundaries. As 
a result, a firm’s competitive position reshapes in comparison to its industry 
peers or in comparison to its past operations. Our results confirm the belief that 
external factors substantially contribute to supply risk within and between 
firms. With regard to internal strategic choices, firms extend their product 
offering and the global reach of their sales. As a result, they must adopt their 
operations, comply with regulatory requirements, and deal with a larger scope 
of suppliers which again strains a firm’s resources. The results suggest that 
internal strategic choices partly increase (within firms) and partly decrease 
(between firms) a firm’s exposure to supply risk.  
3.2 Background 
Organizational situations are complex, path-dependent, and determined by a 
myriad of interdependent factors. There is a large body of literature, 
particularly in strategic management and organization, which proposes and 
tests theories that explain why performance differs among firms and how 
specific organizational situations lead to corporate success or failure (Child, 
1972, MacKay and Chia, 2013, Thietart, 2016).  
Two major streams can be distinguished. The market-based view of the firm 
(outside-in perspective) emphasizes the importance of the market environment 
and of other external factors for a firm’s performance after a specific 
organizational situation (Thietart, 2016). The focus is on the suppliers’ and 
buyers’ power, the threat of new entrants and substitute products, or the 
competitive intensity as drivers of a firm’s performance (Porter, 1980). Once a 
firm has opted to compete in a given industry, this choice pre-determines its 
profitability. For instance, Bayer’s takeover of Monsanto lowered the relative 
importance of the pharmaceutical business and increased the one of the crop 
science business, resulting in a new profit mix. However, a narrow view of 
external factors does not sufficiently explain performance differentials between 
firms, because resource endowments are heterogeneous and immobile among 
firms of the same industry (Barney, 1991). The resource-based view of the firm 
(inside-out perspective) emphasizes the role of superior resources and their 
deployment for performance. This stream of research argues that firms can 
shape their bundle of resources and change the conditions in which they operate 
(de Rond and Thietart, 2007). For example, when Pfizer developed Viagra, its 
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management team allocated resources to the exploration of Viagra’s key 
ingredient and thus created new market opportunities. While external factors 
and internal choices were regarded as competing explanations for performance 
in the past, they have become more integrated for strategy formulation and the 
explanation of firm performance. Performance variations can be explained by 
the interplay among internal choice, external factors, and the context of the 
choices (de Rond and Thietart, 2007).  
These studies have demonstrated that the interplay among internal choice, 
external factors, and context can also lead to inferior performance (MacKay 
and Chia, 2013). MacKay and Chia (2013) found that the purposeful and well-
intended strategic decisions of a Canadian automotive company often had 
detrimental effects on its performance after unexpected changes in the 
environment. For example, the firm’s management had decided to liquidate a 
nickel hedge to improve its financial position. Shortly after this decision, 
however, the price of nickel rose, resulting in a greater loss than gain from the 
liquidation. Besides explaining the failure of the automotive company, the 
study showed that organizational actions and the external environment changed 
the firm’s exposure to downside supply risk. The prior decision to rely on 
American banks as creditors put the supply at risk because these banks 
withdrew credit lines required to finance shipments of supply from China. This 
example underlines the importance of understanding the downside potential 
inherent in every business decision. Moreover, studying downside risk is 
important, because the failure to perform at a desired level substantially 
influences managerial decision making and characterizes a decision maker’s 
risk preferences (Hoskisson et al., 1991, Miller and Leiblein, 1996).  
This study offers an intuitive explanation for a firm’s exposure to downside 
supply risk, broadly defined as a firm’s inability to meet customer demand 
(Manuj et al., 2014). On the one hand, external factors affect a firm’s exposure 
to supply risk (Rao and Goldsby, 2009, Zsidisin, 2003). With the plethora of 
supply risk categorizations, this study focuses on technology change and 
industry complexity as external sources of supply risk. Product change is a key 
determinant of the supply chain strategy (Trkman and McCormack, 2009). In a 
case study of a multinational manufacturing company, its distributors identified 
technological development yielding new products as one of the main risk 
sources (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). In addition, industry complexity greatly 
contributes to supply risk. In a complex environment caused by high 
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competition, a firm’s supply chain cannot adapt quickly to a competitor’s 
moves, because cost reduction was chosen over flexibility (Jüttner et al., 2003).  
At the same time, a firm’s internal strategic choices affect its exposure to 
supply risk. Firms choose the product domains or geographic regions in which 
they operate and compete (Hitt et al., 1994). In this context, the direction of the 
effects remains unclear. Serving additional markets increases the complexity of 
a firm’s supply chain (Hendricks et al., 2009). The more complex a firm’s 
supply chain, the more likely disruptions are to emerge (Bode and Wagner, 
2015). Besides, the more geographic markets a firm serves, the more negative 
is the stock market reaction to announced supply chain disruptions (Hendricks 
et al., 2009). Thus, these strategies may increase a firm’s exposure to supply 
risk. In contrast, the same internal strategic choices can also reduce a firm’s 
exposure to supply risk as increased product and geographic scope reduce the 
negative effect of unpredictable markets (Kovach et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
investments are more likely to be recouped if they are made in adjacent 
domains, reducing the risk of an investment in a specific supplier relationship 
(Lieberman et al., 2017).  
While the distinction between external factors and internal strategic choices 
provides an intuitive structure for the analysis of downside supply risk, their 
effects (size and direction) may also differ by level (Klein et al., 1994). The 
“lower” level (firm-year) captures the effect of changes in external factors or 
internal strategic choices on a firm’s exposure to supply risk over time and 
corresponds to within-firm-variance in econometric analyses. The “higher” 
level (firm) distinguishes cross-sectional differences of external factors and 
internal strategic choices between firms and their effect on supply risk 
exposure. This corresponds to between-firm-variance in econometric analyses. 
Although the same variables are investigated at the different levels, they 
measure different constructs (Firebaugh, 1978). The intuition is that a given 
degree of external uncertainty may be high for one firm, but low for another, 
while both firms face an increase with corresponding associations with supply 
risk. Assuming that the two levels of effects are equal is known as the 
“ecological fallacy” (Robinson, 1950) and can lead to errors in inferences made 
from data (Curran and Bauer, 2011) and confusion in theory development 
(Klein et al., 1994). Hence, the distinction of different levels in the present data 
promises additional interesting insights to understand the phenomenon of 
downside supply risk exposure better.  
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3.3 Hypotheses 
As delineated above and illustrated in Figure 3-1, a firm’s exposure to supply 
risk originates from external factors and its internal strategic choices (Garg et 
al., 2003). With regard to the former, we focus on technology change and 
industry complexity, which are the key environmental factors (Daft et al., 
1988): Product markets change due to rival firms’ technological developments 
(Hoberg et al., 2014) and industry complexity results from the interplay of 
many firms within an industry sector (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). With regard 
to the latter, business and geographic diversification are key strategic choices of 
firms (Hitt et al., 1994). 
Figure 3-1: Conceptual model for the analysis of the exposure to supply-related 
risk 
 
 
Furthermore, external factors and strategic decisions may affect a firm’s 
exposure to supply risk at different levels. Therefore, hypotheses are developed 
for both, the effect of change within a firm (Hypotheses a) and the effect of 
cross-sectional differences between firms (Hypotheses b). Change over time is 
predicted to be positively associated with supply risk exposure for all 
constructs, because it requires a firm to alter its supply chain structure. The 
effect of cross-sectional differences between firms on supply risk exposure is 
more nuanced. While higher degrees of uncertainty from external factors 
increase a firm’s supply risk exposure, a firm accumulates experience, has 
higher reputation and power over its supply base, and gains greater flexibility 
from its previous internal strategic choices. On this basis, higher degrees of 
diversification are supposed to reduce a firm’s supply risk exposure.  
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3.3.1 External factors 
Technological development represents the rate of change in underlying 
technologies of a purchased product (Stump et al., 2002). As technology 
changes, firms have to adapt their sourcing strategy (Mahapatra et al., 2010). 
This imposes additional risk for three reasons.  
First, firms can process only a limited amount of information (Galbraith, 1973). 
The more quickly technology evolves, the more likely a firm’s management is 
to miss or misinterpret important events. For example, Ericsson misinterpreted 
the information of a fire in its supplier’s semiconductor plant while Nokia 
shifted orders to other suppliers (Norrman and Jansson, 2004). This example 
highlights that timely processing and interpretation of information is crucial to 
cope with external factors, but may be impeded in fast-paced markets. Second, 
firms have not only problems in processing and interpreting existing 
information, but they even lack information on the past development in fast-
paced markets. This makes their proper demand forecast and production 
planning more difficult. Consequently, a firm’s own demand forecast will be 
prone to errors resulting in erratic ordering behavior which can escalate along 
the supply chain. This leads to an inefficient supply chain with higher cost and 
to discrepancies between supply and demand. Third, for the efficient 
management of technological change, a firm relies more on loose coupling and 
lower relationship continuity implying that suppliers are switched more 
frequently (e.g., Choi et al., 2001, Heide and John, 1990). However, selecting a 
new supplier is risky (Riedl et al., 2013). The reasons are that challenges arise 
from a firm’s inexperience in assessing the quality and future capabilities of a 
supplier (Krause et al., 2000). In addition, there is no accumulated relational 
capital between a firm and its supplier that could improve the outcomes of 
buyer-supplier relationships (Cousins et al., 2006). Finally, there might be no 
alternative suppliers (Krause et al., 2000) so supplier switching is impossible. 
In sum, technology change overwhelms internal information processing, makes 
planning more difficult, and may necessitate more frequent supplier switching 
with the result that overall supply risk increases on both levels.  
Hypothesis 1a: On the time-level, an increase in technology change is 
associated with an increase in supply risk exposure. 
Hypothesis 1b: On the firm-level, a higher degree of technology change is 
associated with a firm’s higher supply risk exposure. 
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Complex industries are characterized by many firms with equally sized market 
shares (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). In such an industry, firms face 
competition not only in their product offering but also in the supply of raw 
materials (e.g., Wilhelm, 2011). Just as a buying firm instills competition 
among its suppliers to improve their performance (Krause et al., 2000), 
suppliers can encourage competition among their customers to obtain better 
prices. Competition in the market reduces not only a customer’s power but also 
the supplier’s dependence on its customer (Emerson, 1962). As a result, the 
supplier is able to select the customer that offers the most favorable terms 
(Blenkhorn and Banting, 1991) and a buyer’s failure to offer favorable terms to 
the supplier results in lack of supply. Furthermore, competition increases the 
risk of information and knowledge leakage through the supplier. Just as two 
firms learn from each other through joint ventures (Inkpen, 2000), suppliers 
gain access to their customers’ knowledge in joint projects. This knowledge 
concerns not only the immediate exchange episode, but also the relationship as 
such and potential future exchanges (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Yet, if a 
supplier enters into a relationship with the buying firm’s competitor, 
unintended knowledge leakage may have substantial negative effects on the 
buying firm’s performance (Day, 1995). What is more, suppliers may also 
engage in business relationships with several competing buying firms at the 
same time. Although direct knowledge transfers are usually prohibited and 
protective governance mechanisms often in place, spillovers of tacit knowledge 
can never be precluded. In sum, greater industry complexity favors growing 
competition for resources and potential information leakage through the supply 
base with the result that the overall supply risk increases (on both levels). 
Hypothesis 2a: On the time-level, an increase in industry complexity is 
associated with an increase in supply risk exposure. 
Hypothesis 2b: On the firm-level, a higher degree of industry complexity is 
associated with a firm’s higher supply risk exposure. 
3.3.2 Internal strategic choice 
Firms that enter a new business segment are confronted with increased supply 
risk due to their unfamiliarity with and the complexity of the corresponding 
sourcing decisions. First, firms entering a new market must make unfamiliar 
decisions concerning their supply and production in a new business segment. 
Those decisions not only require additional effort (Grant et al., 1988), but also 
make the proper distinction of relevant from irrelevant information more 
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difficult (Alba and Hutchinson, 1987). For example, new and unknown 
resources of which a diversifying firm may not be able to accurately evaluate 
the quality are sourced from other suppliers with whom the firm has not 
previously collaborated. Similarly, the new products are produced in a new 
production process. During ramp-up (i.e., the transition from a research and 
development-oriented to a steady-state production process) discrepancies 
between the planned and the actual production process must be resolved 
(Terwiesch and Xu, 2004). This results in the reconfiguration of product or 
logistics requirements and the production process leading to potential surprises 
for a firm’s suppliers to which they cannot react. Second, the complexity of the 
decisions increases with the number of interactions among different decisions 
as a result of diversification (Simon, 1955). Consequently, a firm may miss 
critical issues along its supply chain until those suddenly materialize and 
disrupt its operations. In sum, the increase in business diversification leads to 
more unfamiliar decisions with respect to sourcing and production as well as 
more complex decisions that induce supply-related risk. 
Hypothesis 3a: On the time-level, an increase in the business 
diversification is associated with an increase in supply risk 
exposure. 
While an increase in business diversification is hypothesized to be associated 
with an increase in supply risk, we predict that a high degree of business 
diversification is associated with a low degree of supply risk. Experience can be 
acquired on novel tasks or on tasks that have been performed repeatedly in the 
past (Katila and Ahuja, 2002) and can be measured in terms of the cumulative 
number of task performances. Task performance experience is converted into 
industry-specific knowledge (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Hence, highly 
diversified firms have a broader knowledge base and can use it to react quickly 
to operational contingencies. This aids not only in managing product 
diversification but also in taking effective mitigation measures against different 
types of risk, including supply risk.  
In contrast to non-diversified firms that have more at stake with a single 
business, highly diversified firms achieve a lower revenue share from a single 
business. They can balance out risk (Carroll, 1984) because their less than 
perfectly correlated income streams from multiple businesses result in a more 
stable overall cash flow. This enables a firm to shift funds between businesses 
in response to a disruption (Hendricks et al., 2009). Besides greater 
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independence from funds, highly diversified firms have a more diverse set of 
suppliers and several supply chains in place and thus, a larger supply base. 
These suppliers might have an overlapping product offering which is delivered 
to different businesses of a firm. If a supplier needs to be replaced, highly 
diversified firms can address their existing supply bases whether one supplier is 
able to deliver the desired good. As a result, an urgent need for the supply of a 
good could be fulfilled in a timelier manner because suppliers are pre-qualified.  
Finally, a multi-product firm can leverage its reputation to increase the sales of 
a new product (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988). For supply, a multi-business firm can 
use its reputation in one business division to attract suppliers. Suppliers are 
more responsive, more anticipatory, and provide more high-quality resources 
towards attractive customers (Hüttinger et al., 2012). As a result, a firm faces 
low supply risk if its reputation makes it attractive. In sum, firms with a high 
degree of business diversification face a low supply risk exposure compared to 
firms with a low degree of business diversification, because they have 
accumulated experience, are able to pool different risks, and leverage size to 
attract more qualified suppliers.  
Hypothesis 3b: On the firm-level, a higher degree of business 
diversification is associated with a firm’s lower supply risk 
exposure. 
Like an increase in business diversification, a firm’s increase in geographic 
diversification increases its exposure to supply risk. To begin with, an increase 
of geographic diversification implies that a product will be sold to other 
markets in larger quantities than before. The further the distance between 
customer market and production facilities (i.e., the spatial distance), the more 
complex the distribution logistics become (Marucheck et al., 2011). The 
consequences are twofold: the likelihood of supply disruptions increases (Bode 
and Wagner, 2015) and quality risks that are attributable to suppliers become 
more likely (Marucheck et al., 2011). In addition, countries impose regulatory 
restrictions like local content requirements or tariffs to protect local industry 
against imports. Locally produced components or local assembly circumvent 
such tariffs. Airbus’s recent acquisition of the equity interest in the Bombardier 
C-series and the announced partial relocation of the production to Mobile, 
Alabama, prevents excess import duties into the United States (US). This 
example illustrates that a firm is often forced to change its supply chain design 
due to regulatory requirements of the foreign countries to which they export. To 
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summarize: As an increase in geographic diversification usually increases the 
spatial distance between production and distribution and may lead to changes in 
the configuration of the supply chain, supply risk exposure similarly increases. 
Hypothesis 4a: On the time-level, an increase in the geographic 
diversification is associated with an increase in supply risk 
exposure. 
In contrast to an increase in geographic diversification, a high degree of 
geographic diversification will be associated with a low supply risk exposure. 
Just like business diversification, knowledge has been accumulated with each 
entry into a foreign market. A part of this knowledge is universally valuable to 
all international entries. Hence, a firm with a high degree of geographic 
diversification benefits from a larger pool of generalizable knowledge than a 
firm which is not so diversified (Lu and Beamish, 2004). Through the 
accumulation of general knowledge, firms are better prepared to deal with 
supply-related issues stemming from international supply such as cross-border 
regulation. In addition, a high degree of geographic diversification is associated 
with a firm’s market power over its suppliers, distributors, and customers 
(Kogut, 1985). As previously argued, power and dependence are two sides of 
the same coin. If a firm exerts power over its suppliers, its suppliers are 
dependent on the firm (Emerson, 1962). Suppliers that are highly dependent are 
willing to accept price reductions or to accelerate deliveries if requested by 
their customer (e.g., Buchanan, 1992). Firms may even increase their 
purchasing volume and leverage their buying power (Vereecke and Muylle, 
2006) if they are able to standardize parts across different geographic areas. 
Hence, geographically diverse firms have more buying power that can protect 
them against supply risk. Finally, an expanded multi-national network increases 
a firm’s strategic flexibility (Kogut, 1985). A highly diversified firm can shift 
sales from one region to another in response to unanticipated threats in ways 
not possible for a single-business firm without such investments already in 
place (e.g., Lee and Makhija, 2009). In addition, firms hedge against currency 
fluctuations by ramping up purchases of production inputs from the same 
nations as they sell their final products to (Hoberg and Moon, 2017). Taking 
this one step further, firms can explicitly source from those countries that offer 
the most favorable exchange rates. Furthermore, a firm that operates in several 
geographic regions has multiple supply chains in place. If one supply chain is 
disrupted, a firm can redeploy resources from one region to another, effectively 
Sources of Supply Risk: Environment or Strategic Choice? 
46 
reducing supply risk. In sum, a firm’s high degree of geographic diversification 
lowers its supply risk exposure through learning opportunities, higher 
purchasing power and increased operational flexibility. 
Hypothesis 4b: On the firm-level, a higher degree of geographic 
diversification is associated with a firm’s lower supply risk 
exposure. 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Construction of the data set 
Data on supply risk stem from the risk section of annual reports that are 
available for download from the electronic data gathering, analysis, and 
retrieval system (EDGAR) of the SEC. Annual reports are arguably the firm’s 
most important communication channel for the presentation of their business 
performance and development (Gao et al., 2016). The disclosures therein affect 
shareholder behavior (e.g., Staw et al., 1983). As annual reports are widely 
accepted as accurate, relevant, and representative, their semantics were used to 
extend industry classifications (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) or to detect 
competitive forces (Hoberg et al., 2014). According to the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles in the US (US-GAAP), annual reports must disclose the 
material risks facing a firm (FASB, 2010), with risk being defined as possible 
loss caused by future events (FASB, 1975). A risk is material if the disclosure 
of a possible future loss “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
made available” (TSC Industries vs. Northway, 1976). The risk can be 
associated with the supply and operations side of a firm, such as the loss or 
damage of enterprise property by fire, obligations related to product warranties, 
and losses from catastrophes (FASB, 1975). This definition of risk in 
accounting corresponds to the definition of risk in supply chain management.  
Since 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required 
firms to disclose risks in a single, dedicated section, the Item 1.A (“Risk 
Factors”) (SEC, 2005). Risks are the factors that “make the offering speculative 
or risky” (SEC, 2005). In Item 1.A, each risk is presented under a sub-caption 
that summarizes the risk and that is subsequently denoted as a “risk item.” 
Following prior studies, the risk item serves as source of information on supply 
risk. Although the risk is then discussed below this sub-caption, the discussion 
does not contain additional information necessary for the risk’s classification. 
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Table 3-1: Risk items (extract) disclosed by "LS Starrett Company" (CIK 
93676) in 2013 and 2014 after receiving comments from the SEC on 
the corporate risk disclosure 
Fiscal year ended 06/30/2013 Fiscal year ended 06/30/2014 
Risks Related to Raw Material and  
Energy Costs 
Volatility in the price of energy and raw 
materials could negatively affect our margins. 
Risks Related to Technology Technological innovation by competitors could 
adversely affect financial results. 
Risks Related to Foreign Operations International operations and our financial 
results in those markets may be affected by 
legal, regulatory, political, currency exchange 
and other economic risks. 
Risks Related to Information Systems Any inadequacy, interruption, integration 
failure or security failure with respect to our 
information technology could harm our ability 
to effectively operate our business. 
 
Each risk item should focus on a single risk that the SEC enforces. Frequently 
mentioned criticisms by the SEC are ambiguous risk items that could apply to 
any firm, inconsistencies with other parts of the report, and omitted or 
irrelevant risk items. For example (as illustrated in Table 3-1), the L.S. Starrett 
Company changed the risk items in the wake of criticism from the SEC. A 
study of SEC staff comments on prospectuses of initial public offerings reveals 
similar results (Robbins and Rothenburg, 2005). Firms even modify their risk 
disclosure if a close rival, the industry leader, or numerous industry peers 
receive such comment letters (Brown et al., 2018).  
The specific section of Item 1.A discusses a wide range of topics from general 
market risk down to idiosyncratic risk that affects only the supply of a single 
firm (SEC, 2005). Studies that focus on Item 1.A show that investors regard the 
risk disclosure as relevant. In general, risk items reflect the risk that a firm 
faces (Campbell et al., 2014). The information content of the qualitative part of 
the risk disclosure is associated with quantitative information from financials 
(Beatty et al., 2018). Although the general risk disclosure is associated with 
higher stock return volatility (Israelsen, 2014), disclosing firm-specific risk 
reduces volatility by reducing the information asymmetry between firms and 
their investors (Bao and Datta, 2014). In this regard, more specific risk items 
lead to a stronger market reaction (Hope et al., 2016). Besides triggering a 
market reaction, the risk items reflect a firm’s operational exposure: The 
disclosure of oil-related risk approximates the risk associated with the price of 
oil (Israelsen, 2014). In addition, the disclosure of cybersecurity risk is 
associated with the occurrence of such incidents (Li et al., 2018). Thus, the 
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disclosure of other risks can be used to proxy other risks that cannot be 
measured (Israelsen, 2014) such as supply risk. Furthermore, first studies have 
already exploited Item 1.A. Firms with greater exposure to key employee risk 
disclosed are smaller and more innovation-oriented. They have higher total and 
idiosyncratic stock return volatilities (Israelsen and Yonker, 2017). This again 
demonstrates that a firm’s risk disclosure in its annual report contains relevant 
and validated information that can be used for the measurement of supply risk. 
For the purpose of this study, we used a combination of keywords and visual 
features to detect Item 1.A in and to truncate it from the annual reports. 
Specifically, we used the regular expressions “Item 1.A” and “Risk Factors” 
without punctuation and white spaces to detect the beginning of Item 1.A and 
the headlines of Item 2 and Item 3 to detect the end of Item 1.A. For each hit, 
we checked whether this was a headline (font-style in bold). All text between 
headlines was extracted. Previous studies have deployed similar approaches 
(e.g., Li et al., 2018).  
Table 3-2: Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and pairwise correlations 
  M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Techn. change 6.99 3.64 1.00 
                      
(2) Ind. complexity 0.77 0.16 0.30 * 1.00 
                    
(3) Business div. 0.19 0.26 –0.22 * –0.16 * 1.00 
                  
(4) Geographic div. 0.33 0.29 –0.28 * –0.13 * 0.21 * 1.00 
                
(5) Size 6.39 1.94 –0.05 * 0.03 * 0.31 * 0.30 * 1.00 
              
(6) Leverage 0.12 0.14 0.02 * 0.07 * 0.11 * –0.07 * 0.37 * 1.00 
            
(7) Book-to-market 0.64 0.60 –0.10 * –0.04 * 0.02 * –0.08 * –0.10 * –0.04 * 1.00 
          
(8) Return on assets –0.03 0.20 –0.27 * –0.10 * 0.18 * 0.21 * 0.43 * 0.01 
 
–0.07 * 1.00 
        
(9) Risk in cf 0.35 3.94 –0.03 * –0.01 
 
0.02 * 0.01 
 
0.07 * 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.10 * 1.00 
      
(10) Readability 1.00 0.35 0.01 
 
0.07 * 0.16 * 0.11 * 0.44 * 0.29 * –0.02 * 0.09 * 0.06 * 1.00 
    
(11) Analyst follow 1.56 1.06 0.05 * 0.08 * 0.11 * 0.24 * 0.64 * 0.12 * –0.27 * 0.28 * 0.05 * 0.25 * 1.00 
  
(12) Big-4 auditing 0.75 0.44 0.07 * 0.06 * 0.12 * 0.19 * 0.51 * 0.18 * –0.20 * 0.13 * 0.02 
 
0.20 * 0.41 * 1.00 
Note: n = 10,502; Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown; size, 
readability, and analyst following were transformed using the natural logarithm, 
big-4 auditing is a binary variable; correlations flagged with * are significant at 
𝑝 < 0.05. 
 
From the extraction, the risk items themselves were parsed using visual 
features. Specifically, the formatting of each sentence in the extraction is 
investigated. Building on the SEC’s requirement to present each risk as risk 
item and subsequent discussion, the longest part is the discussion. Hence, we 
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extract the second-longest part of the risk section as measured by the count of 
the occurrence of a visual feature (i.e., bold, italics, underlining, and/or 
capitalization). Although the extraction of risk items is not trivial, the high 
correlation (0.90) of the number of risk items extracted to a previous study by 
Bao and Datta (2014) confirms the quality of our extraction approach. 
Financials were obtained from Compustat (Capital IQ North America 
Fundamentals Annual and Historical Segment) and the Hoberg-Phillips data 
library (http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/), and matched to the information from the 
annual reports. The unit of analysis was the firm-year that a firm’s central index 
key (CIK) and its date of the fiscal year end uniquely identify. Due to data 
availability, the period investigated covers the 10-year time horizon from 2006 
until 2015. Industries in which operational strategies do not play a major role 
(e.g., banking, insurance, or services) were dropped. In total, 10,502 firm-years 
(1,599 firms, on average 6.6 (minimum: 3, maximum: 10) observations per 
firm) were retained for the analysis. Descriptive statistics and pairwise 
correlations among the variables are reported in Table 3-2.  
3.4.2 Supply risk  
Each risk item that was extracted consists of one or two sentences describing a 
single risk as described above. As these risks cover a broad range of different 
themes, a sentence latent Dirichlet allocation (sLDA) was employed to identify 
supply-related risk items and to quantify a firm’s exposure to such risks. Bao 
and Datta (2014) developed this algorithm as extension of the original LDA by 
Blei et al. (2003) for the analysis of the risk disclosure in Item 1.A. The 
rationale behind the sLDA is that the risk items in the risk disclosure section 
are a blend of different topics, each of which is composed of distinct words. To 
exploit the unique structure of the risk disclosure, all words of one risk item are 
assumed to be sampled from the same topic. The sLDA achieves high quality in 
assigning and quantifying common topics in the risk disclosure: It has highest 
predictive power measured by perplexity and best cluster quality measured by 
the silhouette coefficient (Bao and Datta, 2014). According to extensive 
numerical studies conducted by Bao and Datta (2014), the sLDA has a 
comparable quality to supervised algorithms but is far more reliable. They 
found that it had highest precision for 30 to 40 topics.  
Appendix B describes how the texts were preprocessed prior to building the 
topic model. Then, a metric similar to the “term frequency inverse document 
frequency” (tf-idf) was used as indicator for the most meaningful words 
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characterizing a distinctive topic in preparation for the analysis. For the purpose 
of the present study, the nominator is the percentage of firms using a specific 
word. The denominator is the natural logarithm of the average fraction of a 
firm’s risk items that contain the word. Words with a high score are potentially 
relevant. These are used by several firms in a small fraction of their risk items. 
In contrast, words that score low are less relevant. These are either used by very 
few firms or in a large fraction of risk items. All words that score lower than 
two were excluded from the relevant words of the period. In total, the corpus of 
relevant words comprises 981 distinctive terms ranging from 344 terms in 2006 
to 847 in 2016.  
Figure 3-2: Computation of the scores for the exposure to supply-related risk 
 
 
Figure 3-2 describes the computation of the supply risk score. The sLDA 
simultaneously identifies the underlying topic structure of the documents and 
assigns each risk item to a topic (Bao and Datta, 2014). The topic model is run 
with 34 topics on the corpus of relevant words present in the respective risk 
items. Its output is twofold: Each risk item is assigned to a topic and each topic 
is described by the words that occur the most frequently. The number of 34 
topics serves as compromise between a higher granularity of topics (like 40 or 
50) and the robustness of the assignment of risk item to topic. The key words 
per topic are robust to the number of topics.  
Two researchers manually labeled all topics based on each topic’s most 
frequent words and each topic’s compilation of risk items, because automated 
labeling were not applicable (Mei et al., 2007). After discussions with other 
scholars in seminars and workshops, all supply-related topics were grouped into 
the broader category supply and the assigned risk items were counted for each 
firm and year. All other topics detected cover risks unrelated to supply 
management. The risk items assigned to these topics were discarded. Table 3-3 
describes the supply-related sLDA-topics.  
 
 
 
 
Derive topic structure 
and assign risk item to 
topic
Label all topics
Group topics into 
categories 
(supply, irrelevant)
Count the number of 
risk items assigned to 
the supply-category
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Table 3-3: Supply-related topics extracted from 10-K reports’ Item 1.A using the 
sLDA 
Topic Topic label Key words Sample 
0 Disruption in 
production 
natural 
facility 
production 
disaster 
manufacturing 
The impact of natural disasters could negatively impact 
our supply chain and customers resulting in an adverse 
impact to our revenues and profitability. 
3 Dependence on 
contract 
manufacturing 
party  
rely 
development 
manufacture 
delay 
We have no capacity to manufacture supplies of our 
product candidates and intend to rely solely on third 
parties to manufacture supplies of all of our product 
candidates. 
17 Dependence on 
joint 
development 
license 
agreement 
contract 
development 
right 
We are dependent on technology systems and third-party 
content that are beyond our control. 
22 Supply issues supplier 
supply 
component 
party 
raw 
As we rely on a limited number of third parties to 
manufacture, assemble and test our IC products and to 
supply required parts and materials, we are exposed to 
significant supplier risks. 
23 International 
risks 
foreign 
currency 
international 
fluctuation 
rate 
We manufacture a significant portion of our products 
outside the United States, and political, societal or 
economic instability may present additional risks to our 
business. 
 
Let 𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝 denote the set of supply-related risk items. 1𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘∈𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝  is an indicator 
function indicating the membership of the 𝑘th risk item of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
(𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡,𝑘  ) in the set of supply-related risk items 𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝.  
1𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡,𝑘∈𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝 = {
 1  𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 ∈ 𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝
 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The risk exposure to supply-related risk of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is then calculated as 
the sum of the indicator function values for the 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 risk items 𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘 of firm 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 1𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡,𝑘∈𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝑘=1
 
The measurement for the exposure to supply-related risk is validated by 
computing the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) credit rating and the measurement of supply-related risk. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is necessary, because the variables are 
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not continuous. Its value of 0.19 illustrates that the disclosure of supply-related 
risk items is associated with bankruptcy probability and hence proxies a firm’s 
exposure to risk. 
3.4.3 External factor variables 
Technology change (𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡) is operationalized by product market fluidity 
(Hoberg et al., 2014). The variable is based on the product description sections 
in firm 10-K reports and measures the change in a firm’s product descriptions 
due to competitors’ moves in the firm’s product markets. Technically, it 
measures the overlap between words in a firm’s product description and the 
change in words describing the product market universe and is computed as dot 
product between the vector indicating the words a firm uses and the normalized 
vector indicating the words that changed from the previous year. This measure 
has been widely applied in the finance and accounting domains (e.g., Boone et 
al., 2016).  
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ⋅
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡
‖𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡‖
 
𝑁𝑖,𝑡 represents the vector indicating the words a firm 𝑖 uses in year 𝑡 and 𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡 
the vector indicating the words that have changed from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡. Data are 
available for download from the Hoberg-Phillips data library homepage 
(http://hobergphillips.usc.edu). Higher values of product market fluidity 
indicate higher technology change. 
Industry complexity (𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡) is approximated by the reverse of industry 
concentration, because a higher concentration corresponds to a lower 
complexity (e.g., Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). An industry is thereby described 
by its four-digit SIC-code. Its concentration is measured by an industry’s 
Herfindahl index of sales that is defined as the sum of the squared annual 
market shares of each firm operating in the industry. This measure has been 
widely used in strategic and operations management to account for industry 
complexity (e.g., George et al., 2016). 
𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − ∑ (
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑠𝑗,𝑡
)
2
𝑁𝑗,𝑡
𝑖=1
 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 equals the annual sales of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡, 𝑠𝑗,𝑡 the sum of sales 
of all firms 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Industry complexity is computed as 1 
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minus sales concentration with higher values indicating higher industry 
complexity. 
3.4.4 Internal strategic choice variables 
Publicly listed firms are required to disclose significant segment information 
(FASB, 1997). A separate segment needs to be reported if it covers 10 % of 
revenues, profits, losses, or assets. The segments can pertain to business or 
geographic segments. The measure of business diversification (𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡) is based 
on computing the Herfindahl index for each firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 based on the sales 
reported by its different business segments. It is defined as 1 minus the sum of 
the squared business segments’ shares of sales of a firm.  
𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − ∑ (
𝑠𝑏,𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑖,𝑡
)
2
𝐵𝑖,𝑡
𝑏=1
 
𝑠𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 is the annual sales of business segment 𝑏 of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is the 
sum of sales of all 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 business segments in which firm 𝑖 operates in year 𝑡. 
Firms with values closer to 1 are more diversified while firms closer to 0 are 
less diversified.  
As for business segments, firms must disclose significant geographic segment 
information. The measure of geographic diversification (𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡) is based on 
computing the Herfindahl index for each firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 based on the sales 
reported by its different geographic segments. It is defined as 1 minus the sum 
of the squared geographic segments’ shares of sales of a firm.  
𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − ∑ (
𝑠𝑔,𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑖,𝑡
)
2
𝐺𝑖,𝑡
𝑔=1
 
𝑠𝑔,𝑖,𝑡 is the annual sales of geographic segment 𝑔 of a firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is 
the sum of sales of all 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 geographic segments in which firm 𝑖 operates in year 
𝑡. Firms with values closer to 1 are more diversified while firms closer to 0 are 
less so. Both measures of diversification assume a value of 0 for single-segment 
firms and have been widely applied in prior operations management research 
(e.g., Hendricks et al., 2009).  
3.4.5 Control variables 
Several variables control for differing firm characteristics and disclosure 
incentives. The natural logarithm of the book value of assets controls for firm 
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size as larger firms tend to disclose more risks. Moreover, leverage ratio (book 
value of debt to book value of equity), book-to market ratio (book value of 
equity to market value of equity), and return on assets (net income to assets) 
control for differences in firm success and future growth options. Firms that are 
more successful or have more future growth options were found to disclose less 
risk in their annual reports (Hope et al., 2016, Israelsen and Yonker, 2017). 
Furthermore, the 5-year standard deviation of annual cash flows controls for 
risk inherent in a firm’s business model. Firms with a higher standard deviation 
of cash flows were found to disclose more risks in their annual reports (Hope et 
al., 2016). Besides, the length of the annual report controls for a firm’s internal 
disclosure orientation. The natural logarithm of file size serves as general 
measure for many dimensions of readability and serves as indicator for the 
clarity of the provided information (Hope et al., 2016, Loughran and 
McDonald, 2014). In addition, the natural logarithm of the number of analysts 
following a firm and a big-four auditing company control for differences in 
disclosure that is imposed by external auditing. Higher analyst following and a 
big-four auditing company were found to influence the disclosure quality (e.g., 
Nelson and Pritchard, 2016). Finally, firm-specific random intercepts and the 
time-dummy-variables control for firm-specific (e.g., differences in operating 
model, industry, or long-term strategy) and time-specific effects (e.g., overall 
economic development), respectively. 
3.5 Analysis 
3.5.1 Model specification 
As firms are observed over time, two levels are present in the dataset. Standard 
approaches for the analysis of such data are fixed or random effects models for 
the two-level and multi-level models for more level cases. As multi-level and 
random effects models have the similar underlying equations and yield to 
almost identical results for the two-level case (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002), only 
fixed effects and random effects models are distinguished here. In fixed effects 
models, higher level variance (i.e., variance between firms) is controlled out by 
a group-wise demeaning of the variables. While this has the advantage of 
providing unbiased estimates in the presence of unobserved cross-level 
heterogeneity, it fails to measure the effect of any time-invariant variables (Bell 
and Jones, 2015). In contrast, random effects models combine within- and 
between-variance in a single estimate. If the within- and between-effects are 
different, the estimator is an uninterpretable weighted average of these two 
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effects (e.g., Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). This can be thought of as omitted 
variable bias because unaccounted variance will be absorbed by the error terms 
(group-error and random error). 
The solution to this issue is to split each variable into a group-centered and a 
group-mean variable (Mundlak, 1978). By including the group-means into the 
regression equation, the between-effect is explicitly modeled and captures 
group-level heterogeneity (Bell and Jones, 2015, Certo et al., 2017). This 
approach has two major advantages. It yields unbiased estimates for the group-
centered variables. Besides, it provides interesting information about the group-
means (Bell and Jones, 2015). Thus, within- and between-variance of external 
factors and internal strategic choices can be used to explain differences in 
supply risk exposure in a single model.  
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) as measure of the relative 
importance of between-firm variance ranges from 0.75 for technology 
development to 0.95 for industry complexity, indicating that a large fraction of 
variance is attributable to differences between firms. In other words, between 
75 % and 95 % of variance would be lost if a standard fixed effects model was 
estimated. At the same time, a Hausman test suggests that a random effects 
model is inappropriate (𝑝 < 0.001) (Hausman, 1978). Thus, this study also 
explicitly models the heterogeneity of the between-effect. To this end, all 
variables are split into two variables: a group-centered variable for the within- 
and the group-mean for the between effect. The group-mean is calculated as 
average over all observations of a firm. The group-centered variables are 
computed as difference of the firm-year observation and the firm average. 
These variables are used in a random effects estimation model with panel-
clustered robust standard errors to account for the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation which are present in the dataset. To control for period effects 
across firms (𝑝 < 0.001), year dummies were used, as this method is the most 
efficient for short panel data (Petersen, 2009). If the model is correctly 
specified, the estimates derived with a fixed effects model are the same as the 
estimates for the demeaned variables in the random effects model as delineated 
above. For the sake of brevity, only the complete model with random effects is 
described.  
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Operationally, the xtreg-routine with random effects in Stata 15 was used to 
estimate the following model: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏1
𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏2
𝐶 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏3
𝐶 ∗ 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏4
𝐶 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶
+ 𝑏1
𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑏2
𝑀 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏3
𝑀 ∗ 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏4
𝑀 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑏5
𝐶 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏6
𝐶 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏7
𝐶 ∗ 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏8
𝐶 ∗ 𝑏2𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝐶     
+ 𝑏9
𝐶 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡
𝐶   + 𝑏10
𝐶 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐶 + 𝑏11
𝐶 ∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐶
+ 𝑏12
𝐶 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡
𝐶
+ 𝑏5
𝑀 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏6
𝑀 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏7
𝑀 ∗ 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏8
𝑀 ∗ 𝑏2𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑏9
𝑀 ∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏10
𝑀 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑏11
𝑀 ∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
+ 𝑏12
𝑀 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡
𝑀
+ ∑ (𝑏13,𝑗
𝐶 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
𝐶 + 𝑏13,𝑗
𝑀 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
𝑀)
2016
𝑗=2008
+ 𝑏0 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4) 
 
In this equation, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 represents the dependent variable of supply risk 
exposure. 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 refer to the external factors of technology change and 
industry complexity respectively. 𝐵𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡 measure the internal strategic 
choices of business and geographic diversification respectively. 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑏2𝑚𝑖,𝑡 account for firm size, leverage ratio, return on assets, and 
book-to-market value. 𝑏𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms being 
audited by a big-four auditing company, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 represents the file size and 
controls for the overall readability of a firm’s annual report, and 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
accounts for the number of analysts following a firm. 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 controls for variation 
in a firm’s cash flows. All these variables are measured for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗  accounts for time-effects, with 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 = 1 if 𝑗 = 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. The 
superscript 𝐶 indicates a centered variable and estimate while the superscript 𝑀 
denotes the group mean variable and estimate. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the random error term for 
shared errors between firm 𝑖 and year 𝑡, 𝜇𝑖 accounts for unobserved firm-level 
random effects, and 𝑏0 is the common intercept shared by all firms. 
All independent variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile to address 
outliers (Aguinis et al., 2013). For an additional robustness check, the model 
was estimated in a pooled regression to derive variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
VIFs ranged from 1.02 to 3.18 for the final estimation model. This indicates 
that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. 
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3.5.2 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity poses a serious threat to the validity of empirical results. Its most 
frequent causes are reverse causality, measurement error, or omitted variable 
bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Although the absence of endogeneity cannot be 
proven, this study fulfills reasonable standards for plausible exogeneity of the 
regressors (cf. Ketokivi and McIntosh, 2017). The arguments revolve around 
theoretical arguments, the measurement of variables, and the use of panel data. 
First, reverse causality is unlikely to be present. As noted above, theory and 
prior empirical studies offer quite a few arguments, why external factors or 
internal strategic choices contribute to supply risk. The opposite is rather 
difficult to imagine. A firm has only limited influence on external factors such 
as technology change or industry complexity in the short run. An alternative but 
equally unlikely explanation may be that a firm, which identifies additional 
risks in its supply chain, deliberately seeks global sales or extends its product 
range.  
Second, measurement error is addressed by minimizing the risk of common 
method bias as a main source of measurement error. The dependent and 
independent variables are not only calculated from secondary data sources, but 
were also obtained from different data sources. The measurement problem 
persists in the sense that firms can strategically disclose or withhold 
information in their annual reports. However, numerous studies have confirmed 
that a firm’s risk disclosure reflects its overall risk (e.g., Campbell et al., 2014, 
Israelsen and Yonker, 2017, Li et al., 2018). Thus, we believe that a firm’s 
disclosure of supply risk provides a good proxy for its downside risk exposure.  
Third, omitted variable bias is addressed by the specification as a hybrid model 
(Certo et al., 2017). The demeaned variables provide robust estimates that are 
equal to the estimates of a fixed effects model. As a result, they are robust to 
omitted variable bias. In order to gain additional insights into the intercepts, the 
between-firm heterogeneity is explicitly modeled by the group means of the 
variables. The study includes several control variables which have been found 
to influence a firm’s risk disclosure to address the issue of omitted variable 
bias. 
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Table 3-4: Results of fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) regression 
analysis 
Note: Robust standard errors (SE) in parentheses (clustered at firm-level); the estimates 
of RE models were derived using the generalized least squares estimator; AIC 
and BIC of RE models were calculated using the maximum-likelihood estimator; 
R² (within) is reported for FE model, R² (adjusted) is reported for RE model.  
 † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed). 
 
 Fixed effects Random effects 
 Control model Full model Control model Full model 
Variables Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
External factors (group-centered for RE model, uncentered for FE model) 
Techn. change   0.045 *** (0.012)   0.045 *** (0.012) 
Ind. complexity    0.777 † (0.433)   0.777 † (0.433) 
External factors (group-means, for RE model only) 
Techn. change       0.245 *** (0.021) 
Ind. complexity       0.512  (0.382) 
Internal strategic choice (group-centered for RE model, uncentered for FE model) 
Business div.   0.384 * (0.188)   0.384 * (0.188) 
Geographic div.   0.079  (0.231)   0.079  (0.231) 
Internal strategic choice (group-means, for RE model only) 
Business div.       –0.611 * (0.259) 
Geographic div.       0.635 ** (0.229) 
Control variables (group-centered for RE model, uncentered for FE model) 
Size 0.318 *** (0.069) 0.299 *** (0.069) 0.318 *** (0.069) 0.299 *** (0.069) 
Leverage 0.079  (0.272) 0.062  (0.268) 0.079  (0.272) 0.062  (0.269) 
Book-to-market 0.041  (0.040) 0.034  (0.040) 0.041  (0.040) 0.034  (0.040) 
Return on assets –0.319 * (0.138) –0.272 * (0.137) –0.319 * (0.138) –0.272 * (0.137) 
Risk in cf 0.000  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) 0.001  (0.003) 
Readability 0.176 † (0.095) 0.153  (0.094) 0.176 † (0.095) 0.153  (0.095) 
Analyst follow 0.007  (0.051) 0.006  (0.051) 0.007  (0.051) 0.006  (0.051) 
Big-4 auditing 0.197  (0.141) 0.187  (0.139) 0.197  (0.141) 0.187  (0.139) 
Control variables (group-means, for RE model only) 
Size     –0.218 *** (0.057) –0.168 ** (0.056) 
Leverage     –0.415  (0.514) –0.479  (0.498) 
Book-to-market     0.320 ** (0.123) 0.473 *** (0.117) 
Return on assets     –2.490 *** (0.444) –0.567  (0.458) 
Risk in cf     0.018  (0.031) 0.020  (0.029) 
Readability     1.397 *** (0.284) 0.957 *** (0.273) 
Analyst follow     0.440 *** (0.089) 0.222 ** (0.083) 
Big-4 auditing     0.501 ** (0.180) 0.414 * (0.169) 
Constant 1.495 *** (0.442) 0.626  (0.570) 2.684 ** (0.945) 0.716  (0.968) 
Firm FE YES YES NO NO 
Firm RE NO NO YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
R² 0.102 0.107 0.745 0.746 
AIC 30,796.47 30,744.35 37,725.78 37,518.17 
BIC 30,919.88 30,897.80 37,994.38 37,844.84 
Observations 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 
Number of CIK 1,599 1,599 1,599 1,599 
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3.5.3 Results 
While the control model adds control variables, the full model integrates the 
independent variables of external factors and internal strategic choices. As 
shown in Table 3-4, the R² increases when the control and independent 
variables are added. Finally, both Akaike’s (AIC) and Schwarz’s (BIC) 
Bayesian information criteria indicate that the full model fits the data better as 
their respective values become smaller. This offers statistical and empirical 
support for the effect of external factors and internal strategic choices on the 
exposure to supply risk. The discussion of the results is divided into three parts: 
The first part shows the results of the centered variables. The second part 
describes the results concerning the group means. The third part contrasts the 
estimates of the centered variables with the ones of the group means. The 
estimates of the centered variables model lend some support to the hypotheses. 
An increase in supply risk exposure was predicted to stem from an increase in 
external factors and change in the internal strategic choices. While Hypothesis 
1a suggested that an increase in technology change is associated with an 
increase in supply risk exposure, Hypothesis 2a claimed that an increase in 
industry complexity is associated with an increase in supply risk. The 
coefficient of technology change is significantly positive (𝑏1
𝐶 = 0.045,  
𝑝 < 0.001) providing support for Hypothesis 1a. The positive coefficient of 
industry complexity (𝑏2
𝐶 = 0.777, 𝑝 = 0.08) provides weak support for 
Hypothesis 2a. In sum, change induced by external factors (technology change 
and industry complexity) contributes heavily to an increase in supply risk. 
Furthermore, the risk from internal strategic choices was investigated. An 
increase in business diversification (Hypothesis 3a) and geographic 
diversification (Hypothesis 4a) were hypothesized to increase the supply risk 
exposure. In line with expectancy, the coefficient of business diversification is 
significant and positive (𝑏3
𝐶 = 0.384, 𝑝 < 0.05) in support of Hypothesis 3a. 
The results do not support Hypothesis 4a (𝑏4
𝐶 = 0.079, 𝑝 = 0.725).  
In addition, estimates for the group means are investigated, because the intra-
class correlation suggested a considerable amount of variance on the group-
level. The hypotheses predicted that supply risk stems from a high degree of 
external factors but a low degree of diversification. More specifically, a high 
degree of technology change (Hypothesis 1b) and a high degree of industry 
complexity (Hypothesis 2b) were both hypothesized to be related to a high 
supply risk. As predicted by Hypothesis 1b, the coefficient for technology 
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change is positive and significant (𝑏1
𝑀 = 0.245, 𝑝 < 0.001). However, the 
results do not support Hypothesis 2b (𝑏2
𝑀 = 0.512, 𝑝 = 0.562). Furthermore, 
Hypothesis 3b predicted that firms with a high degree of business 
diversification face low supply risk and Hypothesis 4b claimed that firms with a 
high degree of geographic diversification are exposed to a low supply risk. The 
results provide partial support for the hypotheses as the coefficient of business 
diversification (𝑏3
𝑀 = −0.611, 𝑝 < 0.05) is significant and negative. In 
contrast to expectancy, the coefficient for geographic diversification is positive 
(𝑏4
𝑀 = 0.635, 𝑝 < 0.01). Firms with a high degree of geographic 
diversification are associated with a high supply risk exposure. While risk 
pooling effects across regions and segments were expected, they are observed 
only for the latter. 
Finally, the within-effects are contrasted to the between-effects to further 
investigate the differences between the effects. Of the four independent 
variables, three have indeed different estimates for within- and between-effects. 
The estimates of business diversification (𝜒2(1) = 9.97, 𝑝 < 0.01) and 
technology change (𝜒2(1) = 72.63, 𝑝 < 0.001) were significantly different 
from each other while the estimates of geographic diversification  
(𝜒2(1) = 2.96, 𝑝 = 0.085) were weakly different from each other. For 
industry complexity (𝜒2(1) = 0.22, 𝑝 = 0.641), the estimates were not 
significantly different.  
As robustness check, the above model was run as fixed effects model. As 
displayed in Table 3-4, the estimates for the group-centered variables from the 
random effects models are equal to the respective estimates from the fixed 
effects model. Furthermore, the random effects model was run as multi-level 
model (2 levels). The results are almost equal. Moreover, a third level was 
added capturing industry effects. The intra-class correlation coefficient shows 
that only 17 % of the total variance in the dependent variable were explained by 
industry effects, 53 % by firm effects and 30 % by time effects. However, the 
inclusion of the industry-level had only minor influence on the size of the 
estimates for the group mean of geographic diversification leading to the 
conclusion that these effects do not play a major role. For the sake of brevity, 
they are not presented here. 
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3.6 Discussion 
This study investigated factors that contribute to a firm’s supply risk exposure. 
The results make several important theoretical, methodological, and empirical 
contributions and have important implications for managers. First, this study 
pursues a structured approach to delineate factors that contribute to a firm’s 
supply risk exposure. Previous research has either relied on anecdotal or 
survey-based evidence to identify sources of risk (e.g., Wagner and Bode, 
2006), however, the studies have not delivered a structured framework to 
explain which sources of risk turn into exposure to supply risk. This study’s 
theoretical perspective builds on the strategic choice and environmental 
determinism literature which finds that both dimensions may contribute 
independently to negative firm performance (MacKay and Chia, 2013). This 
perspective also enhances the understanding of purely negative supply risk: 
Increases in supply risk stem from both the choices that a firm actively makes 
(such as increase business diversification) and external factors beyond that 
firm’s direct control (such as increases in industry technology change). More 
importantly, external factors explain both higher degrees of and increases in 
supply risk to a larger extent than internal strategic choices indicating that an 
outside-in perspective (industry factors) explains a firm’s supply risk exposure 
better than an inside-out perspective (resources and their deployment). 
Second, from a methodological perspective, this study investigates within- and 
between-firm variance in a single empirical model. The approach has only 
recently gained management scholars’ attention. The results confirm that 
changes over time are indeed not the same as differences between firms. This 
confirms that researchers must carefully specify the level for which a theory is 
valid (Klein et al., 1994). By accounting for both effects and avoiding 
ecological fallacy, this essay distinguishes the direction of each effect and 
draws the correct conclusions for each level, time and firm, which is crucial in 
multilevel theorizing and modelling (Paruchuri et al., 2018).  
Combining this study’s theoretical perspective with its methodological 
approach, further theoretical contributions can be carved out. Third, external 
factors always contribute to supply risk in the sense that both an increase and a 
higher degree lead to higher supply risk (with different effect sizes). Thus, 
uncertainty in a firm’s environment translates into risk exposure that the firm 
cannot escape. In contrast, internal strategic choices exhibit a more nuanced 
finding. For business diversification, the sign is positive for the within-effect 
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but negative for the between-effect. Thus, firms can counter their supply risk 
exposure in the long run by means of high degree of business diversification. 
One possible explanation of these results is that firms operating in several 
disciplines have access to a broader supply base and can leverage their power 
and reputation to mitigate their supply risk exposure.  
Fourth, although geographic diversification was posited to provide operational 
flexibility and the resulting size power over its suppliers, such benefits do not 
seem to translate into a reduced exposure to supply risk. Prior conceptual and 
empirical papers have already discussed a more complicated or even negative 
relationship between geographic diversification and firm performance and 
found that most firms realize disadvantages – not advantages – from the degree 
of their global sourcing strategy (Lu and Shang, 2017). Transaction costs 
increase with the number of country-specific transactions with suppliers, 
customers, distributors, or government agencies (Hitt et al., 1997). In addition, 
firms that are more geographically diversified exhibit a more negative stock 
market reaction than do firms that are less diversified (Hendricks et al., 2009). 
Besides, from an operations management perspective, firms with greater 
geographic diversification have an increased likelihood of product recalls 
(Steven et al., 2014). This study not only accumulates further empirical 
evidence that a high degree of geographic diversification in sales is not 
necessarily beneficial for the operations, but also adds a risk perspective to the 
explanation that international operations increase the cost of managing a 
multinational network (Lee and Makhija, 2009). 
Fifth, the difference of the “within-effect” of geographic diversification from its 
“between-effect” can explain opposing results found in empirical studies thus 
far. Hendricks et al. (2009) reported a negative moderating effect between 
geographical diversification and stock market reaction in an event study. In 
contrast, Kovach et al. (2015) found a positive moderating effect between 
unpredictability and operating performance in a longitudinal multi-level study. 
While the former identified differences between firms based on cross-sectional 
data, the latter found differences over time. Thus, the explicit modeling of the 
within-effect and between-effect explains these differences and advances the 
understanding of the multifaceted nature of supply risk.  
Finally, this study contributes to the empirical measurement of ex-ante 
downside exposure to supply risks that firms face and for which no real 
measurement exists to date. The risk section of a firm’s annual report is 
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scrutinized by means of a sLDA to detect risks that deal with supply. One 
additional risk item about supply-related risk in a firm’s annual report is 
interpreted as an increase in the ex-ante downside exposure to supply-related 
risk. The positive association between external factors and supply risk 
disclosure provides empirical evidence that a firm’s disclosure with respect to 
supply risk reflects its exposure. This measurement is an improvement over 
those presented in previous studies that relied on ex-post information on 
materialized disruptions or that approximated the ex-ante risk exposure using 
either variables describing the environment or sales data. As the measurement 
derived from the corporate risk disclosure directly captures a firm’s ex-ante 
downside exposure to supply risk, it more accurately concurs with managers’ 
perceptions of risk (March and Shapira, 1987) and is more relevant to 
operations management researchers. Furthermore, this study introduces a new 
measurement of technology change which relates a firm’s change to its 
industry’s change (Hoberg et al., 2014). While the measurement has attracted 
broad attention in the fields of finance and accounting, operations management 
scholars have not been aware of it, yet. 
For managers, our results have important implications. The results suggest that 
a high degree of geographic diversification is associated with a high supply risk 
exposure while a high degree of business diversification is associated with low 
supply risk exposure. From these results, we conclude that firms continued to 
rely on their existing supply base when entering foreign geographic markets but 
engaged in new supplier relationships when they entered new business 
segments. In order to fully exploit the mitigation potential of geographic 
diversification, firms should also diversify their supply base when they are 
active in different geographic markets. Furthermore, from a sole risk 
management perspective, firms should diversify their businesses (in terms of 
segments) and enlarge their supply base. Although this increases the supply risk 
exposure in the short run, more diversified firms benefit from risk pooling 
effects, thereby decreasing their supply risk exposure in the long run. Finally, 
technology change and industry complexity contribute to supply risk to a larger 
extent than changes in business diversification. This suggests that firms should 
hold some resources to tackle their risk exposure because they cannot escape 
from the uncertainty in their external environments.  
While this study makes several contributions to theory and has important 
implications for practitioners, it has a few limitations which might serve as 
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avenues for further research. First of all, this study identifies only the 
differences in within- and between effects as well as opposite directions of 
business diversification. Future studies can attempt to explain the differences 
and explicitly consider mediating and moderating factors between strategic 
decisions and supply risk exposure. In addition, this study can serve as starting 
point for the investigation of international sales, international procurement and 
how the two are related. Moreover, we suggest future research on the 
consequences of the exposure to supply risk. Future studies can investigate 
whether risk exposure has negative performance implications and how firms 
can actually tackle efficiently the risk that they anticipate. Finally, the same 
limitations that apply to any empirical study with secondary data pertain to this 
study. Data of firms that are publicly listed in the US and belong in the 
manufacturing sector were used to test the proposed relationships. Firms in 
other industries, operating in other countries, or not publicly listed might have 
other requirements or objectives. Consequently, the generalizability of the 
findings might be limited. Further research can explore these issues. Also, an 
important assumption underlying the use of secondary financial data and 
information from annual reports is that they accurately represent a firm’s true 
financial condition and that there are no accounting misrepresentations or 
manipulations. Therefore, we suggest further research on this topic using other 
data sources.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This study distinguishes two types of supply risk sources. External factors 
beyond a firm’s direct control contribute to its supply risk exposure. In 
response to changes in the industry, a firm has to adapt its value chain, identify 
new suppliers for innovative products, or counter competitive pressure within 
its industry. The empirical results suggest that both changes over time and 
differences between firms explain supply risk exposure. The second type, a 
firm’s strategies, also contribute to its supply risk exposure. A firm’s decision 
to extend the product or the geographic diversification has consequences for its 
supply chains. The empirical results provide evidence that an increase in 
business diversification contributes to an increased supply risk exposure 
whereas a high degree of business diversification leads to a pooling effect with 
the result that supply risk exposure decreases. These results are linked to prior 
findings in the operations management literature. 
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Abstract: 
Firms face risks in their upstream and downstream supply chains. Although 
some operational strategies can fully or partially insulate a firm from the 
adverse effects of possible supply chain disruptions, implementing these 
strategies is costly. At the same time, firms face intense pressure on margins, 
forcing them to keep operating costs low. These conflicting goals require 
further investigation on whether and to what extent different operational 
strategies can mitigate several types of risk. This paper delineates and tests how 
operational strategies mitigate the exposure to supply chain risks with 
minimum negative influence on performance. To measure a firm’s exposure to 
supply chain risk, we analyzed corporate qualitative risk disclosures in annual 
reports (Form 10-K) using an adapted latent Dirichlet allocation approach from 
computational linguistics. The results suggest that operational strategies 
mitigate the negative association between supply-related risk and performance, 
but not the negative association between demand-related risk and performance.   
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4.1 Introduction 
“Risk is a function of how poorly a strategy will perform, if the ‘wrong’ 
scenario occurs.” 
Michael E. Porter (1985: 476) 
Over the past two decades, many firms have implemented many supply chain 
initiatives, from single sourcing or vendor-managed inventory all the way to 
just-in-time logistics concepts, to reduce inventory levels and increase the 
utilization of fixed assets (e.g., Chen et al., 2005). In stable environments, these 
initiatives have a positive effect on firm performance. In volatile, uncertain, 
complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environments, however, they also make 
firms more vulnerable to exogenous disruptive events. Both the supply and the 
demand sides of supply chains are susceptible to such disruptions. For example, 
the 2011 earthquake in Japan disrupted Toyota’s supply for months, while a fire 
in a Primark distribution center threatened the company’s run-up for the 
Christmas sales season (Gibson and Savage, 2013). Once materialized, such 
disruptions have a severe effect on a firm’s operating performance, stock price, 
as well as short- and long-term shareholder value (Hendricks and Singhal, 
2003, 2005a, b, 2014). 
Professionals are aware of the increased vulnerability of their supply chains and 
associated negative consequences: 42 % of global chief procurement officers 
have reported an increase in supply-related risk (Deloitte, 2016) and 60 % of 
chief supply chain officers consider risk management a crucial activity (IBM, 
2009). However, the same managers have also reported that pressure on 
margins and savings remains high (Deloitte, 2016) and that cost containment is 
a top priority (IBM, 2009). This trade-off between costly risk management and 
cost containment is a key challenge for supply chain managers: For every type 
of risk, they have to decide in advance between taking the risk of a possible 
loss (lottery) or incurring the cost of a risk management intervention which 
prevents extreme losses (sure payout) (Bakshi and Kleindorfer, 2009, Blome 
and Schoenherr, 2011). If managers accept too much risk, then a disruption and 
operational losses are almost certain. In contrast, if managers invest too much 
on risk management, the firm’s operations become inefficient and profit 
margins decline. Precise guidance on the trade-off on risk acceptance vs. risk 
management is scarce, because neither a measurement for ex-ante downside 
risk exists nor is there deep knowledge about the efficiency of risk mitigation 
activities. 
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Chopra and Sodhi (2004) have suggested implementing risk mitigation 
strategies that have minimum impact on efficiency. To the best of our 
knowledge, only two studies have investigated conditions under which certain 
operational strategies are efficient. The empirical results of Kovach et al. 
(2015) suggested that capacity slack strengthens firm performance in unstable 
markets. Talluri et al. (2013) illustrated that operational risk mitigation 
strategies improve supply chain performance in the presence of distinct types of 
supply chain risk. While the former study focuses on demand variability as sole 
source of risk, the latter considers only operational performance. Hence, there 
is still no clear guidance on the conditions under which costly risk management 
provides benefits on the corporate level, leading to our research question: 
Which operational strategies mitigate different types of supply chain risk in the 
least costly manner? 
We investigate how firms operate if they are exposed to supply chain risk. Risk 
exposure is a firm’s acknowledgement that a risk exists. For its measurement, 
we use the textual risk descriptions in corporate annual reports (Item 1.A in  
10-K filings). The risk exposure is matched to financial data on operational 
strategies and performance. This data set allows us to answer our research 
question in response to calls to incorporate performance metrics for the 
evaluation of risk management approaches (Manuj et al., 2014) and to 
investigate conditions under which operational risk management is beneficial 
(Kovach et al., 2015). 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Supply chain risk exposure 
Risk can be conceptualized either as fluctuations around an expected value 
(Arrow, 1965) or as a purely negative deviation from an expected outcome 
(Mao, 1970). Although both are found in the literature, the latter more 
accurately reflects managerial perceptions (March and Shapira, 1987) and is 
hence predominantly found in management in general (e.g., Miller and 
Leiblein, 1996) and in supply chain management in particular (e.g., Käki et al., 
2015). In this study, risk is conceived as the possible threat of a negative 
deviation from an expected performance outcome. On the one hand, risk 
comprises the negative-only deviation of the realized result from the anticipated 
one. Such deviation is often triggered by an event in a firm’s environment. On 
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the other hand, risk contains the probability that such an event actually occurs 
(Wagner and Bode, 2008). 
Figure 4-1: Sources of risk along the supply chain and operational mitigation 
strategies 
 
 
As Figure 4-1 illustrates, this study assumes a supply chain perspective and 
focuses on risk caused by potential disruptions that affect supply and demand 
(Manuj et al., 2014). Supply risk is the possibility of a disruption associated 
with inbound supply or operations, such that a firm is unable to meet customer 
demand (Manuj et al., 2014). One example of a supply disruption is the 
complete breakdown of production if a single-sourced supplier fails to deliver a 
critical component. Demand risk is the possibility of an event that is associated 
with outbound flows or with variance in customer demand and may affect the 
likelihood of customers placing orders with the focal firm (Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008). With regard to variance in customer demand, both the product mix and 
the volume offered by a firm can be affected (Tang and Tomlin, 2008). 
Examples of events affecting the outbound logistics are truck driver strikes or 
fires in distribution warehouses (Wagner and Bode, 2008). Examples affecting 
the customer demand are a lack of market acceptance of new products or the 
introduction of new products by competitors, rendering a firm’s product 
obsolete (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). 
4.2.2 Risk disclosure 
Annual reports are arguably the most important communication channel that 
firms have to present their business performance and development to 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Gao et al., 2016). Disclosures therein 
significantly affect shareholder behavior (e.g., Staw et al., 1983). According to 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the United States (US-
GAAP), annual reports must disclose the material risks facing a firm (FASB, 
2010), with risk being defined as possible loss caused by future events (FASB, 
1975). A risk is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
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having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available” 
(TSC Industries vs. Northway, 1976). The risk can be associated with either the 
supply or demand side of a firm, such as the loss or damage of enterprise 
property by fire, obligations related to product warranties, and losses from 
catastrophes (FASB, 1975). This definition of risk corresponds to the definition 
of risk in supply chain management.  
Although managers can choose which risks to disclose based on what they 
believe to be significant, risk disclosures reflect the risk to which firms are 
exposed (Rajgopal, 1999). Additionally, the selection of risks disclosed is in 
itself informative about the firm strategy and the risks on which managers focus 
their attention (Schrand and Elliott, 1998). Consequently, the risk disclosure in 
annual reports has been of longstanding interest to researchers, especially with 
the rise of computational linguistics. In general, textual disclosures are 
informative with respect to both fundamentals and market reactions (Li, 2010). 
Increases in textual risk disclosures are associated with higher stock return 
volatility, trading volume, investor’s risk perceptions, and more dispersed 
forecast revisions (Kravet and Muslu, 2013). Negative news is more strongly 
weighted (Kothari et al., 2009). As the annual reports are widely accepted to be 
accurate, relevant and representative, their semantics were used to extend 
industry classifications (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) or to detect competitive 
forces (Hoberg et al., 2014).  
In accounting and finance, common methodological approaches are to compare 
the semantics of annual reports (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016), assess their 
readability (Loughran and McDonald, 2016), assess their sentiment (Kearney 
and Liu, 2014), or detect common topics in risk disclosure (e.g., Campbell et 
al., 2014). To achieve the latter, researchers have applied various methods of 
automated text analysis from computational linguistics ranging from 
dictionary-based and supervised to unsupervised text mining algorithms. In 
contrast to the former two methods which have the drawback that the criteria 
for the categories have to be defined a priori, unsupervised text mining 
algorithms require only a specific number of topics. They are particularly 
useful to infer unknown connections from text (Agarwal et al., 2017). One 
example of an unsupervised text mining algorithm is the latent Dirichlet 
allocation (LDA) proposed by Blei et al. (2003). The LDA is part of 
probabilistic generative models and can be used to infer a hidden thematic 
structure in documents. Documents arise from a generative process based on 
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distributions of words and topics. To generate a document, its words are 
assumed to be picked from the distribution of a document’s topics and the 
distribution of words given the topic drawn. While all documents cover the 
same topics and all topics use the same words, their respective probabilities are 
different. From the observed set of documents, the documents’ hidden 
distributions of topics and each topic’s distribution of words are computed by 
maximizing the likelihood of observing the documents.  
Table 4-1: Risk items (extract) disclosed by "LS Starrett Company" (CIK 
93676) in 2013 and 2014 after receiving comments from the SEC on 
the corporate risk disclosure 
Fiscal year ended 06/30/2013 Fiscal year ended 06/30/2014 
Risks Related to Raw Material and  
Energy Costs 
Volatility in the price of energy and raw 
materials could negatively affect our margins. 
Risks Related to Technology Technological innovation by competitors could 
adversely affect financial results. 
Risks Related to Foreign Operations International operations and our financial 
results in those markets may be affected by 
legal, regulatory, political, currency exchange 
and other economic risks. 
Risks Related to Information Systems Any inadequacy, interruption, integration 
failure or security failure with respect to our 
information technology could harm our ability 
to effectively operate our business. 
 
Since 2005, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
required firms to disclose risks in a single, dedicated section, Item 1.A (“Risk 
Factors”) (SEC, 2005). Risks are the factors that “make the offering speculative 
or risky” (SEC, 2005). In this section, each risk must be presented under a sub-
caption that summarizes the risk and that is subsequently denoted as a “risk 
item”. The risk must then be discussed below this sub-caption. Each risk item 
and its accompanying discussion should focus on a single risk. The SEC 
enforces these requirements. Frequently mentioned criticisms by the SEC are 
unspecific risk items that could apply to any firm, inconsistencies with other 
parts of the report, and omitted or irrelevant risk items. For example (as 
illustrated in Table 4-1), the L.S. Starrett Company changed the risk items after 
having received critical comments from the SEC. A study of SEC staff 
comments on prospectuses of initial public offerings reveals similar results 
(Robbins and Rothenburg, 2005).  
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Table 4-2: Sample supply- and demand related risk items disclosed in annual 
reports (Form 10-K, Item 1.A) 
Supply-related risk Demand-related risk 
If we fail to maintain or expand our 
relationships with our suppliers, in some cases 
single-source suppliers, we may not have 
adequate access to new or key technology 
necessary for our products, and, as a result, 
our ability to deliver leading-edge products 
may be impaired. 
Unfavorable legislation in the hearing health 
market may decrease the demand for our 
products, and may negatively impact our 
financial condition. 
We depend on highly specialized equipment to 
manufacture our products and loss of or 
damage to our manufacturing facilities could 
result in significant losses. 
The competitive nature of our business results 
in significant price concessions to our 
customers and increased pressure to reduce 
our costs. 
We have increased our dependence on 
external sources of wood pulp, which subjects 
our business and results of operations to 
potentially significant fluctuations in the price 
of market pulp. 
The uncertainty of acceptance of products 
developed through biotechnology could affect 
our profitability. 
 
Item 1.A discusses a wide range of topics from general market risk down to 
idiosyncratic risk that affects only the supply or demand of a single firm (SEC, 
2005). Table 4-2 shows a sample of supply- and demand-related risk items. 
Studies focusing on Item 1.A show that investors regard the information 
disclosed as relevant. In general, risk items reflect the risk that a firm faces 
(Campbell et al., 2014). The qualitative risk factor section has additional 
explanatory power for financials (Huang, 2010) and is associated with higher 
stock return volatility (Israelsen, 2014). In particular, disclosing firm-specific 
risk reduces information asymmetry between firms and their investors (Bao and 
Datta, 2014). The information content of the qualitative part of the risk item 
disclosure is associated with quantitative information from financials (Beatty et 
al., 2018). In this regard, more specific risk items lead to a stronger market 
reaction (Hope et al., 2016). The information content of risk factors has also 
been validated: As the disclosure of oil-related risk can serve as proxy for risk 
associated with the oil price, the disclosure of other risks can be used to proxy 
those risks for which well-accepted proxies do not exist (Israelsen, 2014) such 
as supply chain risk. First studies rely on the information content revealed in 
the risk disclosure. Firms with greater exposure to key employee risk disclosed 
are smaller and more innovation-oriented. They have higher total and 
idiosyncratic stock return volatilities (Israelsen and Yonker, 2017). This again 
demonstrates that the firms’ risk disclosure in their annual report not only 
contains relevant and validated information, but is also explored from other 
angles.  
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4.2.3 Risk management 
Researchers have identified several operational strategies that reduce either the 
risk’s probability of occurrence or its loss (Ho et al., 2015). The strategies 
cover the development of robustness or resilience (e.g., Brandon-Jones et al., 
2014), supply chain agility (e.g., Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009), multi-
sourcing (e.g., Tomlin, 2006), information sharing (e.g., Dehning et al., 2007), 
or supplier development (e.g., Talluri et al., 2010). While these risk mitigation 
strategies can be effective, they involve coordinating activities across several 
stages of the supply chain and increase a firm’s dependence on its suppliers or 
customers. However, increasing the dependency on suppliers or customers is in 
itself a driver of a firm’s exposure to supply chain risk (Wagner and Bode, 
2006). In addition, if risk is transferred from one firm to another, risk can 
accumulate at one member of the supply chain or its different members might 
follow individual and possibly contradicting strategies (Hallikas et al., 2004). 
Hence, the focus of this study is on strategies that a firm can implement 
independently from other firms in its supply chain to manage supply chain risk.  
The discussion of such strategies typically revolves around redundancy or 
operational slack (Chopra and Sodhi, 2014). Slack refers to resources available 
to a firm in excess of actual requirements and serves as cushion to adapt to 
internal or external pressures (Bourgeois, 1981). Operational slack can be 
categorized as absorbed slack (Singh, 1986) because it is of low discretion 
(George, 2005). Inventory and capacity are two common forms of operational 
slack (Chopra and Sodhi, 2014). If the normal flow of goods is disrupted, 
operational slack does not address the corresponding root causes of disruptions, 
but rather mitigates the disruption’s immediate negative effects (Field et al., 
2006). It enables a firm to buy time such that the attention can be diverted from 
immediate firefighting to identifying a workaround as remediation. Operational 
slack can be employed to maintain operations, repair facilities, or obtain 
supplies from different sources, when severe disruptions materialize in the 
supply chain (MacKenzie et al., 2014). Consequently, the association between 
the level of operational leanness (as the inverse of operational slack) and firm 
performance or credit ratings exhibits a curvilinear relationship indicating that 
less slack is not always better (Bendig et al., 2017, Modi and Mishra, 2011). In 
contrast, operational slack can be beneficial for firm performance. Firms with 
more operational slack experience less negative stock market reactions to 
supply chain disruptions announced (Hendricks et al., 2009) and exhibit 
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superior performance if they operate in unstable environments (Kovach et al., 
2015). Besides these benefits on firm performance, operational slack lowers the 
likelihood of new venture failure (Azadegan et al., 2013a), has a positive 
(negative) effect on product exploitation (exploration) (Voss et al., 2009) and 
improves worker safety (Wiengarten et al., 2017).  
A second operational strategy is flexibility. It reflects a firm’s ability to adapt 
or respond effectively to change (Jack and Raturi, 2002). However, the two 
concepts of slack and flexibility are interwoven. Operational slack is an 
antecedent of flexibility because most firms derive their short-term flexibility 
from redundant operational resources like inventory or capacity (Jack and 
Raturi, 2002). To avoid conceptual ambiguity, this study’s focus is on how 
firms can invest in operational slack to manage identified risks. 
4.3 Conceptual Framework 
This essay studies the link between corporate supply chain risk exposure, 
operational slack, and firm performance. From an information processing 
perspective, firms require appropriate information processing capabilities to 
operate effectively in an uncertain environment (Tushman and Nadler, 1978). 
Firms can reduce the information processing requirements by the creation of 
self-contained tasks leading to slack and the introduction of slack into the 
firm’s operations (Galbraith, 1974). The most prominent forms of operational 
slack are inventory and redundancy as outlined in subsection 4.2.3. Figure 4 - 2 
depicts the conceptual framework and the relationships that are hypothesized.  
Figure 4-2: Conceptual framework guiding the analysis 
 
4.3.1 Supply and demand side risk 
When risk is conceptualized as the possible threat of a negative deviation from 
the expected performance, an increase in risk exposure implies that additional 
negative deviations from the expected result can occur. Events triggering a 
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deviation are key suppliers who cannot deliver input required for production 
(supply risk exposure) or customers who may refuse a new product (demand 
risk exposure). A firm with higher risk exposure faces more potential 
deviations and consequently a higher probability that at least one event 
materializes than a firm with lower risk exposure. Prior research has shown that 
the actual occurrence of such events has a severe negative effect on operational 
performance (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005a). These also reduce stock returns, 
increase stock price volatility, and reduce customer satisfaction. Therefore, a 
higher risk exposure increases the likelihood that the operational performance 
of a firm decreases. Exposure to risk requires a firm’s managers to monitor 
their firm’s current situation in the light of environmental developments. In 
addition, the managers must assess the extent to which the developments are 
relevant or irrelevant for their firm. The execution of such tasks requires 
resources. For example, the Procurement Risk Management Group at Hewlett 
Packard developed a suite of software tools to support risk management 
practices (Nagali et al., 2007). Moreover, firms develop potential action plans 
in anticipation of potential future disruptions as Mattel did to deal with 
potential disruptions (Pyke and Tang, 2010). These examples show that firms 
exposed to risk commit costly resources to risk management activities which 
harms operational performance. Finally, higher risk exposure leads to more 
variability in a firm’s cash flow (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). To smooth 
out the cash flow, the firm’s management may seek to decrease the corporate 
exposure at the expense of higher cost (Miller, 1998). On the one hand, slack 
resources can be introduced into a firm’s operations which is costly. On the 
other hand, tasks can be re-planned, re-adjusted, and re-aligned throughout an 
organization. This reduces operational efficiency as employees have to deviate 
from established working procedures and change existing production steps. 
Therefore, a higher risk exposure increases costs and reduces revenue, leading 
to lower profit: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the exposure to supply risk, the lower the 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the exposure to demand risk, the lower the 
financial performance. 
4.3.2 Risk mitigation strategies 
Slack absorbs external shocks and (partially) decouples a firm’s operations 
from the environment (Bourgeois, 1981). However, it reduces operational 
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efficiency, is costly, and may have only limited benefits. As shown in  
Figure 4-2, firms must evaluate whether operational slack actually mitigates the 
effects of the exposure to a given set of perceived operational risks (Galbraith, 
1973) and whether the resources fit to the environment (Tushman and Nadler, 
1978). As discussed above, we focus on capacity and inventory as operational 
slack resources in response to exposure to supply and demand risk. 
4.3.2.1 Inventory slack 
In practice firms carry inventory for several well-documented reasons, such as 
the risk inherent in the timing or rate of supply and demand. Inventories ensure 
the availability of goods despite delivery or production delays, serve as a hedge 
against price fluctuations, or smooth production if huge bulk orders are placed 
(e.g., Nahmias, 2009, Slack et al., 2007). Hence, they can improve the 
operational flow. The drawback of additional costs stemming from storage, 
loss, or obsolescence is also well documented (e.g., Nahmias, 2009, Slack et 
al., 2007). The production/manufacturing literature reveals comparable results: 
additional buffers of costly work-in-process inventory increase the capacity of 
production flow-lines (Conway et al., 1988). The cost-benefit trade-off of 
inventory has generated numerous empirical studies investigating inventory as 
well as the link of inventory to performance. Several studies have rejected the 
idea that firms with the smallest inventories perform best (e.g., Chen et al., 
2005, Eroglu and Hofer, 2011). One reason for this is environmental 
uncertainty. If the exposure to risk is low, the operational flow can be ensured 
at very low levels of inventory. In contrast, high inventory levels would result 
in increased cost only. However, if exposure to risk is high, inventory is 
required to ensure the operational flow. The cost for inventory is lower than 
cost from production interruptions. This view is supported by empirical results: 
They suggest that firms with more slack in their supply chain experience less 
pronounced stock market reactions to announced operational disruptions 
(Hendricks et al., 2009). Inventory is especially favorable if the disruption is 
short (Tomlin, 2006). These arguments suggest that firms holding higher levels 
of inventory in the presence of supply risk exhibit a lower performance decline 
than those with lower levels of inventory. 
Hypothesis 3a: The negative association between a firm’s exposure to 
supply risk and its financial performance is weaker if the 
firm has high levels of inventory slack than if the firm has 
low levels of inventory. 
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In contrast, the usefulness of inventory in the presence of demand risk is not as 
clear as in the presence of supply risk. Higher inventory can be 
counterproductive. Exposure to demand risk implies that the trend of demand 
carries risk in the sense that demand does not materialize as planned. If in this 
case raw materials continue to be sourced or finished goods produced, this 
introduces automatically slack. But more slack does not absolve a firm from re-
planning when demand does not materialize. On the contrary, a high level of 
inventory in the presence of demand risk leads to higher risk of obsolescence. If 
demand risk materializes (i.e., demand lower than expected), then inventory 
accumulates. The longer inventory has been stored, the greater the probability 
that either expiration dates have passed or products have become technically 
outdated. As a result, inventory is obsolete. It does not only lose value but may 
also be disposed at cost. Therefore, a higher exposure to demand risk leads to 
the higher risk of costly obsolete inventory. These arguments suggest that if 
firms are exposed to demand risk, they have a stronger performance decline 
with high inventory slack than firms with low inventory slack. 
Hypothesis 3b: The negative association between a firm’s exposure to 
demand risk and its financial performance is stronger if the 
firm has high levels of inventory slack than if the firm has 
low levels of inventory. 
4.3.2.2 Capacity slack 
Although a high utilization of capacity is good, the inverse-U-shaped 
relationship between production resource efficiency and performance indicates 
that a certain minimum level of resources is even better (Modi and Mishra, 
2011). Similar to the line of argument for inventory, a firm can use capacity 
slack to buffer its operations against outside contingencies (Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004). Empirical results suggest that capacity slack mitigates effects from the 
exposure to supply risk. Firms with high capacity experience less severe stock 
market reactions after they announce a supply chain disruption because they 
recover more quickly (Hendricks et al., 2009). Excess capacity is 
extraordinarily valuable in markets that are characterized by a high degree of 
demand instability (Kovach et al., 2015). In daily operations, if a disruption 
actually hits a firm and leads to the consumption and depletion of inventory, 
production must be halted, creating a backlog of orders. After the normal flow 
of goods is restored, excess capacity not only enables a firm to catch up more 
quickly on its production schedule, but allows it to reschedule and shift 
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production between sites or production flow lines. Customer orders can be 
fulfilled with only minor delays and backlogs cleared. Especially in service 
operations, capacity serves as a buffer to scale up production quickly (Ellram et 
al., 2004). In the healthcare industry, capacity is used to react quickly if tasks 
require more time than anticipated (Jack and Powers, 2004). Hence, we posit 
that firms that are exposed to supply-related risk but possess excess capacity 
have a lower performance decline than firms that have more capacity tied up. 
Hypothesis 4a: The negative association between a firm’s exposure to 
supply risk and its financial performance is weaker if the 
firm has high levels of capacity slack than if the firm has 
low levels of capacity. 
If some product is not approved or if a major customer goes bankrupt and 
cancels all its orders, a previously defined production plan becomes obsolete. 
On short notice, the reserved production capacity is idle, resulting in cost only. 
Production capacity or knowledge exclusively utilizable for a single product or 
customer even becomes obsolete and the investment is consequently sunk. Cost 
for capacity remains. As demand does not materialize, no revenue can be 
generated. Therefore, a higher exposure to demand risk results in idle capacity 
and lack of revenue:  
Hypothesis 4b: The negative association between a firm’s exposure to 
demand risk and its financial performance is stronger if the 
firm has high levels of capacity slack than if the firm has 
low levels of capacity. 
4.3.2.3 Interaction of slack resources 
The upshot of the preceding analysis is that operational strategies mitigate the 
exposure to supply-related risk. Inventory or capacity slack ensures the 
operational flow in the presence of uncertainty. Raw material inventory 
provides resources to maintain production despite of a supplier failure or 
additional finished goods inventory can be sold to keep up sales despite of a 
production interruption. In addition, capacity slack helps to increase production 
after the occurrence of a disruption to reduce the backlog of sales. However, the 
two operational strategies are not likely to act in isolation, but interdependently 
(Ennen and Richter, 2010). Firms that hold both, inventory and capacity slack 
can use both simultaneously to bridge the time between the occurrence of a 
disruption and its final resolution more efficiently. Although capacity enables a 
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firm to catch up its production schedules after a supply disruption, additional 
inventory then helps to boost capacity utilization by keeping additional work-
in-process buffers to reduce idle time of machinery. In the same vein, although 
inventory alone enables a firm to continue to sell finished products, additional 
capacity can be used to continue production at other locations or to dedicate 
other capacity to the disrupted product line. This suggests that simultaneous 
high levels of inventory and capacity slack create additional remedies to the 
exposure to supply-related risk. Due to the interaction of the operational 
strategies, a firm profits from the presence of both, inventory and capacity slack 
at the same time more than from the presence of a single resource.  
Hypothesis 5a: The total positive effect of joint inventory and capacity 
slack on the negative association between a firm’s exposure 
to supply risk and its financial performance is stronger than 
the sum of its parts.  
While capacity and inventory have a mitigating effect on the exposure to 
supply risk, they are presumed to have an exacerbating effect on the demand 
side. Investments in inventory or capacity in anticipation of a demand surge 
bear the risk of cost from obsolescence. However, again, inventory and 
capacity are likely to act interdependently. A firm that has only plenty of 
inventory, but little excess capacity can accept the inventory holding cost until 
demand resurges, while a firm with capacity but no inventory can continue to 
utilize its production capacity and produce to stock until demand surges. If 
inventory and capacity slack are both present, capacity is idle for a longer time. 
Before resuming production, inventory has to be used up. At the same time, 
costs are not only incurred for inventory holding but also for idle workers and 
machinery for production. Hence, such a firm will suffer more than if it only 
had one operational strategy in place. 
Hypothesis 5b: The total negative effect of joint inventory and capacity 
slack on the negative association between a firm’s exposure 
to demand risk and its financial performance is stronger 
than the sum of its parts.  
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Construction of the data set 
Data were obtained from the archival database in Compustat (Capital IQ North 
America Fundamentals Annual) and the electronic data gathering, analysis, and 
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retrieval system (EDGAR) of the SEC. The starting point was SEC release  
33-8591 effective December 2005, which introduced Item 1.A as delineated 
above. The unit of analysis was the firm-year that a firm’s central index key 
(CIK) and its date of the fiscal year end uniquely identify. The period 
investigated covers the fiscal years from 2006 until 2016. Industries in which 
operational strategies do not play a major role (e.g., banking, insurance, or 
services) were dropped from the analysis.  
Table 4-3: Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and pairwise correlations 
Variable M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Return 0.07 0.17 1.00              
(2) Supply 4.20 2.56 –0.11  1.00            
(3) Demand 3.53 2.45 –0.25  0.31  1.00          
(4) Inventory –0.01 0.90 –0.08  0.01 + 0.02 + 1.00        
(5) Capacity –0.01 0.89 –0.18  0.00 + 0.00 + 0.08  1.00      
(6) Size 6.19 2.10 0.53  –0.03  –0.17  –0.15  –0.12  1.00    
(7) Leverage 0.26 0.24 0.06  –0.00 + –0.01 + –0.05  0.03  0.37  1.00  
Note: n = 10,771. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown; 
correlations flagged with + are not significantly different from zero (𝑝 > 0.05), all 
others are significant at the 𝑝 < 0.001 level; supply and demand are lagged by 1 
period, inventory and capacity are standardized by industry-mean and standard 
deviation; size was transformed using the natural logarithm. 
 
Based on this scope, Appendix A delineates the multi-step-procedure in which 
the risk items were extracted from the annual reports and relevant financial data 
was matched to the extracted risk items. The results were compared to a 
previous study by Bao and Datta (2014) to investigate the quality of the 
extraction of risk items. The numbers of extracted risk items from both studies 
are highly correlated (0.90). In total, 10,771 firm-years (1,574 firms, on average 
(minimum, maximum) 6.8 (3, 10) observations per firm) were retained for the 
analysis. The number of observations, their mean and standard deviation, as 
well as all pair-wise correlations are displayed in Table 4-3. 
4.4.2 Risk exposure 
All risk items extracted formed the corpus of texts to be analyzed. This corpus 
reflected the structure of the risk items. Each risk item consists of one or two 
sentences describing a single risk. Many risks items reoccur over subsequent 
years. This corpus was analyzed by means of a sentence latent Dirichlet 
allocation (sLDA) algorithm that Bao and Datta (2014) developed for the 
analysis of the risk disclosure in Item 1.A. They adopted the original LDA by 
Blei et al. (2003) to exploit the unique structure of the risk items. As each risk 
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item deals with only one single topic, the sentence boundaries provide 
additional information on which words constitute one topic. As a result, instead 
of sampling words independently, all words of a sentence are sampled from the 
same topic (Bao and Datta, 2014). As the risk disclosure discusses a broad 
range of different topics, the sLDA was employed to identify supply- and 
demand related risk items and to quantify a firm’s exposure to such risks which 
allows to analyze the research question at finer granularity (George et al., 
2016). The sLDA achieves high quality in assigning and quantifying common 
topics in the risk disclosure: It has highest predictive power measured by 
perplexity and best cluster quality measured by the silhouette coefficient (Bao 
and Datta, 2014). Results of their extensive numerical studies show that the 
sLDA has a comparable quality to supervised algorithms but is far more 
reliable. It has highest precision for 30 to 40 topics.  
To build the topic model, the textual data was processed to extract the most 
meaningful words characterizing a distinctive topic. In addition to the steps 
outlined in Appendix B, a metric indicating the distinctiveness of a word was 
calculated. The purpose of the metric is to identify the words that are used by 
firms across different industries to capture rather broad themes of risk but not 
firm-specific ones. At the same time, the words should not be boilerplate (i.e., 
applicable to any situation). The computed metric is similar to the “term 
frequency inverse document frequency” (tf-idf). The tf-idf reflects the 
importance of a word in a corpus of documents. The counted number of 
appearances of a term in a document is divided by the number of documents in 
which the term occurs. The intuition of this calculation is that the more 
frequently a word occurs, the more important it is. However, if many 
documents use the word, then it is less distinctive. The metric applied in this 
study is calibrated to the data structure present. Other studies have also 
developed their metrics to distillate the most important words (e.g., Hasan et 
al., 2015). The nominator is the percentage of firms using a specific word. The 
denominator is the natural logarithm of the average fraction of a firm’s risk 
items that contain the word. The firm’s fraction of risk items containing a word 
is used instead of the absolute value in order to avoid distortions by very long 
risk disclosures. The intuition of the metric is as follows. The more firms use a 
specific word, the more likely it is to be relevant for a broad group of firms. 
However, the higher is the percentage of risk items of a firm that contain the 
word, the more likely it is that the word applies to a wide set of different 
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situations. Words that score high are used by several firms in only few risk 
items on average. These words are potentially relevant. In contrast, words that 
score low are either used by very few firms or in a large fraction of risk items. 
The former case excludes words on firm-specific risks while the latter case 
excludes words that are used in many situations. All words that score lower 
than two were excluded from the relevant words of the period. In total, the 
corpus of relevant words comprises 981 distinctive terms ranging from 344 
terms in 2006 to 847 terms in 2016.  
Figure 4-3: Computation of the scores for the exposure to supply- and demand-
related risk 
 
 
Figure 4-3 describes the computation of the supply and demand risk scores. 
After preparing the corpus of texts, the topic model is run with 34 topics. The 
algorithm simultaneously identifies the underlying topic structure of the 
documents and assigns each risk item to a topic (Bao and Datta, 2014). Its 
output is twofold: On the one hand, the topics are characterized by the most 
frequent words describing the topic. On the other hand, each risk item is 
assigned to a topic. The number of 34 topics serves as compromise between a 
higher granularity of topics (like 40 or 50) and the robustness of the assignment 
of risk item to topic. The key words per topic are robust to the number of 
topics. Two researchers manually labeled all topics based on each topic’s most 
frequent words and each topic’s compilation of risk items. Although automated 
labeling procedures exist, they are not applicable if solid background 
knowledge is required (Mei et al., 2007). All supply- and demand-related topics 
were then grouped into the two broader categories supply and demand, after 
discussions with other scholars in seminars and workshops. All other topics 
detected cover risks unrelated to supply chain management. Examples for these 
topics are the lack of human resources, volatility in the stock price, or lack of 
refinancing. The risk items assigned to these topics were not further considered.  
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Table 4-4: Supply- and demand-related topics extracted from 10-K reports’ Item 
1.A using sLDA 
Cat Topic Topic label Key words Sample 
S
u
p
p
ly
 
0 Disruption in 
production 
natural 
facility 
production 
disaster 
manufacturing 
The impact of natural disasters could negatively 
impact our supply chain and customers resulting in 
an adverse impact to our revenues and profitability. 
3 Dependence on 
contract 
manufacturing 
party 
rely 
development 
manufacture 
delay 
We have no capacity to manufacture clinical or 
commercial supplies of our product candidates and 
intend to rely solely on third parties to manufacture 
clinical and commercial supplies of all of our 
product candidates. 
17 Dependence on 
joint 
development 
license 
agreement 
contract 
development 
right 
We are dependent on technology systems and third-
party content that are beyond our control. 
22 Supply issues supplier 
supply 
component 
party 
raw 
As we rely on a limited number of third parties to 
manufacture, assemble and test our IC products and 
to supply required parts and materials, we are 
exposed to significant supplier risks. 
23 International 
risks 
foreign 
currency 
international 
fluctuation 
rate 
We manufacture a significant portion of our 
products outside the United States, and political, 
societal or economic instability may present 
additional risks to our business. 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
4 Market 
competition 
competition 
competitive 
industry 
compete 
competitor 
We face intense competition and rapid technological 
change that could result in products superior to the 
products we are developing. 
9 Product 
approval 
approval 
regulatory 
obtain 
requirement 
regulation 
We may be unable to complete our BTT study or 
obtain regulatory approvals, which will prevent us 
from selling our products and generating revenue. 
25 Market 
acceptance 
party 
reimbursement 
marketing 
revenue 
acceptance 
MelaFind may not be commercially viable if we fail 
to obtain an adequate level of reimbursement by 
Medicare, Medicaid and other third party payers. 
26 Product 
approval 
approval 
regulatory 
delay 
development 
clinical 
Ethical and other concerns surrounding the use of 
stem cells may negatively affect regulatory approval 
or public perception of our product candidates. 
31 Industry 
demand 
economic 
industry 
demand 
global 
downturn 
Current uncertainty in global economic conditions 
makes it particularly difficult to predict demand for 
our products and forecast revenues, and makes it 
more likely that our actual results could differ 
materially from expectations. 
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Both the supply-related risk category and the demand-related risk category 
consist of five topics each from the sLDA. As a result, every risk item is either 
assigned to the category of supply-related risk, to the category of demand-
related risk or discarded. Table 4-4 describes the relevant sLDA-topics and 
their mapping to the categories of supply- and demand-related risk. Other 
studies in the field of accounting that have applied the LDA to annual reports 
have also aggregated the number of topics to broad categories (e.g., Dyer et al., 
2016).  
Let 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑚 and 𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝 denote the sets of demand- and supply-related risk items 
respectively. 𝟏𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘∈𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑚 is an indicator function indicating the membership of 
the 𝑘th risk item of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 (𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘) to the set of demand-related risk 
items 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑚.  
1𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡,𝑘∈𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑚 = {
 1  𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 ∈ 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑚
 0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The risk exposure to demand-related risk of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is then calculated as 
the sum of the indicator function values for the 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 risk items 𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘 of firm 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 1𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘∈𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑚
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝑘=1
 
The exposure to supply-related risk is calculated analogously based on the set 
of supply-related risk items 𝑅𝑆𝑢𝑝. The measurements for the exposure to 
supply- and demand-related risk as well as the total number of extracted risk 
items are then compared to the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating that is 
available in the Compustat database. In the case of S&P credit rating in 
Compustat there are seven rating categories, the highest credit quality being 
A+, and the lowest C. The credit ratings reflect the default probability of the 
bonds issued (A+: low default probability, C: high default probability). A bond 
is in default (D), if the issuer is not able to redeem either a coupon or the 
underlying principal. The literal ratings are recoded as numeric values with 1 
corresponding to the A+ rating and 8 corresponding to C rating. Hence, the 
lower the value of the credit rating the lower is the default probability. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the measurement of demand- 
and supply-related risk as well as the total number of risk items and the credit 
rating is computed because all variables are not continuous. The correlation of 
Supply Chain Risk and Risk Mitigation: Which Strategies are the Most Efficient? 
84 
0.25 between the total number of risk items and the S&P credit rating indicates 
that the number of risk items reflects some information of the credit rating. This 
reinforces the view that the number of risk items disclosed is a meaningful 
proxy for the risk exposure of a firm. The correlation between the credit rating 
and supply- and demand-related risk is 0.15 and 0.12, respectively. The results 
illustrate that while supply- and demand-related risk items are associated with 
bankruptcy probability, exposure to them is not as severe as it is to the full 
bundle of risk items including stock market risk, refinancing risk, or regulation 
risk.  
4.4.3 Risk mitigation and performance 
The return on assets proxies the performance of a firm. The return on assets 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is operationalized by dividing a firm’s earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization 𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑖,𝑡 by its book value of 
assets 𝑏𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑡: 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑖,𝑡
𝑏𝑣𝑎𝑖,𝑡
 
The higher a firm’s return on assets 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡, the higher its performance. On the 
one hand, this metric is highly aggregated and generated on the same corporate 
level as the independent variables of supply- and demand-related risk exposure. 
On the other hand, it encapsulates the efficiency in employing the given assets. 
Furthermore, previous studies have also used the 𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎 to capture the 
performance (e.g., Paeleman and Vanacker, 2015).  
A firm’s inventory slack 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 was measured as the days of inventory of firm 
𝑖 in year 𝑡. The variable is calculated as a firm’s inventory position at the end of 
the current year 𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡, divided by its annual cost of goods sold 𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
(for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡): 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡
 
Firms with higher values of inventory slack 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 have more days of 
inventory available and can utilize this to decouple from outside contingencies. 
Previous studies have used these measurements for inventory slack (Hendricks 
et al., 2009). 
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To measure a firm’s capacity slack 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡, we use the ratio of a firm’s gross 
property, plant, and equipment at the end of year 𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡, to annual sales 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡): 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
Firms with higher values of capacity slack 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 have more capacity to 
achieve their sales. They can use this as an additional buffer in their operations 
to produce at different locations or catch up production after an unavailable 
supply incident. We followed prior studies in using the metric (Hendricks et al., 
2009).  
Both slack measures were industry-adjusted (4-level SIC code). First, period 𝑡’s 
industry-mean was subtracted from each observation. The difference was then 
divided by the period’s industry standard deviation. The industry-adjusted slack 
measures reflect the extent to which a firm has above or below industry average 
levels of slack measured by industry standard deviations. Consequently, the 
slack measures are comparable across the different industries. Such 
standardization is common practice in empirical studies (e.g., Hendricks et al., 
2009).  
Firm-specific intercepts account for the influence of any time-constant factors 
that affect a firm (as discussed in subsection 4.5.1). They absorb a firm’s long-
term strategies and its disclosure orientation, as well as control for industry 
fixed effects. In addition, cross-sectional time fixed effects account for any 
economic events affecting all firms. Therefore, only time-varying firm 
individual factors with an influence on performance must be controlled for. 
Prior studies have considered the leverage ratio and the firm size as such factors 
(e.g., Mishra et al., 2013, Paeleman and Vanacker, 2015). The leverage ratio 
represents the financial health and strength that a firm has in a certain period. A 
higher leverage indicates financial distress which limits the firm’s room for 
mobility to exploit future market opportunities (Opler and Titman, 1994). The 
leverage ratio of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is calculated from the firm’s book value of 
debt divided by its sum of the book values of debt and equity. In addition, 
bigger firms were found to be more profitable. The natural logarithm of a 
firm’s annual total sales controls for firm size.  
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4.5 Analysis 
4.5.1 Model specification 
Due to the longitudinal data structure of firms observed over years, the 
estimation model was specified as a firm- and period fixed effects model with 
panel-clustered robust standard errors. The Lagrange multiplier test suggested 
by Breusch and Pagan (1980) indeed indicated a firm-specific intercept  
(𝑝 < 0.001); hence, the firm-effects could not be pooled. As the predictors are 
correlated with the unit effects, the Hausman test was rejected and, 
consequently a fixed effects estimator was chosen (Mundlak, 1978). The  
t-statistics were computed using panel-clustered robust standard errors because 
these are unbiased and produce correctly-sized confidence intervals (Stock and 
Watson, 2008) in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Wald test for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity, 𝑝 < 0.001) and autocorrelation (Wooldridge’s test,  
𝑝 < 0.001). To control for period effects across firms (𝑝 < 0.001), year 
dummies were used, as this method is the most efficient for short panel data 
(Petersen, 2009). 
Apart from the methodological arguments, a fixed effects estimator allows us to 
concentrate on variance within a firm. Specifically, factors explaining various 
levels of performance were controlled to focus on the firm-individual effect of 
additional risk exposure on performance. Operationally, the xtreg-routine with 
fixed effects in Stata 14.2 was used to estimate the following models: 
Null model (NM): 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖,0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏3,𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
2016
𝑗=2008
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
 
Base model (BM): 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖,0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏7,𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
2016
𝑗=2008
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(6) 
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Interaction model (2IM): 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖,0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡    
+ 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏8 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏9 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏10 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑏11,𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
2016
𝑗=2008
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(7) 
 
Three-way interaction model (3IM): 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖,0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏8 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏9 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏10 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏11 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏12 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏13,𝑗 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗
2016
𝑗=2008
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(8) 
 
In these equations, 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 represents the dependent variable of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
The intercept 𝑏𝑖,0 accounts for firm-specific time-constant effects. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑝,𝑖,𝑡−1 
and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1 measure the lagged exposure to supply- and demand-related 
risks of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1. 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑙𝑖,𝑡 refer to inventory and 
capacity slack of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 standardized by industry mean and standard 
deviation. 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 control for firm size and leverage ratio of firm 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗  accounts for time-effects, with 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗 = 1 if 𝑗 = 𝑡 and 0 
otherwise. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the random error term for shared errors between firm 𝑖 and 
year 𝑡. All variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile to address outliers 
(e.g., Aguinis et al., 2013, Chen et al., 2005, Dehning et al., 2007). For an 
additional robustness check, the model was estimated in a pooled regression to 
derive variance inflation factors (VIFs). These serve as upper limits to identify 
any variance-induced biases. VIF values ranged from 1.03 to 2.04 for the 
estimation models, indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. 
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4.5.2 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity poses a serious threat to the validity of empirical results. Its most 
frequent causes are reverse causality, measurement error, or omitted variable 
bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Although the absence of endogeneity cannot be 
proven, this study fulfills reasonable standards for plausible exogeneity of the 
regressors (cf. Ketokivi and McIntosh, 2017). The arguments revolve around 
the lagging of the independent variables, the measurement of variables, and the 
specification as fixed effects panel data estimator.  
First, the time lag between the independent risk variables and the dependent 
performance variable addresses reverse causality. Hence, retrospective 
justifications of performance declines are not an issue. Although one could 
claim that an anticipated performance decline leads to an increase in risk 
disclosure, this is exactly the purpose of the risk disclosure: to inform investors 
about possible future threats. In addition, the time lag between the independent 
variables and the moderators ensures that firms do not use the risk disclosure as 
post-hoc means to defend wrong operational decisions. The time lag supports 
the view that firms learn about their environment and then take actions which 
are reflected in their performance. 
Second, measurement error is addressed by minimizing the risk of common 
method bias which is one of the main sources of measurement error (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). The dependent and independent variables are not only calculated 
from secondary data sources, but were obtained from different data sources. 
The risk variables are derived from qualitative descriptions of the risk 
disclosure in annual reports which can be used to proxy a firm’s exposure to 
specific categories of risk (Israelsen, 2014). On the other hand, the operational 
strategies and performance are derived from a firm’s financial data that have 
been widely applied in operations management (Hendricks et al., 2009, Kovach 
et al., 2015). The measurement problem persists in the sense that firms can 
strategically disclose or withhold information in their annual reports. However, 
this problem is not limited to textual disclosures but is also found in other 
forms of financial reporting. The major argument is that the cross-sectional size 
of the data set helps to average out this firm-individual strategic behavior. 
Third, omitted variable bias is addressed by the specification as a fixed effects 
model with firm-specific intercepts. These intercepts absorb any unobserved 
heterogeneity that is stable over time. The fixed- instead of a random effects 
model allows the firm-specific effects to be correlated with the regressors 
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which is the case as previously discussed. The model only assumes that the 
independent variables are uncorrelated with each other and with the residual 
disturbance. We find that the independent variables and moderating variables 
are uncorrelated (Table 4-3). To address concerns of time-varying confounders, 
time-fixed as well as time- and firm-variant controls are included. These 
controls are discussed in subsection 4.4.3.  
4.5.3 Results 
The variables were standardized before creating the interaction terms to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results. While the BM includes the main 
effects and the control variables (𝐹 = 35.63, 𝑝 < 0.001), the 2IM integrates 
the moderating effects of inventory and capacity (𝐹 = 28.82, 𝑝 < 0.001) and 
the 3IM also captures the interaction of the two operational slack strategies 
(𝐹 = 26.61, 𝑝 < 0.001).  
Table 4-5: Results of fixed effects regression analysis 
 Base model 2-way model 3-way model 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Supply –0.007 * (0.003) –0.008 * (0.003) –0.008 ** (0.003) 
Demand –0.009 * (0.004) –0.010 * (0.004) –0.010 * (0.004) 
Inventory –0.002 (0.003) –0.002 (0.003) –0.002 (0.003) 
Capacity –0.016 *** (0.003) –0.016 *** (0.003) –0.017 *** (0.003) 
Supply × Inventory    0.004 * (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 
Demand × Inventory    –0.006 ** (0.002) –0.007 ** (0.002) 
Supply × Capacity    0.005 * (0.002) 0.004 † (0.003) 
Demand × Capacity    0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 
Supply × Inventory × Capacity      0.003 * (0.002) 
Demand × Inventory × Capacity      0.000 (0.001) 
Size 0.098 *** (0.006) 0.099 *** (0.006) 0.099 *** (0.006) 
Leverage –0.103 *** (0.012) –0.103 *** (0.012) –0.104 *** (0.012) 
Constant –0.493 *** (0.035) –0.498 *** (0.035) –0.498 *** (0.035) 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
R² within (R² adjusted) 0.201 (0.709) 0.205 (0.710) 0.206 (0.710) 
AIC –24,505.68 –24,551.19 –24,562.45 
BIC –24,425.26 –24,449.32 –24,449.86 
Observations 10,771 10,771 10,771 
Number of firms 1,574 1,574 1,574 
Note: SE refers to robust standard errors clustered at the firm level; BIC calculated with 
number of firms. 
 † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed). 
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As shown in Table 4-5, the R² (within) increases from 0.201 to 0.206 (adjusted 
R² from 0.709 to 0.710) when the interaction effects are added. Finally, both 
Akaike’s (AIC) and Schwarz’s (BIC) Bayesian information criteria indicate 
that the IMs fit the data better as their values become smaller. This is statistical 
and empirical support for the moderating effects of operational strategies in the 
presence of supply- and demand-related risks. The hypothesized relationships 
between a firm’s performance and its exposure to supply chain risk received 
support from the data. The base model estimates suggest that firms facing more 
risk related to supply (H1) and demand (H2) exhibit a lower performance. As 
expected, supply side risk (BM: 𝑏1 = −0.007, 𝑝 < 0.05) and demand side risk 
(BM: 𝑏2 = −0.009, 𝑝 < 0.05) are negatively associated with return on assets. 
A one-standard-deviation (SD) increase in supply (demand) risk is related to a 
decrease of 𝑟𝑜𝑎 of 70 (90) basis points. In addition, capacity  
(BM: 𝑏4 = −0.016, 𝑝 < 0.001) is negatively associated with return. These 
results are in line with prior research (e.g., Modi and Mishra, 2011). When 
looking at the results of the interaction models, the estimates indicate support 
for the mitigating effect of inventory slack on the relationship between supply- 
and demand-related risks and performance. Specifically, firms with high 
inventory slack were hypothesized to have a weaker negative association 
between supply-related risk and return (H3a) but a stronger negative 
association between demand-related risk and return (H3b) than firms with low 
inventory slack. As predicted by Hypothesis 3a, inventory positively moderates 
the relationship between supply risk and return (2IM: 𝑏5 = 0.004, 𝑝 < 0.05). 
The interaction plot in Figure 4-4a highlights that as supply risk increases, 
firms with both high (+1 SD) and low (–1 SD) inventory experience a decline in 
performance. However, firms with high inventory slack have a flatter 
performance decline compared to firms with low inventory if supply risk 
increases. As a result, in the presence of high supply-related risk, firms with 
high inventory exhibit a higher performance than firms with low inventory. The 
effect hypothesized in Hypothesis 3b was also found. In line with Hypothesis 
3b, inventory negatively moderates the relationship between demand risk and 
return. Figure 4-4b illustrates that firms with both high (+1 SD) and low  
(–1 SD) inventory exhibit a lower performance as demand risk increases. 
Similar to supply-related risk, more inventory-efficient firms exhibit a higher 
performance than less inventory-efficient firms for an average level of demand-
related risk. In contrast to supply-related risk but in line with the hypothesized 
moderating effect of inventory on the association of demand risk and 
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performance, firms with high inventory have a much steeper performance 
decline than firms with low levels of inventory as demand risk increases  
(2IM: 𝑏6 = −0.006, 𝑝 < 0.01). 
Figure 4-4: Interaction plots between types of risk (supply and demand) and 
operational mitigation strategies (inventory and capacity) 
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Note: The plots are based on standardized estimates reported in Table 4-5. The 
interactions are plotted at one standard deviations above (“high”) and below 
(“low”) the mean values of the moderator variables. 
 
The results provide partial support for the idea that capacity slack moderates 
the relationship between supply- and demand-related risks and performance. 
Firms with high levels of capacity slack were hypothesized to have a weaker 
negative association between supply-related risk than firms with low levels of 
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capacity slack (H4a). In contrast to supply risk, the negative association 
between demand-related risk and return was hypothesized to be stronger for 
firms with high levels of capacity slack than for firms with low levels of 
capacity slack (H4b). In line with Hypothesis 4a, the results suggest that 
capacity slack positively moderates the relationship between supply risk and 
return (2IM: 𝑏7 = 0.005, 𝑝 < 0.05). As supply risk increases, firms with high 
(+1 SD) and low (–1 SD) capacity realize a decline in performance  
(cf. Figure 4-4c). The slopes are different though. Firms with low levels of 
capacity have a steeper decline in performance than firms with high levels of 
capacity if supply risk increases. However, firms with low levels of capacity 
always exhibit a higher performance than firms with high levels of capacity. In 
Hypothesis 4b, capacity slack was expected to increase the negative effect of 
demand-related risk on performance. The results do not support Hypothesis 4b 
(2IM: 𝑏8 = 0.000, 𝑝 > 0.10).  
Finally, the results partially support the prediction that inventory and capacity 
slack amplify each other’s positive (negative) effect on the association between 
supply-related (demand) risk and return. More specifically in Hypothesis 5a, it 
was expected that the existence of joint inventory and capacity slack weakens 
the negative association between a firm’s supply-related risk and its 
performance stronger than their sum while the opposite was expected for their 
effect on the association between demand-related risk and performance 
(Hypothesis 5b). The results provide support for Hypothesis 5a  
(3IM: 𝑏9 = 0.003, 𝑝 < 0.05). Figure 4-4d illustrates that the slope is positive if 
both levels of capacity and inventory are high (+1 SD), but negative if either or 
both levels of capacity and inventory are low (–1 SD). In other words, if a firm 
has both inventory and capacity slack then the performance is higher than if 
either is missing. Therefore, the joint effect of inventory and capacity slack on 
the association between supply-related risk and performance is larger than its 
parts. A comparison of slopes reveals that the slope of inventory and capacity 
slack is indeed different from other cases. The results do not provide support 
for Hypothesis 5b (3IM: 𝑏10 = 0.000, 𝑝 > 0.10). The hypothesized joint 
negative effect of inventory and capacity on the association between demand-
related risk and performance is not confirmed. 
As all variables of interest were winsorized at the 99th percentile, all results 
were also computed with a data set in which variables were not winsorized and 
in which observations above the 99th percentile were dropped. Results are 
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robust in direction and size. In addition, robustness checks were conducted for 
different performance outcome measures and different controls of firm size. 
Again, results remain robust in direction and size. 
4.6 Discussion 
This study investigates how the exposure to supply- and demand-related risk 
influences performance and which operational strategies mitigate the negative 
association with the lowest negative performance impact. The results provide 
additional empirical support for the claim that the success of operational risk 
mitigation strategies depends on their fit to the environment: Firms that operate 
in VUCA environments, as highlighted in the introduction, can use different 
operational strategies to mitigate negative performance impacts. These results 
make several important contributions to the literature related to operational 
strategies. 
First, we propose a novel approach to measure the ex-ante downside exposure 
to supply- and demand-related risks firms face. The risk section of a firm’s 
annual report is scrutinized by means of a sLDA to detect risks that deal with 
supply or demand. One additional risk item about supply- or demand-related 
risk in a firm’s annual report is interpreted as an increase in the ex-ante 
downside exposure to supply- or demand-related risk. This measurement is an 
improvement over those presented in previous studies that rely on ex-post 
information on materialized disruptions (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal, 2005b), 
and that do not allow for an ex-ante evaluation of the effectiveness of 
operational strategies (Wagner and Bode, 2008). Others have approximated the 
ex-ante risk exposure using either variables describing the environment (e.g., 
Azadegan et al., 2013a) or sales data (Kovach et al., 2015). However, both 
ways of measuring ex-ante risk also contain upside potentials. As the 
measurement derived from the corporate risk disclosure directly captures the 
ex-ante downside risk exposure of a firm, it more accurately reflects managers’ 
perceptions of risk (Mao, 1970, March and Shapira, 1987). The results suggest 
that an increase in the exposure to supply or demand risk has a negative 
influence on firm performance. This finding is in line with prior research on 
materialized supply chain disruptions (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003).  
Second, the results of this study contribute to a better understanding of the 
conditions under which certain operational strategies are beneficial, responding 
to calls for further research (Kovach et al., 2015, Schoenherr et al., 2012, 
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Talluri et al., 2013). Although the exposure to supply risk has a negative impact 
on firm performance, operational slack can alleviate it. Firms that have more 
inventory or capacity exhibit a lower performance decline than firms with less 
inventory or capacity. This result is in line with prior research (Hendricks et al., 
2009). However, inventory is more efficient than capacity. While firms with 
high level of inventory outperform firms with low level of inventory if the 
exposure to supply-related risk is high, this does not hold for capacity. Even if 
firms are exposed to supply-related risk, low-capacity-firms still outperform 
high-capacity-firms. Moreover, the right mix of operational strategies 
influences the performance. Operating in environments characterized by high 
exposure to supply risk, firms with joint higher levels of inventory and capacity 
outperform firms that have only one or none of the risk mitigation strategies in 
place. 
In contrast, the negative association between the exposure to demand-related 
risk and performance is exacerbated by high inventory slack. This result might 
appear contradictory to prior results which suggest that supply chain slack 
mitigates the influence of instability on performance (Kovach et al., 2015). 
However, the conceptualization of risk strongly affects a firm’s optimal 
decision of the short-term cost structure (Banker et al., 2014). If risk is 
conceptualized as a variation around an expected value, then firms should 
accept higher fixed costs to be able to exploit the upside potential from 
variability. If risk is conceptualized as a negative deviation from an expected 
outcome, firms should aim at reducing fixed costs. In this regard, fixed and 
variable cost are distinguished in terms of cost for adjusting prior decisions 
(Banker and Byzalov, 2014), which corresponds to the notion of operational 
slack as absorbed slack (Singh, 1986). These can be incurred for either ill-
planned inventory or capacity. In contrast to Kovach et al. (2015) who 
measured risk as variation around an expected value, our study conceives risk 
as potential downside threat. The results suggest that a firm’s investment into 
operational slack is not beneficial for a firm exposed to demand-side risk. An 
economic example that illustrates the logic is changed customer preferences 
that render a product obsolete. If a firm invested in inventory solely usable for 
the production of that product, this inventory would become obsolete and 
would have to be salvaged at cost. 
Third, this essay proposes a new idea for the measurement of corporate risk 
exposure. While this study focuses on exposure on supply chain risk, the risk 
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disclosure section of annual reports discusses all the material risk that a firm 
faces and hence covers a broader range of topics like risk from innovation, 
financing problems, or regulatory issues. In subsequent research, strategy 
scholars can scrutinize the risk disclosure in annual reports to identify topics 
that are relevant for their research. To this end, a new approach and data source 
is proposed to gain direct insights about managers’ risk perceptions that reflect 
recognized developments in the external environment (Bansal et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, measurements like expenditures for research and development 
have been shown to be problematic (Bromiley et al., 2017).  
For managers, the results provide additional empirical evidence that the 
effective management of supply chain risks provides a competitive advantage 
and contributes to superior firm performance. On the one hand, operational 
managers must carefully investigate the sources of the risk to which they are 
exposed. While operational strategies effectively tackle supply-related risk and 
reduce its negative effect on performance, they exacerbate the association 
between demand-related risk and performance. Only if managers find that 
supply-related risk is present, they should consider operational slack. However, 
if supply-related risk is present, operational managers must choose an 
operational strategy. Based on the results of this study, operational managers 
should prefer investments in inventory because this appears to have a less 
negative effect on performance than investments in capacity. A firm’s 
managers should try to reduce inventory levels if their firm is facing severe 
downstream risk. 
This study must be considered in light of its limitations pertaining to data and 
methodology. First, the limitations of large-scale empirical research apply. Data 
of firms that are publicly listed in the United States and belong in the 
manufacturing sector were used to test the proposed relationships. Firms in 
other industries, operating in other countries, or not publicly listed might have 
different requirements or pursue different objectives. Consequently, the 
generalizability of the findings might be limited. Further research can explore 
these issues. Second, an assumption underlying the use of secondary financial 
data and information from annual reports is that they accurately represent a 
firm’s true financial condition and that there are no accounting 
misrepresentations or manipulations. Further research is suggested using other 
data sources. Third, the data are highly aggregated at the firm level. Many of 
the firms have different business units with several products involving different 
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suppliers, investment alternatives, and inventory policies. The measures for 
inventory and capacity slack are also distant from the real business world, 
although scholars have frequently used the same or similar constructs in 
previous studies. An analysis on product level with more fine-grained 
constructs might result in more nuanced results. We leave these issues to 
further research. Fourth, apart from these drawbacks on data and the variables’ 
measurements, this study utilizes qualitative textual data to measure a firm’s 
exposure to supply chain risk. Although annual reports have previously been 
used as source of information in operations management (e.g., Davies and 
Joglekar, 2013) and tools are applied that have been developed for other 
studies, textual analysis yields soft information (Tsai and Wang, 2017). 
Different text extraction methods might lead to different extracted risk 
disclosures, which then might be clustered and labeled differently. A fixed 
effects model was used for the regression analysis. Although such models 
produce robust estimates in the presence of heteroscedastic and auto-correlated 
data, all variance between groups is henceforth neglected. Further research on 
these data is suggested to apply different text mining algorithms or regression 
methods to extract more information from the data. Finally, mitigation 
strategies to tackle demand side risk remain unexplored. By integrating ideas 
from marketing or strategy, future research can develop additional mitigation 
strategies that then resolve demand-related risks. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this study, the risk qualitatively disclosed in firms’ annual reports was used 
to measure the risk to which the firms are exposed. These data allow the 
differentiation between the sources of supply chain risk, which are supply side 
and demand side risks. The derived results suggest a negative relationship 
between supply- and demand-related risks and performance. This negative 
relationship between risks on the one hand and performance on the other is 
partially alleviated by operational strategies. Operational strategies only 
mitigate supply-related risk, leaving demand-related risk unaddressed at best. 
This study’s findings are linked to prior results in accounting and operations 
management. 
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5 Conclusion and Outlook 
5.1 Summary 
Firms do not operate in an accommodating world, but in reality are confronted 
with challenges which are difficult to anticipate and can interfere with a firm’s 
planned operations. However, not every firm faces the same challenges. The 
number and types of potentially relevant challenges and consequently the 
potential risk exposure will depend on prior decisions (e.g., operating location 
decisions), the industrial environment (e.g., competitors’ activities), and current 
and past strategies (e.g., internationalization strategy). Moreover, should a 
given risk materialize, the firms affected can employ operational strategies to 
cope with the consequences in such a way that they can swiftly resume 
production. Despite its importance, the potential risk exposure has been largely 
neglected in research up to now. On the one hand, previous research has only 
specified various categories of supply chain risk without explaining which 
external uncertainties might turn into a given type of risk for an individual firm. 
On the other, it has provided abundant empirical evidence that actual events 
indeed do pose a real threat to a firm and should have been managed 
accordingly. However, such research was unable to explain to what extent the 
firms affected were potentially exposed to this risk prior to its occurrence, and 
whether the mitigation of the potential risk exposure would have made 
economic sense. On order to remedy this negligence of a firm’s potential risk 
exposure, this dissertation builds on the contingency theory and information 
processing theory literatures and presents a new approach for the measurement 
of a firm’s risk exposure based on a textual analysis of the publicly available 
10-K reports for a given firm. Inter alia, firms provide operations-related 
information in their 10-K reports (e.g., risk factors in Item 1.A, locations in 
Item 2). By linking additional data on a firm’s financial performance and 
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natural disaster occurrences with the data from the 10-K reports, this 
dissertation empirically analyzes whether firms remain effective if they are 
confronted with sudden and unforeseen change in their environment and how 
they respond to such changes. 
The study in Chapter 2 investigates empirically the moderating effect of the 
industrial environment on the relationship between the effect of a natural 
disaster on a firm’s production network and its subsequent performance. The 
study has been motivated by the observation that economies rebound quickly 
from the destruction caused by natural disasters, provided that aid is directed to 
the right recipients and the economy’s original production capabilities are 
restored. Transferring these insights to the firm level, the industrial 
environment, and specifically its three attributes of complexity, munificence, 
and dynamism, is presumed to play a role for the negative association between 
the effect of a natural disaster on a firm’s production network and its 
subsequent performance: In particular, the performance of firms that operate in 
industrial environments characterized by high complexity, high munificence, or 
low dynamism is presumed to be more negatively affected by a natural disaster 
than that of firms operating in industrial environments where the conditions are 
precisely the opposite. The key arguments revolve around competitive forces, 
the managers’ risk preferences, and the accumulated experience in coping with 
change in the said industry. For the development of the required data set, a 
NER tagger has been deployed to analyze Item 2 of a firm’s 10-K report and to 
identify the locations of the firm’s plants. These data have been augmented by 
data on disaster occurrences and financials. Based on the resulting data set, the 
hypotheses developed are tested utilizing a difference-in-difference regression 
model. The results suggest that natural disasters are definitely harmful for firms 
and that their negative impact is indeed moderated by the two industrial 
environment’s attributes of complexity and munificence. The study makes 
several important contributions. To begin with, the textual analysis of Item 2 
presents a novel approach for constructing a firm’s production network which 
is based on publicly available data. Up to now, studies have approximated 
production networks based on the subsidiaries’ names or the location of patent 
filings. In addition, this study accumulates further knowledge which confirms 
that natural disasters do have a negative effect on a firm’s performance. Based 
on this negative relationship, the study identifies two boundary conditions for 
this negative relationship. If a firm operates in industrial environments 
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characterized by low complexity or munificence, disasters have much less 
effect on its performance. By contrast, if it operates in industrial environments 
characterized by high complexity or munificence, natural disasters have a 
stronger negative effect on the firm’s performance. These results have 
important implications for managers and policymakers. Managers must not 
only be aware of the risk of natural disasters when deciding on the geographic 
location of their production facilities but must also take into account the 
industrial environment in which their firm operates. When policymakers decide 
on the allocation of disaster relief aid after a natural disaster has occurred, they 
should also consider the industrial environments in which firms affected 
operate. 
Chapter 3 presents an empirical study on the sources of supply risk. The study 
has been motivated by the observation that the interplay between strategic 
choices, industrial environment, and context not only has strong implications 
for a firm’s performance, but also contributes to its exposure to supply risk. On 
the one hand, exposure to supply risk is assumed to stem from the industrial 
environment (outside-in) in which a firm operates. These factors comprise 
complexity and technological change. On the other hand, supply risk is 
hypothesized as stemming from the major strategic decisions that a firm can 
take (inside-out) such as business and geographic diversification strategies. 
Moreover, the hypotheses distinguish the effect of change over time within a 
firm on supply risk exposure (positive) from the effect of differences between 
firms on supply risk exposure (positive and negative). The main arguments for 
the positive association between change over time and supply risk exposure 
revolve around the uncertainties associated with the necessary alteration of the 
supply chain structure in response to the change. With respect to differences 
between firms, the same arguments hold for the positive association between 
the industrial environment and a firm’s exposure to supply risk, whereas for the 
negative association between strategic decisions and exposure to supply risk, 
the arguments reflect the accumulated experience, the higher reputation and 
power of these firms, as well as their greater operational flexibility. To shed 
light on the relationships information on supply risk has been extracted from a 
firm’s risk disclosure as presented in Item 1.A of its 10-K report and quantified 
by means of a sLDA previously developed for this purpose. This information 
has been augmented by the financial data describing the firm’s strategic 
decisions and its industrial environment. The predicted relationships are tested 
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by means of a multi-level regression model which explicitly distinguishes 
different levels (time and firm) which are present in the data set. The results 
suggest that the industrial environment to a large extent determines a firm’s 
exposure to supply risk, while the strategic decisions are a less important factor 
for the explanation of a firm’s risk exposure. More importantly, the distinction 
of a “within-effect” from a “between-effect” is crucial for strategic decisions. 
While an increase in business diversification is positively associated with a 
firm’s exposure to supply risk, a higher degree is negatively associated with it. 
These results provide several important contributions to the literature on supply 
risk. First, the distinction of the different levels allows the integration of those 
opposing empirical results reported on thus far and exemplifies the necessity to 
be clear on the level for which a given theory is valid. Second, the results 
explain that the exposure to supply risk is pre-determined by the industrial 
environment which a single firm cannot alter. This result accumulates further 
empirical evidence that firms must be prepared for the need to respond to such 
external uncertainty. Third, this study proposes a new measurement of a firm’s 
potential exposure to supply risk based on a textual analysis. Although 10-K 
reports have been extensively studied in the accounting and finance literature, 
they have not been exploited as a source of information in operations 
management. For managers the implications of this study are twofold: 
Managers must be aware of the double-edged sword offered by business 
diversification. Although an increase in business diversification may increase 
their firm’s exposure to supply risk in the short term, such business 
diversification is nevertheless an eminently suitable strategy for tackling supply 
chain risk in the long term. Furthermore, the observation that exposure to 
supply risk largely stems from the industrial environment means that firms 
must keep sufficient resources on hand in order to react to unforeseen changes.  
Chapter 4 deals in more detail with the interplay among factors like a firm’s 
exposure to supply chain risk, its risk mitigation strategies, and its performance. 
The study has been motivated by the observation that firms are under severe 
pressure to simultaneously lower their operating costs and also manage their 
risk exposure. This study analyzes the kind of risk management strategy a firm 
should deploy against a given type of risk to ensure that performance is not (or 
only weakly) impaired. Against the backdrop of information processing theory, 
this study investigates supply- and demand-related risks as typical types of risk 
and capacity and inventory as types of operational slack in response to these 
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types of risks. From a contingency perspective, operational slack must be 
matched to the type of risk in order to be efficient. More specifically, 
operational slack mitigates the negative relationship between a firm’s exposure 
to supply risk and its performance, but inevitably exacerbates the negative 
relationship between demand risk and performance. What is more, inventory 
and capacity are hypothesized to have a joint effect on the relationship between 
the type of risk and performance which is larger than the sum of their parts. To 
shed light on these relationships, the previous sLDA has been employed to 
quantify supply- and demand-related risks in Item 1.A. Inventory and capacity, 
as well as performance, have been measured on the basis of a firm’s financial 
data. The hypothesized relationships are tested utilizing a fixed effects 
regression model. The results suggest that exposure to supply- and demand-
related risks is indeed negative for a firm’s performance. The effect of supply-
related risk on a firm’s performance is, however, mitigated by both, inventory 
and capacity, whereas the effect of demand-related risk on a firm’s 
performance is exacerbated only by inventory. Finally, if a firm is exposed to 
supply risk and simultaneously holds adequate inventory and capacity, both 
their mitigating effects on the association between supply risk exposure and 
performance of a firm amplify each other in such a way that their joint effect is 
greater than the sum of their parts and a firm’s supply risk exposure is reduced 
even further. These results represent a number of important contributions to the 
literature on supply chain risk management. First, this study develops a new 
empirical measurement of a firm’s potential exposure to two distinct types of 
supply chain risk based on secondary data which has not been considered, yet. 
To this end, the study relies on Item 1.A as prime source of information. 
Second, this study accumulates evidence that the type of supply chain risk and 
the respective mitigation strategy must be carefully matched to each other. 
Third, balancing inventory and capacity against each other appears more 
beneficial than relying only on a single type of slack. For managers, this study 
presents important guidelines for the decision on which risk mitigation strategy 
should be pursued. If a firm’s managers identify mainly supply-related risk, 
then they should select operational slack as the best policy. However, if their 
main fear is demand-related risk, then they should avoid operational slack. 
Furthermore, just focusing on one type of slack is an inefficient policy. A firm 
which selects the right level of inventory and capacity slack will be more 
successful compared to a firm which just maintains a single type of slack in 
response to supply-related risk.  
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Overall, these three essays taken together make an important contribution to the 
literature on supply chain risk management. From an empirical perspective, this 
dissertation suggests positive impetus for future research relying on the 
qualitative sections of 10-K reports as a source of information. Automated text 
analysis tools greatly facilitate the analysis and allow the reliable information 
extraction on a large scale. The information extracted deepens the 
understanding of a firm’s exposure to various types of risk. On the basis of 
these new empirical measurements, this dissertation can advance the theoretical 
understanding of supply chain risk and provide new insights on the sources of a 
firm’s potential risk exposure while also suggesting how a firm can efficiently 
cope with its risk exposure. 
5.2 Limitations 
Although this dissertation makes an important contribution to theory and 
practice, its results must be viewed in the light of certain limitations with 
respect to the data and the methodology. First, the dissertation heavily depends 
on the corporate risk disclosure in 10-K reports. However, the risk disclosure 
reflects only the risk that a firm has identified and found sufficiently probable. 
In this regard, firm may evaluate incorrectly or be even unaware of some risks. 
Furthermore, managers have considerable discretion in deciding what 
constitutes a material risk. Other incentives might lie behind the decision on 
what risk to disclose. Quite a few drivers for this decision have been identified 
(e.g., the number of following analysts and their opinion, auditors’ reports, 
prior managerial experience), though this list is far from being exhaustive. Thus 
although studies in the field of accounting support the assumption that a firm’s 
risk disclosure reflects its real risk exposure, this assumption requires critical 
examination. Second, the dissertation uses advanced text mining tools for the 
analysis of the 10-K reports. Although these tools have been developed by prior 
research and do lead to reliable results, they nevertheless build on stochastic 
models and make predictions accordingly (e.g., is a given term a location, or 
what topic does a certain term belong to). Moreover, the application of these 
tools is highly case-specific. In this dissertation, a measurement similar to the 
tf-idf-metric has been used to identify the most important words in a firm’s risk 
disclosure. There are no clear guidelines as to which parts of speech or how 
many terms should be considered for the automated analysis of texts. 
Consequently, some researchers even refer to the application of text mining 
tools as an art, even though the tools themselves are built on scientific models. 
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The implication is that different researchers might come to different 
conclusions if they apply the same tools using a different set of words or other 
modeling assumptions. Third, the dissertation relies on secondary data only of 
manufacturing firms publicly listed in the United States. In other countries, 
other challenges might be regarded as a risk. Also, privately owned firms may 
have different values and pursue other objectives, with the result that different 
risks are relevant. Finally, other industries might have a different risk exposure, 
may be unable to employ operational slack, or find that other risks are relevant. 
Therefore the results are only generalizable within these boundaries and other 
studies with a different scope might come to different conclusions. Fourth, the 
dissertation uses regression models to derive its conclusions. The estimation 
models deployed (difference-in-difference, fixed effects) apply a robust 
specification (clustered robust standard errors, time controls, firm controls) and 
provide robust estimates even if the model was misspecified (e.g., due to 
omitted variable bias, heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, wrong functional 
form). Nevertheless, misspecifications might still distort the results. Besides, 
the results only indicate a correlation between the independent and the 
dependent variables, but not necessarily the direction of this effect. As a result, 
the dissertation can only provide empirical evidence on the association between 
the constructs but is not in a position to make causal claims about the direction 
of the effects identified.  
5.3 Future research directions 
Despite its shortcomings, this thesis sheds light on supply chain risk 
management from a new angle. Scrutinizing unstructured texts, converting the 
data into information, and using this as input for advanced empirical analyses 
allows the derivation of new insights into supply chain risk management. The 
data provide the opportunity to generate additional knowledge for future 
research. First, future researchers can further explore the disclosure of supply 
chain-related risks. Since this dissertation has identified the major supply chain-
related risks, as in the next step these risks can be further clustered to derive a 
taxonomy of these risks. One potential approach could be to also include more 
detailed sections of the textual disclosure on supply chain risk in the analysis 
utilizing a topic model. Such an analysis would identify different topics within 
the disclosure of supply chain risk. Each of these “second level” topics could 
then be interpreted as one element in an empirical taxonomy of the overall 
supply chain risk. Second, a list of keywords could be defined to validate 
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existing risk typologies. In such a project, the potential exposure of firms as 
disclosed in the 10-K report could be compared to the exposure suggested by 
existing typologies. In addition, the frequency of types of risk could be used to 
enrich the information content. Third, prior research clusters firms based on the 
strategies that they pursue. One prominent example is the distinction between 
product-differentiation and cost-leadership firms. The same idea could be 
pursued, but based on supply chain risk. It would be possible to compute 
pairwise similarities among all the textual descriptions of the supply chain-
related risks that firms have disclosed. Based on the resulting pairwise 
similarity matrix, several clusters of firms could be identified. Intra- and inter-
group analyses could well generate important insights. As regards the former, 
the coherence of a group could be assessed with respect to other relevant 
variables such as performance or operational slack. If they differ, a theory on 
the reasons for these differences could be developed. The inter-group analysis 
could reveal whether firms with different risk exposures are inclined to make 
different strategic decisions. Fourth, the production location data could be 
further refined by including physical distances or product flows. To derive such 
distances, the states’ geographic positions can be looked up and the distances 
between them computed. For the derivation of product flows, the production 
locations could be linked to the names of subsidiaries which often reveal the 
product segment to which the respective subsidiary belongs. As a result, the 
production networks of firms could be analyzed on a more fine-grained level. 
Fifth, scanning the entire 10-K report of a firm instead of merely dedicated 
sections, all the firm names could be identified. The occurrence of a firm name 
would hint at a relationship between these firms. This would allow the 
construction of a network of interrelated firms which could be used to 
investigate the innovation potential of such firm networks. Sixth, and moving 
one step further away from 10-K reports, other firm publications such as 
sustainability reports or news releases could be explored using text mining 
tools. For example, one could try to find similar news releases. If two firms 
publish two very similar news releases, these firms are likely to announce either 
a joint project or are competitors offering a very similar product and addressing 
similar customer needs.  
In sum, this dissertation mines the texts of 10-K reports in order to construct a 
measurement of the potential risk exposure of a firm. Such a measurement 
allows new insights into what type of external contingencies could turn into 
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risk exposure, which conditions make a firm extraordinarily vulnerable to 
external threats, and how firms can deal efficiently with such a potential risk 
exposure. The dissertation finally highlights that the analysis of textual data in 
general and of 10-K reports in particular represent promising avenues for 
further empirical research in operations management. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Derivation of the data set analyzed in chapter 4 
The final data set was derived in a five-step procedure as Figure A-1 illustrates. 
In the first step, 26,749 annual reports of 4,155 firms meeting the selection 
criteria were downloaded via the SEC’s EDGAR database. In the second step, 
the risk items were extracted. To do so, Item 1.A was identified by a 
combination of text search and visual characteristics and was subsequently 
truncated from 24,317 (91 %) annual reports (4,003 firms). The remaining parts 
and all other annual reports were discarded. Furthermore, visual features (i.e., 
bold, italics, underlined, and capital letters or a combination thereof) that 
fulfilled the SEC’s requirement of presenting the information clearly and 
concisely were used to then identify and extract the risk items from these risk 
sections.  
Figure A-1: Multi-step procedure for the derivation of the final data set 
 
Downloaded reports
Observations: 26,749
Firms: 4,155
Extracted risk items
Observations: 24,317 
Firms: 4,003
Cleansed risk items
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• Visual characteristics of risk section
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• Introductory sentences and standard language
• Risk sections with less than three risk items
Match financials and drop observations with missing or excess financials
• Based on firm identifier (CIK) and financial yearend date
• Missing relevant financials
• Negative balance sheet (assets) and income sheet items (sales, cost of goods sold)
• Minimum number of observations per firm and industry-year
• ROA above 500% or below -100%
Lag risk items by one period
• Risk: period t-1
• Mitigation and performance: period t
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In the third step, the risk extraction was further cleansed, leaving 22,505 firm-
years (3,823 firms). Firm-years which contained less than three risk items were 
dropped, and boilerplate language and introductory sentences were deleted. The 
reason for this cleansing is twofold. On the one hand, these firms were likely to 
state that they were not required to disclose a risk section. On the other hand, 
focus was on keeping a high data quality by being overly conservative. Fourth, 
a firm’s financials from Compustat were matched to the risk disclosure from 
EDGAR based on the CIK and the date of the fiscal year end (+/–7 days). 
Observations with relevant financials that were missing or implausible (i.e., 
negative book value of assets, negative cost of goods sold, negative sales) were 
dropped. In addition, firms with a return on assets of below –100 % and above 
500 % were discarded, because such returns do not represent a sustainable 
long-term profit. Finally, all firms with less than three observations or operating 
in industries with less than three firms in a given year were also dropped. 
Remaining were 12,246 firm-years from 1,692 firms over the time period 
between 2006 and 2016. Fifth, additional observations were lost because the 
risk variables are lagged by one period to relieve endogeneity concerns in the 
estimation model. 
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Appendix B: Preprocessing of text 
In order to derive meaningful topics, the text from the risk items had to be 
further cleansed. All digits were removed and all words were lemmatized 
reducing inflected verbs to infinitive or nouns in plural to singular. In contrast 
to stemming, lemmatizing bases on morphological rules and is less aggressive. 
Furthermore, only verbs, adjectives, and nouns (with the exception of proper 
nouns) were considered. In addition, several words were eliminated using the 
following rules. First, all stopwords (i.e., words that are very common in the 
English language) were eliminated. Besides already excluded determiners or 
prepositions, the list of stopwords (319 in total) comprises verbs like “describe” 
or “become”. Second, additional 34 words that are very common to the risk 
disclosure were disregarded (e.g., risk, uncertainty, negative). Third, all words 
consisting of three letters or less were excluded. Fourth, the 15 most frequently 
occurring words in the risk disclosure of a given year were neglected (e.g., 
business, product, result, affect, or operation). The following example 
illustrates the necessity for a time-dependent corpus of relevant words: In 2008, 
the word “condition” enters the list of the most common words. This coincides 
with the risk of worsening economic conditions due to the financial crisis in 
2008 which many firms mention. Using a static list across all periods would 
have resulted in the exclusion of “condition” in all periods. 
Figure A-2: Preprocessing of the corpus of text from the risk items to enable 
automated topic modeling 
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